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h afez Ghanem delivers a thorough assessment of the economic di-
mensions of the  Arab Spring, beginning with political developments 
since the revolutions and the economic impact of changes in legal 
and institutional frameworks.  Arab economies grew at healthy rates 
before the revolts, but the benefits of economic growth were unfairly 
distributed. The politically connected reaped great benefits, while 
educated youth could not find decent jobs, and the poor and middle 
class struggled to make ends meet. 
Ghanem advises the Arab Spring countries to adopt new economic 
policies and programs that enhance inclusiveness, expand the middle 
class, and foster growth in undeveloped regions. Key elements include 
strengthening economic institutions, developing small businesses, re-
forming the education system to better prepare Arab youth for the 
modern labor market, promoting gender equality with the objective 
of raising female labor market participation rates, and setting up pro-
grams for rural and regional development to reduce inequality and 
eliminate extreme poverty.
hafe z ghanem  is vice president for the Middle East and 
North Africa at the World Bank and a nonresident senior fellow in 
Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution. He is 
a former assistant director general of the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization and a former country director at the World Bank. He is 
coauthor of After the Spring: Economic Transitions in the Arab World 
and author of numerous articles on Arab economies.
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This book has a simple message: It is high time for Arab governments 
and their international partners to focus on the economy and on build-
ing inclusive institutions. An almost exclusive focus on divisive political 
and identity questions since the Arab Spring started in 2010 has con-
tributed to the current malaise. Peace, stability, and democracy in the 
Arab world will be achieved only if all Arab citizens, especially youth, 
are fully included in their countries’ economy and society and if they 
feel that their voices are heard in the various institutions of governance. 
A submessage of this book is that economic growth on its own is not 
enough. It must be accompanied by social justice.
“The people want to bring down the regime” was the slogan adopted 
by the young men and women who led the Arab Spring uprisings. The 
world held its breath as millions of Tunisians and Egyptians poured 
into Bourguiba Avenue in downtown Tunis and into Tahrir Square in 
Cairo, demanding an end to autocratic rule and the installation of dem-
ocratic governance. And the regimes were brought down. Those were 
exciting days. The democracy fever spread to Bahrain, Yemen, Jordan, 
and Morocco; massive crowds of demonstrators took to the streets 
demanding bread, freedom, social justice, and human dignity. Western 
powers provided military support to an uprising in Libya that deposed 
a dictator who had come to power through a coup in 1969. And Syri-
ans rose to rid themselves of an autocratic dynasty that had ruled them 
since 1971. Optimism was the order of the day. Arabs were finally wak-
ing up and joining the growing ranks of middle-income countries—like 
those of Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia—who have transited 
from autocracy to democracy.
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But can a country with no democratic tradition and with weak insti-
tutions become a well-functioning democracy and improve the lives of 
its citizens over night? The answer is obviously no. Democratic transi-
tions take years, even decades, to succeed, and there are many twists 
and turns along the way. Moreover, they can be costly and require 
heavy human and economic sacrifices. Ask any Arab today if he or she 
feels that the region is better off than before the Arab Spring. What do 
you think the answer will be?
Nevertheless, the Arab Spring has brought about a significant, and 
probably irreversible, change in Arab societies and body politic. I 
recently asked a Cairo taxi driver what he thought of President el-Sissi. 
He was full of praise for the newly elected president. However, he was 
quick to add, “you know we have overthrown two presidents before him 
(referring to Mohamed Morsi and Hosni Mubarak); so if this one does 
not deliver we can overthrow him, too.” Holding leaders accountable 
is important for economic, political, and social development. The Arab 
world appears to be moving toward more open and inclusive governance. 
But how long will it take for this new spirit to provide results in terms of 
peace, stability, control of corruption, and economic well-being?
While excessive pessimism should be avoided, it is clear that the 
Arab transition has taken on a violent, and even scary, character. Thou-
sands have been killed, millions of homes have been destroyed, and 
more than 15 million Arabs have become either refugees or internally 
displaced people. Relative to its size, the Arab region has the largest 
number of failed and fragile states. One fact tells it all. There are thou-
sands of Yemeni refugees in Somalia (an African failed state) today. 
How long will the chaos in the Arab world last? What can be done to 
end violent extremism? Can Christians, Jews, Sunnis, Shias, and the 
myriad of other religions and sects that exist in the Middle East ever 
live peacefully together? Will anyone be able to stop the organization 
of the Islamic state, or Daesh, as it is known in Arabic? Will Iraq con-
tinue to exist as a nation state? Is the violence in Syria going to end in 
our lifetime? Will Lebanon ever go back to some semblance of nor-
malcy, with a functioning parliament that meets regularly and is able 
to pass legislation—and even to elect a president? Are the Arab abso-
lute monarchies sustainable? Will Egypt and Tunisia remain relatively 
stable? Should Yemen and Libya be written off as unsalvageable failed 
states? Can the Arab-Israeli conflict be resolved? The answers to those 
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questions are important for the world. Turmoil in the Arab region has 
global spill-over effects. Thousands of would-be illegal migrants perish 
every year as they try to cross the Mediterranean to get into Europe. 
Data on illegal immigration are difficult to obtain, but it seems reason-
able to assume that not everybody dies or gets caught and that many 
thousands succeed in illegally entering Europe. Arabs are the first vic-
tims of violent extremism, but they are not the only victims. People in 
Europe, the United States, and even Japan have suffered from terrorism 
at the hands of Middle Eastern extremist groups.
This book is not about terrorism or violent extremism. Moreover, 
it is not about politics nor about democratic transitions. It is about 
economics. However, I do believe that achieving inclusive economic 
growth would contribute to peace, stability, and an end to violence 
in the Arab world. People who feel that their societies provide equal 
opportunities to all and that their voices are heard in policy discus-
sions, who have good jobs, benefit from quality public services, and 
have hope for a better future for themselves and their children usually 
think twice before risking their and their families’ standard of living by 
joining violent or extremist organizations.
Economic growth and social justice are not silver bullets that will, 
on their own, lead to peace, stability, and democracy in the Arab 
world. But economic programs that contribute to greater inclusion and 
higher standards of living should be part of any policy package that 
aims at peace and stability. The current focus on security measures and 
political arrangements is not sufficient and should be complemented 
by economic and social reforms. Successful political transitions in the 
Arab world will need to be underpinned by transitions to more inclu-
sive economic and social orders.
Inclusive, or shared, growth is defined as growth that leads to higher 
income and better living standards for all the population and not just 
the richest group. Empirically, the degree of inclusiveness is often mea-
sured by seeing whether the income of the bottom 40 percent of the 
population has increased and, if so, by how much. Inclusive growth 
also implies an expansion of the middle class and an improvement in its 
living standards. Hence an alternative way of measuring inclusiveness 
is to measure changes in the size of the middle class.
The Arab Spring countries grew at respectable rates of around 4–5 
percent a year during the decade preceding the uprisings. Yet all polls 
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showed increasing dissatisfaction with economic conditions during this 
relatively high growth period. This dissatisfaction could be explained 
by the fact that growth was not inclusive, and therefore most people’s 
lives were not touched by it. Moreover, people felt that inequality 
increased, as a small minority, usually well connected to the political 
elite, received most of the benefits from growth. The sense of unfairness 
may explain why youth insisted so strongly on the importance of social 
justice during the Arab Spring uprisings.
Youth, smallholder farmers, and women suffer most from economic 
and social exclusion in the Arab world. Young people face huge prob-
lems finding decent jobs or housing to enable them to get married. They 
feel that they are excluded from the various decisionmaking processes 
and are not allowed to provide any input into the decisions that affect 
their well-being. Poverty in the Arab world is mostly a rural phenome-
non, and smallholder farmers are the bulk of the rural poor. Most of the 
lagging regions in the Arab world, for example, Upper Egypt and West-
ern Tunisia, are populated by smallholder farmers who live under very 
difficult conditions. Women are an important excluded group. Female 
labor force participation rates in the Arab region are the lowest in the 
entire world. Arab women have limited access to productive assets and 
to credit. Women farmers are a particularly vulnerable group.
In this book I suggest that to achieve inclusive growth, and partic-
ularly to deal with the grievances of the three most excluded groups, 
Arab countries need to focus on four priorities: institutional reforms 
to improve implementation of policies and programs; reforms of the 
business environment, with a special emphasis on developing small and 
medium-size enterprises (SMEs); rural development and support to lag-
ging regions; and improving the quality of education.
Weak institutions and inadequate governance arrangements in Arab 
countries lead to the adoption of plans and policies that, while they 
may be technically sound, do not necessarily reflect the needs of differ-
ent stakeholders. Those institutional and governance weaknesses imply 
that the plans, programs, and projects are often not implemented. Lack 
of implementation leads to lower investment and growth. There is a 
need to render economic institutions in the Arab world more inclusive 
and responsive to citizens’ needs. Arab countries could benefit from the 
example of successful East Asian economies that put in place consulta-
tive processes (including different government departments, the private 
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sector, and civil society) to agree on national development plans and 
monitor their execution. Effective implementation needs accountabil-
ity. Each executing agency in charge of a particular sector or policy 
issue should be held accountable for implementation. There also needs 
to be a supervisory mechanism that secures the accountability of the 
institutions and ensures that progress is being made. Institutions usu-
ally respond to pressure both from the top (president or prime minister) 
and from the bottom (citizens).
A focus on expanding small businesses and the SME sector would help 
grow the middle class and provide greater opportunities for young men 
and women as business people as well as employees. Real SMEs are rare 
in the Arab world. Arab economies are dominated by large firms, often 
operating in sectors that are protected from foreign as well as domestic 
competition, and by micro enterprises that mostly operate in the infor-
mal sector. Those micro enterprises use low technology and therefore 
provide low wages, and they are predominantly family affairs. They pro-
vide livelihoods for millions of Arabs, but they do not offer decent jobs. 
Developing the Arab SME sector would require reforms to the business 
environment and competition policies to level the playing field and allow 
SMEs to grow and compete with large firms, as well as special programs 
to help SMEs with access to technology, markets, and credit.
Achieving inclusive growth requires paying particular attention to 
lagging regions that depend mainly on agriculture for livelihood. It 
is no coincidence that the Arab Spring started in Sidi Bouzid, a poor 
region in rural Tunisia. Most agricultural producers in the Arab world 
are smallholder family farmers with plots of less than five hectares. 
Hence a program for inclusive growth needs to pay special attention 
to smallholder family farmers. There are six areas where governments 
could intervene to support smallholder family farmers and help increase 
their yields: linking smallholders to domestic and international markets 
to increase their share in value added; adapting financial and invest-
ment services to the needs of smallholder family farmers; improving 
access to land and securing titles; increasing investment in research 
and extension and adapting them to the needs of smallholders; helping 
farmers adapt to climate change; and launching special programs for 
women farmers and youth.
There appears to be a disparity between the skills that Arab youth 
acquire at schools and universities and those required by employers. 
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That is why it is also important to consider reforms of education sys-
tems. Access to education has improved dramatically in the Arab world 
over the past two or three decades, but quality has not improved and 
may even have deteriorated. Students in any of the Arab countries score 
below the average level on international science and mathematics tests. 
Low quality of education has an economic cost, as Arab youth are not 
as productive and competitive as their counterparts around the world. 
It also has a political cost, as young people who spent many years in 
the education system are disgruntled because they cannot find jobs that 
fit with their expectations. Opinion polls indicate that Arab youth are 
less happy and feel less in control of their lives than youth in other 
parts of the world. To improve the quality of education, Arab countries 
need to adjust curricula and teaching methods to reflect the skills and 
competencies demanded by today’s globalized labor market. There is 
also a need for institutional reforms that hold schools and teachers 
accountable for student learning.
Peace and stability in the Arab world are global public goods. There-
fore, it is in the interest of the international community to help Arab 
governments achieve inclusive growth that would contribute to peace 
and stability. The international community needs to remain engaged in 
the region. However, it may also be necessary to reexamine the nature 
of this engagement and reorient aid flows toward areas and sectors that 
directly enhance economic inclusiveness. Examples of such areas would 
be institution building, support to small-scale enterprises, agriculture 
and rural development, and education.
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2
Spring, but No Flowers
Four years after the start of the Arab revolutions the results are discour-
aging. Today, most people try to avoid using the term “Arab Spring.” 
Very little has been achieved in the area of democratic reforms. Instead 
of building vibrant and stable democracies, most of the countries of the 
Arab Spring revolutions have entered a phase of violence and instability. 
Political turmoil has been associated with macroeconomic instability, 
low growth, and high unemployment. The revolutionaries’ dreams for 
more freedom and dignity, and more bread and social justice, appear 
now even less attainable than before the uprisings.
Of course, country circumstances, and hence outcomes, are different. 
For a while, before terrorist attacks on the Bardo museum and at Port el 
Kantaoui near Sousse, Tunisia seemed well on its way to becoming a suc-
cess story. It achieved significant progress toward democracy after a long 
and painful transition. Morocco, where the king is leading reform from 
the top, may be another exception. In general, among the revolting Arab 
countries, Jordan and Morocco, the two kingdoms, have been more suc-
cessful in maintaining stability and economic growth than the republics.
Are the discouraging results so far surprising? Probably not. Arab 
societies are polarized between Islamists and secularists and are 
also divided along religious, sectarian, and in some countries ethnic 
grounds. Highly polarized societies typically have a much harder time 
transitioning to democracy.1 Arab countries have virtually no experi-
ence or culture of democracy. And the institutions necessary for demo-
cratic governance—for example, political parties and other civil society 
1. Grand (2014) develops the argument on why transitions are more difficult in 
polarized societies, using examples from third-wave transitions to democracy.
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organizations—are either nonexistent or very weak.2 Under the circum-
stances, the euphoria and bubbling optimism of 2010–11 appear to 
have been more the result of wishful thinking than of a serious analysis 
of the chances for a quick transition to democracy in the Arab world.
But excessive pessimism today may also be a mistake. In 2010–11 
Arab populations, especially youth, expressed their desire for more 
freedom and dignity as well as more bread and social justice. This 
marked the end of Arab exceptionalism, that is, the view that Arabs 
were somehow different from other peoples because they placed less 
value on political freedom and civil liberties.
The Arab Spring is not a season. It is a first and important step 
on the long road to a new political, social, and economic order. As 
described by Amin and others (2012), this road will be long and tor-
tuous with several twists and turns, and even setbacks, along the way. 
Political transitions in the Arab world will take many years and maybe 
even decades, but they will ultimately succeed as they have in other 
parts of the world. There is no such thing as Arab exceptionalism.
For this long transition to succeed with minimum human and social 
costs, political reforms must be accompanied by measures intended to 
grow the economy and enhance equality and social justice. Economic 
and political inclusion need to move hand in hand. Sharp divisions 
over issues of selection of political systems and of national identity are 
likely to continue in the Arab world, and the current political polar-
ization will not disappear anytime soon. However, consensus could be 
achieved over issues of economic development and inclusive growth.
Leaders of Arab countries in transition have so far put economic 
issues on a back burner and focused almost exclusively on highly divi-
sive political questions such as the role of religion in politics. It is time 
for a change in priorities. Faster and more inclusive economic growth 
would help achieve political stability and create the social cohesion nec-
essary for building consensus and succeeding in the political transition.
2. I stress here the importance of institutions and culture for successful tran-
sitions. But other analysts have emphasized different reasons for the difficulty of 
democratic transformation in the Arab world. Elbadawi and Makdisi (2011) stress 
the role of oil wealth and of the Arab-Israeli conflict in hindering the development 
of Arab democracy. Wittes (2008) emphasizes the role of oil rents and geopolitical 
rivalries in supporting the authoritarian status quo. 
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The Secularist-Islamist Divide
Arab democratization is particularly difficult because of the high degree 
of polarization between nationalist-secularists and Islamists. The two 
groups have very different visions of the type of country and society 
they want to live in. A Tunisian who believes in secularism and nation-
alism along the lines advocated by the late president Habib Bourguiba 
would develop a vision of an independent Tunisian state very close to 
southern European models. On the other hand, a Tunisian Islamist 
would dream of living in a Tunisia that is part of a greater caliphate 
similar to the one built by the early followers of the prophet Mohamed. 
Constructing a stable and liberal democracy would require that both 
sides make compromises to reach consensus or that one side succeeds in 
making the other disappear. Regardless of whether one of the options 
may be morally superior to the other, it is clear that neither of those 
options is easy, and certainly neither can be achieved in a short period 
of time. In view of the deep schism between nationalists and Islamists, 
Tunisia’s achievements over the past four years are remarkable.
Arab nationalist movements started in the late nineteenth century 
in reaction to European and Ottoman imperialism and continued 
throughout most of the twentieth century. Nationalism in the Maghreb 
expressed itself against French, and to a lesser extent Spanish, pres-
ence.3 In Algeria, Amir Abdel Kadir led an armed resistance to the 
French in the 1830s and 1840s. In Morocco, the revolt of Abdel Karim 
al-Khattabi led to the eviction of the Spanish army from the Rif Moun-
tains in the early 1920s. Both revolts were ultimately put down by the 
French military.
The twentieth century, and especially the period following the First 
World War, witnessed the development of urban-based associations 
and nationalist political parties seeking independence. Those move-
ments were heavily influenced by ideals of nationalism and socialism 
brought home by the thousands of Arab soldiers who served in the 
French army during the war.
The first such party was the Constitution (destour, in Arabic) Party 
in Tunisia, which was created in 1920. Bourguiba, a French-educated 
3. For a detailed description of the nationalist movements in the Maghreb, see 
Willis (2014).
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lawyer who was the first president of independent Tunisia, rose up the 
ranks of the Destour but ultimately managed to break up the party and 
create the Neo-Destour in 1934. The Neo-Destour was much more 
vocal in its demands for independence and more willing to directly 
confront the French colonial authorities.
In Morocco, the National Action Bloc was created in the 1930s and 
transformed itself into the Independence (istiqlal, in Arabic) Party in 
1944. Like the Neo-Destour, Morocco’s Istiqlal was mostly an urban 
party supported by the new intellectual and business elites.
Modern nationalist sentiment in Egypt dates back to the late nine-
teenth century, when Ahmed Orabi, at the time head of the Egyptian 
armed forces, revolted in 1879 against the khedive, who represented 
the Ottoman Empire.4 Like Abdel Kadir and Abdel Karim al-Khattabi, 
Orabi’s revolt failed, as the British intervened to support the khedive. 
Orabi’s army was defeated in 1882, he was exiled, and Egypt became 
a British protectorate.
Orabi’s nationalist mantle was taken over by Saad Zaghloul, a civil-
ian, who started a revolution against British colonial rule in 1919. 
Zaghloul established the Wafd, which continued to be Egypt’s largest 
party, winning 179 parliamentary seats out of 211 in the 1924 elec-
tions and 157 seats (with 89 percent of the vote) in 1936, until it was 
dissolved by Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952. Throughout its history the 
Wafd was in constant conflict with the king and with the British, who 
effectively ruled Egypt despite its nominal independence in 1922.
The situation in Jordan and Yemen was different.5 Yemen was 
divided into North and South. The North became independent of Otto-
man rule in 1918 and was ruled by hereditary imams until a revolution 
toppled the system in 1962 (with Egyptian military support). The South 
was under British rule and then local communist rule in the 1960s. The 
two parts of Yemen were united in 1990. In addition to the North-
South divide, Yemen is also divided along sectarian lines between Sun-
nis and Shias.
Unlike Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen, which have a relatively 
long history as separate nation states, Jordan was created in 1922 as 
4. See Ghanem (2014a) for a more detailed exposition of Egypt’s political econ-
omy and history.
5. See Owen (2012).
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a prize for Amir Abdullah, of the Hashemite family of Arabia, for his 
support to the allies against the Ottomans during the First World War. 
Jordan was part of the British mandate that covered Palestine and only 
became an independent kingdom under Abdullah in 1946. Jordan’s 
kings, especially King Hussein, who ruled from 1953 to 1999, led the 
nationalist movement with strong support from Bedouin tribes.
As described by Muasher (2014), Arab independence struggles took 
a distinctly nationalist flavor, and their leaders adopted secular values. 
Owen (2012) argues that for the first generation of postindependence 
Arab leaders, establishment and protection of national sovereignty was 
the most important goal. This necessitated the expansion of the mili-
tary and the development of a middle-class officer cadre with an intense 
sense of patriotism. The military ruled directly in Egypt (under Nasser, 
Anwar Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak) and Yemen (under Ali Abdullah 
Saleh) and played a key role in protecting the regimes in Tunisia, Jor-
dan, and Morocco, where President Bourguiba, King Hussein, and 
King Hassan II established themselves as leaders of the nationalist 
movements in their respective countries.
Arab nationalism did not embrace democracy. Postindependence gov-
ernments questioned the legitimacy of democratic governance because it 
was supported by elites who collaborated with colonial powers. On the 
other hand, the nationalist movement was a force for modernization. 
It called for the separation of state and religion, greater social justice, 
women’s rights, and support for a cultural and artistic renaissance.
Islamism could be viewed as the antithesis of Arab nationalism. 
Modern political Islam has its roots in Egypt, where it started in 1928 
with the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna. The 
Brotherhood continues to exist in Egypt today, although it has been 
designated a terrorist organization and banned by the administration of 
President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi. It has offshoots across the Arab world. 
It is present in Jordan, where its political arm, the Islamic Action Front, 
is an important opposition actor. Morocco has two Islamist parties: 
the moderate Justice and Development Party is currently leading the 
coalition government, while the hard-line Justice and Charity Party is 
not a legally recognized party and does not participate in the formal 
political process. Inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, Tunisian Isla-
mists founded the Movement of the Islamic Tendency in 1981 and then 
changed its name to Ennahda, which means renaissance in Arabic, in 
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1989. Ennahda is participating in Tunisia’s coalition government. Islah 
is the Brotherhood’s offshoot in Yemen, and it joined the government 
and the national dialogue after the 2011 revolution.
The Brotherhood was created as a pan-Islamic social and politi-
cal movement, partly in response to the fall of the Ottoman Empire 
and the abolition of the caliphate in Turkey by Mustapha Kemal 
 Ataturk. This abolition was seen as an important setback by many 
pious  Muslims, including al-Banna, who considered the caliphate a 
necessity  in Islam. This put the Brotherhood in direct confrontation 
with Arab nationalists.6
The Brotherhood was based on two important principles. The first is 
the adoption of sharia law as the basis for conducting the affairs of state 
and society. For the Brotherhood, Islam is a state as well as a religion. 
This is sometimes understood to imply that secular ideas are inherently 
un-Islamic and therefore Muslims who call for a secular state could 
be considered nonbelievers. The Brotherhood holds conservative views 
on gender equality and the role of women in society. They argue for a 
“modest” dress for women and the separation of the sexes at schools 
and workplaces. They also believe that cultural products should reflect 
the Islamic nature of society, and they have called for censorship of 
books and movies that they consider un-Islamic. Thus the Brotherhood 
has often been at odds with Arab cultural and artistic elites.
The second principle is to unify Islamic states and free them from 
foreign imperialism. Hence the Brotherhood considers any individual 
Arab country as just one small part of a large Islamic empire (or caliph-
ate) stretching from Spain to Indonesia. A previous general guide (or 
chairman) of the Brotherhood in Egypt, Mohamed Akef, generated an 
outcry when he stated in an interview with the magazine Rosa al Yusuf, 
“To hell with Egypt.”7 Of course, he meant to emphasize the pan- 
Islamic ambitions of his organization, but nationalists interpreted his 
statement as meaning that the Brotherhood does not care about Egypt.
The Brotherhood has officially announced that it supports democ-
racy and rejects violence. However, its detractors argue that it is dif-
ficult to reconcile democratic values that imply that the people have 
the final say regarding their affairs with an Islamic approach that 
6. For a history of the Brotherhood, see Wickham (2013).
7. Shoeb (2006). 
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believes that God’s word as presented in the Quran and the Hadith 
(the Prophet’s sayings) should be the basis of all constitutions and laws. 
The Brotherhood’s stated belief that Islam is a state as well as a religion 
seems incompatible with democratic governance.
The Brotherhood’s doctrine seems to have embraced violence and 
the concept of jihad, at least in its initial years. According to Hassan 
al-Banna, jihad was the obligation of every Muslim. In one of his tracts 
he states that
today the Muslims, as you know, are compelled to humble them-
selves before non-Muslims and are ruled by unbelievers. . . . Hence, 
it has become an individual obligation, which there is no evading, 
on every Muslim to prepare his equipment, to make up his mind 
to engage in jihad, and to get ready for it until the opportunity is 
ripe and God decrees a matter which is sure to be accomplished.8 
Today’s leaders of the Brotherhood insist that they no longer espouse 
violence. Their nationalist detractors disagree and label them as ter-
rorists. This debate is probably going to continue for a while and will 
not be resolved any time soon. However, one thing is clear. Al-Banna’s 
words appear to describe current positions of avowedly terrorist orga-
nizations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
Scholars disagree as to whether the Brotherhood has changed and 
has embraced democratic values. Wickham (2013) argues that the 
Brotherhood has evolved, especially owing to some of its members’ par-
ticipation in political life. She believes that this experience has made 
the Brotherhood more open to political debate and dialogue and more 
accepting of democratic values. In a sense, the Brotherhood joined the 
formal political system to change it but ended up being changed by it. 
Nevertheless, she explains, one cannot conclude that the Brotherhood 
has embraced the liberal and inclusive ethos of democracy because its 
insistence on an Islamic frame of reference implies the existence of 
an authority above the electorate. Bradley (2012) is less nuanced. He 
argues that the belief that the Brotherhood has evolved has more to do 
with its recruitment of effective spokesmen who spout the virtues of its 
prodemocracy platform than with any real change in its position.
8. Quoted in Wendell (1978, p. 150). 
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Regardless of the issues of acceptance of democracy and rejection 
of violence, the other differences between nationalists and Islamists 
appear irreconcilable. They include national versus religious identity, 
personal liberties, women’s role in society, and the role of the arts and 
culture. Arab and Muslim society seems to be divided right down the 
middle, and the polarization appears to be getting worse every day 
with the emergence of groups like the Islamic State and the develop-
ment of jihadist ideologies among migrant populations in Europe and 
North America.
Different Transition Experiences
This polarization of Arab society greatly complicated the transition 
process. Nowhere is this more evident than in Egypt. Tunisia faces 
the same challenges as Egypt but so far has succeeded in maintaining 
national unity and building a democratic consensus. Yemen’s transition 
is in deep trouble, but it is not only owing to the secularist-Islamist 
divide. Yemen’s troubles are also caused by ethnic and sectarian dif-
ferences. The two monarchies, Jordan and Morocco, have been more 
successful in maintaining stability, but the pace of democratic reforms 
has been slow. 
Egypt
Egypt is by far the largest Arab country, and its transition, which has 
been particularly messy, has attracted world attention. Hence it makes 
sense to study it in some detail.
The military was put in charge of the transition in Egypt, and 
Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Mubarak’s minister of defense, 
became the de facto head of state after Mubarak’s resignation. The 
first political disagreement he had to deal with was on the question of 
the timing of elections and the writing of a new constitution. After the 
dissolution of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, the Brotherhood 
was the only organized group left in the country and therefore would 
win in any early election. They pushed for elections to take place before 
a constitution was written. The liberal, nationalist, Nasserist, and left-
ist parties wanted time to prepare and organize their bases. Therefore 
they argued for agreement on a new constitution before elections. At 
this point the Brotherhood promised not to field candidates for more 
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than 50 percent of the seats in parliament, so that they would rule only 
in a coalition government, and they also promised not to field a presi-
dential candidate. The military sided with the Brotherhood and started 
preparing for elections before the constitution.
In spite of a boycott by the revolutionary youth and continued 
demonstrations and unrest, elections for the lower house of Parliament 
took place in three stages between November 28, 2011, and January 
8, 2012. As expected, the results were catastrophic for the secularists. 
The Brotherhood won 37.5 percent of the popular vote, which trans-
lated into 45 percent of the seats in Parliament. The Salafists came in 
second, winning 27.8 percent of the popular vote and 25 percent of 
the seats in Parliament. Thus Egypt’s first postrevolution parliament 
had a crushing Islamist majority of 70 percent. Elections for the upper 
house were carried out on January 29 and February 22, 2012. They 
elicited little enthusiasm, and voter turnout was low. Islamists won 
nearly 80 percent of the seats, with the Brotherhood holding an abso-
lute majority of about 58 percent.
The Brotherhood-dominated parliament elected a constituent assem-
bly to start drafting Egypt’s postrevolutionary constitution. It included 
66 Islamists out of 100 members. It had only 6 women and 5 Copts. 
Secular parties boycotted the assembly, and ultimately the courts 
declared it unconstitutional because members of Parliament elected 
themselves to the assembly. Agreement was reached between secularists 
and Islamists on the structure of the second constituent assembly, but 
the secularists claimed that the Islamists broke that agreement. Many 
secular parties followed the call of Mohamed el-Baradei (liberal) and 
Hamdeen Sabbahi (Nasserist) to boycott the second constituent assem-
bly. Other groups, including Coptic Church representatives, also joined 
the boycott. According to a poll carried out by Al-Ahram news agency, 
more than 80 percent of Egyptians wanted the constituent assembly to 
be reformed to better reflect all forces in society. The schism between 
the Islamists and the rest of society appeared to be getting wider.
In the meantime, a presidential election was held in two rounds, 
the first round on May 23 and 24, 2012, and the second on June 16 
and 17, 2012. The Brotherhood broke its second political promise and 
fielded a presidential candidate. In fact, it fielded two candidates. Its 
preferred candidate was Khayrat al-Shatter, a millionaire businessman 
and deputy general guide of the Brotherhood. However, al-Shatter had 
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legal problems that could disqualify him. That is why the Brotherhood 
also fielded a second candidate, Mohamed Morsi, president of its polit-
ical party (Freedom and Justice). This earned Morsi the nickname “the 
spare-tire candidate.” In the end, the Brotherhood was right: al-Shatter 
was disqualified, and Morsi became the official Brotherhood candidate.
The military stated that it was not supporting any political group 
or candidate. However, most Egyptians felt that it supported Ahmed 
Shafik, a former general of the Egyptian air force and the last prime 
minister under Mubarak. The choice of Shafik as the standard-bearer 
of the liberal-nationalist-military alliance was unfortunate. He was too 
closely associated with the Mubarak regime. It would have been dif-
ficult for the people of Tahrir Square to vote for him. Another liberal 
candidate, Amr Moussa (a former minister of foreign affairs and sec-
retary general of the Arab League) presented himself in the elections, 
but he did not receive much support from the military and its followers.
Morsi won the first-round presidential elections and Shafik came 
in second (table 2-1). Thus the second round was a runoff between 
those two. In that first round, Islamists (Morsi and Abul Foutouh) 
obtained 42.3 percent of the vote. The liberals (Shafik and Moussa) 
won 34.8 percent, and the Nasserist Sabbahi 20.7 percent. Sabbahi’s 
strong showing demonstrates that the Nasserist and leftist message still 
attracts substantial support in Egypt, particularly among the working 
class. It is noteworthy that Sabbahi won pluralities in Egypt’s two larg-
est cities, Cairo and Alexandria.
Morsi won the second round of presidential elections with 51.7 per-
cent of the vote to Shafik’s 48.3 percent. Many secularists voted for 
Morsi because they did not want to support someone they considered 
to be a Mubarak clone. Others simply stayed home on election day. It 
is hard to predict what the outcome of the elections (and hence of the 
overall transition) would have been had the liberal-nationalist-military 
coalition selected someone other than Shafik as their standard-bearer. 
But an opinion poll by Al-Ahram indicates that had the second round 
of presidential elections been between Mohamed Morsi and Amr 
Moussa, Moussa would have won with 77.6 percent of the vote to only 
22.4 percent for Morsi.
Egyptians of all political leanings, who were worried that the elec-
tions might get rigged in favor of Shafik, celebrated Morsi’s electoral vic-
tory. His inauguration on June 30, 2012, was reminiscent of the day that 
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Mubarak resigned. Tahrir Square was filled with huge crowds represent-
ing all political forces. A few weeks later Morsi fired Field Marshal Tan-
tawi from his post as minister of defense and replaced him with General 
el-Sissi. He also appointed a new chief of staff of the armed forces. This 
move was widely supported. Democracy seemed to be working, as the 
elected civilian president was taking control of the military.
Morsi promised to be the president of all Egyptians and to appoint two 
vice presidents, a woman and a Copt. But those promises were not kept, 
and the euphoria following Morsi’s election quickly dissipated as Egyp-
tians slowly came to believe that he was only the Brotherhood’s president.
The Brotherhood’s worst mistake occurred on November 22, when 
Morsi issued a seven-article constitutional declaration. Article 2 stated 
that all decrees, constitutional declarations, or laws issued by President 
Morsi since his inauguration on June 30 could not be appealed or can-
celed by any authority of the country (effectively ending parliamentary 
and judicial oversight) and that all pending lawsuits against his deci-
sions were void. Article 6 authorized the president to take any mea-
sure he saw fit to protect the revolution and safeguard national unity 
(effectively giving him unlimited dictatorial powers). Reaction against 
this declaration was quick and vehement. The president was forced to 
retract and annul his ill-fated declaration, but the damage to his stature 
and to the Brotherhood’s democratic image was already done.
The Brotherhood decided to quickly push through a new constitu-
tion before the judiciary could dissolve the second Islamist- dominated 
constituent assembly, which was being boycotted by nearly all sec-
ular groups. The new constitution was passed by referendum that 
TAble 2-1. Results of First-Round Presidential elections, egypt, 2012
Candidate Political current
Share of vote 
(percent)
Mohamed Morsi Muslim brotherhood 24.8
Ahmed Shafik liberal 23.7
Hamdeen Sabbahi Nasserist 20.7
Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh Moderate Islamist 17.5
Amr Moussa liberal 11.1
Others 2.2
Source: egyptian Supreme Committee for elections.
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was carried out in two stages on December 15 and 22, 2012. It was 
approved by a 63.8 percent majority, but voter turnout was only 
32.9 percent, and a majority of voters in Cairo (the capital and largest 
city) voted against the constitution. The new constitution reflected an 
Islamist vision of Egypt rather than a broad societal consensus. Copts 
were against this constitution because it did not sufficiently protect 
minority rights. Women’s groups opposed it because it did not ensure 
equality of the sexes, and the media opposed it because it did not pro-
tect freedom of the press.
An open confrontation emerged between the Brotherhood and nearly 
all sections of Egypt’s elite: the judiciary, the media, artists, intellectu-
als, and of course the deep state (key civil servants and security person-
nel). Large segments of Egyptian society felt that President Morsi and 
his supporters were imposing their vision of postrevolution Egypt with-
out sufficient consultation. For many among them it became an exis-
tential struggle. Two political parties that historically have been sworn 
adversaries, Sabbahi’s Nasserists and el-Sayyid al-Badawi’s New Wafd, 
agreed to coordinate and join el-Baradei’s Salvation Front against the 
Brotherhood. Even Abul Foutouh’s moderate Islamists joined forces 
with the secular parties in the Salvation Front.
By early 2013 Morsi’s position was starting to look shaky. He was fac-
ing a united opposition of secularists and moderate Islamists who were 
supported by the revolutionary youth, the judiciary, the media, and the 
cultural elite. Those running large businesses also joined the ranks of 
Morsi’s opponents because the economy was quickly heading toward a 
major crisis. Officially, the military, the police, and the civil service were 
neutral. However, it was an open secret that those intensely nationalist 
institutions, filled by Mubarak appointees, did not trust the Brotherhood.
Thus when a group of revolutionary youth started the Tamarod 
(rebellion, in Arabic) movement and began collecting signatures on a 
petition for early presidential elections, they received tremendous moral 
support from political, cultural, and media elites as well as financial 
support from the business community. They claimed to have collected 
22 million signatures on the petition, far more than the 13 million votes 
that Mr. Morsi obtained on the second round of elections. They then 
organized massive anti-Morsi demonstrations in all Egyptian cities. 
At this point the military stepped in with an ultimatum to both sides 
in the confrontation (but clearly mainly directed at Morsi) to reach a 
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compromise. Otherwise, they said, they would impose their own road 
map for a new transition.
Morsi rejected opposition demands for early elections as well as the 
military’s ultimatum to reach a compromise that would be acceptable 
to the Egyptian street. He insisted that he was the legitimate president 
of Egypt and would complete his four-year term in office. With the 
benefit of hindsight it would have made much more sense for Morsi to 
negotiate a compromise with the opposition and with the military. It 
was clear that Egypt’s transition was in trouble and a change of direc-
tion was needed. It may still have been possible for him to lead this 
change and start a process of healing and national reconciliation. But 
he chose not to, and on July 3, he was deposed. At least as many people 
swarmed into Tahrir Square to celebrate his fall as had celebrated his 
election a year earlier.
The military was once more made responsible for managing Egypt’s 
transition. It quickly appointed the head of the constitutional court, 
Adly Mansour, as interim president, and he appointed a government of 
technocrats headed by a well-known economist, Hazem al-Biblawi, as 
prime minister. The military also announced a road map for a return 
to normal governance that included a referendum on a new constitution 
and presidential and parliamentary elections.
The first step on the road map was concluded when a new constitu-
tion, prepared by a committee chaired by Amr Moussa, was approved 
by referendum on January 14 and 15, 2014. The participation rate of 
nearly 39 percent and the 98 percent yes vote were higher than those 
obtained by the Muslim Brotherhood–backed 2012 constitution.
Transparency International’s team that observed the referendum 
stated that “the political context in the run-up to the referendum 
impaired conditions to hold a fair and free referendum when compared 
with international standards.”9 The assessment pointed out that the 
interim authorities took some steps that limited freedom of expression, 
association, and assembly and that civil society’s capacity to represent 
the voice of the people had thereby been greatly reduced. According to 
Transparency International, government officials as well as public and 
private media outlets campaigned vigorously for a yes vote and did not 
9. Transparency International Observation Mission Egypt Constitutional Refer-
endum, preliminary report, January 16, 2014, p. 2.
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provide an opportunity for the opposition to express its views. More-
over, activists who called for a no vote or for boycotting the referendum 
faced repression.
In spite of those problems, nearly all foreign observers agreed that 
the referendum reflected the will of the Egyptian people. How could 
one explain Egyptians’ supporting two very different constitutions in a 
space of a few months? The answer probably is that it was not the same 
Egyptians who went to vote each time. Participants in the Brotherhood- 
organized referendum were mostly young and male, while those who 
participated in the second referendum were mostly female and middle 
aged. According to this view, the schism between secularists and Isla-
mists in Egypt has a gender as well as a generational dimension. It also 
seems to have a rural-urban dimension, with the Brotherhood usually 
garnering more support in rural areas.
The second step of the road map was completed in May 2014, when 
Field Marshall el-Sissi was easily elected president in a contest in which 
his only adversary was Sabbahi, leader of the Nasserist Party. Thus 
Egypt chose a popular officer as its new president, and people started 
immediately to compare him with Gamal Abdel Nasser, who led the 
revolt against the king in 1952 and who suppressed the Muslim Broth-
erhood in the 1950s and 1960s.
The third and last remaining step of the road map is the parlia-
mentary election, which is now expected to take place by late 2015. 
According to the new electoral law, only 20 percent of the 540 elected 
seats in parliament will be assigned to party lists, while 80 percent will 
be assigned to individuals running in their constituencies. It is expected 
that this arrangement will hinder the development of a strong and uni-
fied opposition block in Parliament
The struggle between nationalists and Islamists continues, even as 
the road map is being implemented. The Brotherhood was designated 
a terrorist organization, its assets were confiscated, and its leaders, 
including Morsi, were put in jail. Brotherhood activists and demon-
strators face severe repression as they could be prosecuted as members 
of a terrorist organization. Demonstrations and street violence have 
become a common occurrence, and many deaths have been reported.
Islamists are fighting back, often using violence and terrorism, but 
the Brotherhood itself denies involvement in those acts. The security 
situation remains volatile, as Islamist groups carry out armed attacks 
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against police and military targets as well as against some civilian tar-
gets. Perhaps the new regime’s greatest challenge is in northern Sinai, 
where the group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, which has sworn allegiance to 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, is active and is targeting security 
personnel and economic installations.
As could be expected, the cycle of violence and counterviolence had 
a negative impact on human rights. Amnesty International states on its 
website that
[in] the years following the “January 25 revolution” the human 
rights outlook in Egypt remains grim. . . . Egypt has suffered a 
number of human rights setbacks, not least since the removal of 
Mohamed Morsi from the presidency in July 2013, including the 
killing of up to 1,000 people on August 14, 2013, during the dis-
persal of sit-ins by his supporters by the security forces. . . . Some 
of the names strongly associated with the “January 25 revolu-
tion,” including one of the founders of April 6 Youth Movement, 
Ahmed Maher, and blogger and opposition activist Alaa Abdel 
Fattah, find themselves behind bars for breaking the repressive 
new assembly law.10
What will happen next in Egypt? There are at least two possible 
scenarios. The more pessimistic scenario would be that the violence 
will continue so that the el-Sissi administration will find that it needs 
to maintain repressive measures that curtail political and civil lib-
erties. Hence under this scenario Egypt’s democratic transition fails 
and the country remains more or less where it was before the Arab 
Spring. The second and more optimistic scenario likens Field Marshall 
el-Sissi to General de Gaulle of France. Under this scenario el-Sissi suc-
ceeds in stabilizing the security situation and then proceeds to imple-
ment democratic reforms. Thus Egypt could gradually evolve into a 
full-fledged democracy. At this point it is not clear which scenario is 
more likely. Supporters of el-Sissi believe that he will lead the country 
toward full-fledged democracy, while his detractors, especially from 
10. See Amnesty International website www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/ 
middle-east-and-north-africa/egypt).
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the Brotherhood, argue that Egypt is turning into a military dictator-
ship even more repressive than the one under Mubarak.
Tunisia
Tunisia’s transition has been very different from Egypt’s, and much less 
messy. The first difference concerns the role of the military. The Tuni-
sian army avoided confrontation with demonstrators yet played a piv-
otal role ensuring security and minimizing violence. Most important, 
it did not intervene directly in the political process and created enough 
space for the civilian politicians to manage the transition.
Thus whereas in Egypt the minister of defense became the de facto 
head of state after Mubarak’s resignation, in Tunisia the president of 
Parliament played that role, but the real power remained with the prime 
minister. Initially Mohamed Ghannouchi, who was prime minister under 
Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, remained at this post, but faced with increasing 
protest he had to step down a month after Ben Ali’s departure.
The second major difference between the Egyptian and Tunisian 
experiences is that Tunisia decided to agree on a constitution before 
electing a permanent government and head of state. On February 27, 
2011, Beji Caid Essebsi, who had held several ministerial positions 
under President Bourguiba, was selected as transitional prime minis-
ter to replace Ghannouchi. He formed a government of independent 
ministers on March 7, with the clear objective of electing a constituent 
assembly. He declared that no member of his government would be 
allowed to run in the forthcoming constituent assembly elections.
Essebsi succeeded in his mission. Elections were held in October 
2011 and were considered a model for the rest of the Arab world. They 
were held peacefully, and the participation rate was high, as 51 per-
cent of eligible voters actually cast their ballots. Foreign and domestic 
election monitors praised the process for its transparency and fairness.
A third important difference with the Egyptian experience is that the 
Tunisian electoral system of a one-round proportional representation 
made it difficult for any single party to obtain an outright majority. 
Thus the Islamists in Tunisia did not control a majority of the seats of 
the assembly, as they had in Egypt, even though they got most votes. 
The Ennahda Party obtained 89 seats out of the assembly’s 217 and 
had to form a coalition with two secular parties, the Congrés pour la 
République, which won 29 seats, and Ettakatol, which won 20 seats. 
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Thus it was agreed that Ennahda’s Hamadi Jebali take over as prime 
minister, while the Congrés’s Moncef Marzouki become president and 
head of state and Ettakatol’s Mustapha Ben Jaffar become speaker of 
the constituent assembly.
As in Egypt, the period 2011–15 was marred by protests, violence, 
and several political assassinations. Tunisia had to carry out its own 
war on terror at a time when the economy was either stagnant or 
declining and social tensions were mounting. Moreover, instability in 
neighboring Libya and the increase in Libyans’ seeking refuge in Tuni-
sia and the transfer of weapons through porous borders rendered the 
situation even more challenging.
Tunisia faced the same disagreements over the constitution as 
Egypt had. Islamists wanted sharia to be the basis for all laws, and 
they favored a parliamentary form of government. However, unlike 
Egypt, Tunisia has a vibrant and powerful civil society, particularly 
labor unions. Union interventions succeeded in pushing Islamists as 
well as secularists to make concessions and reach a consensus on the 
constitution. Ennahda also proved itself much more flexible and open 
to compromise than the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.11 In addition to 
reaching consensus on a constitution, Tunisians also agreed to select a 
neutral government of technocrats to manage the constitutional refer-
endum and the ensuing parliamentary and presidential elections.
Parliamentary elections were held in October 2014, and a secular 
party, Nida Tounes, led by Beji Caid Essebsi, won most seats in Parlia-
ment but not an outright majority. In December Essebsi won the pres-
idential elections. He appointed a respected politician, Habib Essid, as 
prime minister, and Essid formed a broad coalition government that 
included Ennahda, who came in second in the parliamentary elections. 
Thus Tunisia will continue to be governed by consensus between its 
strong secular and Islamist forces. Maintaining this coalition will cer-
tainly be difficult, but the country appears to be well on its way to 
becoming a full-fledged democracy, the first in the Arab world. How-
ever, Tunisia’s transition is being threatened by terrorism. Attacks 
on tourists at the Bardo museum in Tunis and on a beach in Sousse 
11. It is sometimes argued that the fall of the Brotherhood government in Egypt 
was at least one of the factors that prompted Ennahda to make serious concessions 
to secular parties.
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have had a devastating effect on Tunisia’s important tourism sector 
and hence its overall economy. These attacks underline the fragility of 
Tunisia’s transition to democracy.
Yemen
The problems facing Yemen’s transition are more related to sectarian 
and regional differences, as well as interference by al-Qaeda in the Ara-
bian Peninsula (AQAP), than to the secular-Islamist divide. Hence they 
are even more complicated than the problems faced by the Egyptians 
and Tunisians. The transition in Yemen has gotten so out of hand that 
it is not only the future of democracy in the country that is threatened 
but also Yemen’s continued existence as a unified state.
The Arab Spring spread from Tunisia to Egypt and then to Yemen, 
where President Ali Abdullah Saleh had been in power for almost 
thirty- four years. Saleh initially refused to step down and resisted for 
many months until November of 2011, when he finally signed an agree-
ment brokered by the neighboring countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council under which he agreed to hand over power to his vice presi-
dent, Abdel-Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, in return for amnesty for himself 
and his inner circle. During the long months before the agreement there 
were sustained demonstrations and unrest and the country was pushed 
to the brink of civil war.
The protracted political battle in Sana’a (Yemen’s capital city), and 
the inevitable power vacuum during those long months, led to power 
grabs by different factions and tribal groups. The extreme north of 
the country fell under the control of the Houthis, a Zaydi rebel group, 
and the southern secessionist movement (Hirak) gained more ground.12 
Armed groups and tribal forces controlled different parts of Sana’a. 
Perhaps most dangerous, the power vacuum and general chaos allowed 
AQAP to expand its operations in Yemen and to use Yemen as a base 
for attacking other countries.
Hadi was elected president on February 21, 2012 (his was the only 
name on the ballot), to lead a two-year transition that was to include 
agreement on a new constitution and the organization of free elec-
tions. Former president Saleh remained in Sana’a and continued to rep-
resent an important political force, which tended to complicate things 
12. Zaydis are a sect that emerged in the eight century out of Shia Islam. 
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for his successor. A new coalition government was formed headed by 
Mohamed Salim Basindwa, a prominent opposition figure and a for-
mer minister of foreign affairs who resigned from the ruling party 
in the early 2000s. Cabinet posts were evenly divided between the 
opposition Joint Meeting Parties (which includes Islah) and Saleh’s 
General People’s Congress. The government started to organize a 
national dialogue in which all stakeholders participated to prepare a 
new constitution.
The National Dialogue conference proved inclusive and tackled all 
the important issues, but it was not able to complete its work by Sep-
tember 18, 2013, as initially planned. The status of the South in a new 
Yemen was a key stumbling block. Southern representatives, supported 
by the northern Houthis, argued for a federal structure in which the 
South and the North would have equal status. But the General People’s 
Congress opposed the idea. Saleh, who remained head of the party, 
even called it treason.
In the meantime the security situation continued to deteriorate. 
There was an attempt to assassinate the prime minister as well as an 
attack on the ministry of defense in which fifty-six people were killed 
and hundreds were injured. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula con-
tinued its operations in Yemen, and in a widely publicized event the 
United States closed all of its embassies in the region because of a threat 
that reportedly emanated from Yemen.
Protests erupted in Sana’a in the summer of 2014 after the govern-
ment removed fuel subsidies. Those protests and the violent police reac-
tion to them provided a reason for Houthi forces to march into Sana’a 
in September 2014. The Houthi capture of Sana’a faced so little resis-
tance that some observers argued that Saleh was implicitly supporting 
them to take revenge on the Islah Party, a Sunni Islamist group that is 
naturally opposed to the Zaydi Houthis. The Houthis were also seen as 
a threat to AQAP, another Sunni organization.
Naturally, Hadi was greatly weakened by the Houthi capture of the 
capital city. Moreover, he was expelled from the General People’s Con-
gress because he supported United Nations sanctions against Saleh that 
bar him from political office. This meant that in addition to losing 
control of Sana’a, he lost his political base. The UN brokered an agree-
ment between the victorious Houthis and the other political factions. 
A new prime minister, Khaled Bahah, a former ambassador to the UN, 
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was named to lead a broad coalition government in which both the 
Houthis and Hirak were represented. However, with a weakened presi-
dent Hadi, it was inevitable that this arrangement would be short lived.
On February 8, 2015, the Houthis announced the takeover of the 
Yemeni government, dissolving Parliament and replacing it with a 
551-member National Transitional Council, which will elect a five- 
person presidential council. In the interim it was decided that an 
eighteen- member security commission will act as Yemen’s executive 
branch. The Houthis also replaced the heads of offices of the president 
and the prime minister.
At present, Hadi and his government are in exile in Saudi Arabia. 
The Saudis are leading a coalition that is bombarding the Houthis in 
Yemen. This is clearly not the end of the story in Yemen.
Jordan
Like Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, Jordan was rocked in January 2011 
by street demonstrations and widespread protest. But unlike in the 
three republics, the people called not for a regime change but rather 
for a reform of the existing regime. Jordan’s king Abdullah II is a 
descendant of the prophet Mohamed and is seen as a legitimate ruler. 
In addition, he garners huge support from the tribal areas and from 
the military. Muasher (2014) argues that because the Muslim Broth-
erhood has always been allowed to operate legally in Jordan as a 
charitable organization, it adopted moderate policies and saw itself 
as part of the regime. On the other hand, Jordan has a large popu-
lation of Palestinian origin, and tensions between it and the Jorda-
nians could create some instability. More recently a huge influx of 
Syrian refugees further complicated the country’s economic, social, 
and political situation.
The king reacted to the protest movement by deciding to lead a pro-
cess of reform from above. He set up a royal committee to consider 
constitutional changes. However, the committee was dominated by 
conservatives and came up with little in terms of recommendations. 
Perhaps the greatest achievement from this exercise was the creation, 
for the first time in Jordan, of a constitutional court. The king also 
decided to limit the scope of the state security courts, dominated by 
military judges, which earned him rare praise from the opposition.
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Most observers agree that the reforms carried out so far have been 
very limited, and that there is a risk of more protests and instability.13 
Because of his legitimacy and popularity, King Abdullah II is in a posi-
tion to implement gradual reforms so as to steer his country toward full 
democracy while avoiding the huge human and economic costs caused 
by turmoil and instability experienced in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen.
Morocco
Like King Abdullah II, King Mohammed VI of Morocco is a descen-
dant of the prophet Mohamed, is popular, and is seen as legitimate by 
the majority of the population. Faced with a similar wave of protests in 
2011, King Mohammed VI went further than his Jordanian counter-
part in implementing political reforms. As in Jordan, a committee was 
created to amend the constitution. But the amendments proposed by 
the Moroccan committee went much further than those proposed and 
implemented in Jordan.
The new constitution was adopted by referendum in July 2011. It 
strengthened the powers of the prime minister and of Parliament, as 
well as the independence of the judiciary. It enshrined more political 
and social rights and called for a more open and decentralized gov-
ernance system, laying the groundwork for more-inclusive economic 
growth. As prescribed by the new constitution, the king appointed 
the leader of the party that won most seats in Parliament (Abdelilah 
Benkiraine, leader of the moderately Islamist Justice and Development 
Party [PJD]) as prime minister.
The new Moroccan constitution went further than the Jordanian 
one, but it did not significantly reduce the powers of the king, who con-
tinues to be the dominant political figure in Morocco. King Moham-
med VI will continue to lead the transition. Evolutionary change carries 
the risk of a slowdown, or even a halt, in the reform process as powerful 
interest groups feel threatened and attempt to block the transition. This 
could lead to disappointment and frustration among the population, 
especially the youth, and hence to political unrest. That is why King 
Mohammed VI will need to remain one step ahead of the Moroccan 
street, implementing reforms at a pace that is fast enough to maintain 
13. For example, Muasher (2014).
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public support for the evolutionary process, while at the same time 
avoiding abrupt changes that could result in instability and disruption.
The Arab Spring’s Disappointing  
Political and Economic Results
From the review of country experiences presented above one cannot 
expect the Arab Spring to have resulted in much improvement in terms 
of greater democracy and freedom, except maybe in Tunisia. And this 
is exactly what the Freedom House data, comparing results from 2010 
and 2015, presented in figure 2-1, show. Egypt and Jordan, which were 
rated as not free with a freedom index of 5.5 in 2010, continue with the 
exact same rating and index level in 2015.14 Similarly, Morocco’s rating 
as partly free and its index of 4.5 in 2010 remain unchanged in 2015. 
Yemen’s freedom rating actually deteriorated, moving from 5.5 to 6.0. 
14. The freedom index is an average of an index for political freedom and one for 
civil liberties. It goes from 1.0, which is the best rating, indicating greatest freedom, 
to 6.0, which is least free.
FIGURE 2-1. Freedom Index, Arab Countries in Transition, 2010 and 2015 
Index
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Does this mean that the Arab Spring has had no impact on freedom 
in those countries? Not exactly. Tunisia moved from a rating of 6.0 and 
a classification of not free to a rating of 2.0, which means that it is now 
classified as free. That is a great achievement for Tunisia, and it also 
provides an example for other Arab countries. Tunisia has shown that 
it is possible to move toward greater freedom and democracy in spite 
of the secular-Islamist divide, the lack of a democratic tradition and 
culture, weak or nonexistent institutions.
In all five countries the Arab Spring was associated with an increase in 
political instability, terrorism, and violence. Table 2-2 presents the index 
on political stability and absence of violence and terrorism from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. This indicator moves from –2.5 (most 
unstable) to +2.5 (most stable). Note that all five countries had a negative 
index in 2010. This means that even before the Arab Spring the five coun-
tries were in the relatively unstable range. The situation worsened after 
the revolutions, and the indexes became more negative for all countries 
except Yemen. The index for 2014 has not been published yet. However, 
one can guess that, with the Houthi capture of Sana’a, the counterat-
tacks, the activities of AQAP, and the Saudi-led military intervention, 
Yemen’s index for 2014 will probably show further deterioration.
There seems to be a difference between the republics and the mon-
archies in the group. While the level of instability increased in the two 
monarchies, they ended up in 2013 being more stable than any of the 
three republics. For example, compare Jordan’s –0.62 with Egypt’s 
–1.62 or Morocco’s –0.50 with Tunisia’s –0.91, or compare them both 
with Yemen’s –2.35.








Source:  World bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators.
a. Negative values in parentheses.
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More violence and instability is obviously not conducive to economic 
growth and development.15 Table 2-3 presents real GDP growth for 
the five countries for the period 2010–14. In 2010 the Arab economies 
were starting to recover from the impact of the global financial crisis, 
but with the instability brought about by the revolutions, GDP growth 
soon fell again. For example, Egypt was growing at 5 percent a year 
before the Arab Spring but saw its growth fall to about 2 percent the 
following year. Tunisia and Yemen even saw their GDP slip into nega-
tive growth in the year following the revolutions. The two monarchies 
seem to have done a little better than the three republics, with growth 
rates of 3.5 percent in 2014.
Low growth was associated with increasing unemployment. By 2014 
the unemployment rate had reached 13.4 percent in Egypt and 9.3 per-
cent in Morocco. Youth unemployment in Tunisia rose to 36.4 percent. 
Paradoxically, revolutions that were started by youth who demanded 
better job opportunities (in addition to freedom, justice, and dignity) 
ended up, at least initially, creating more unemployment and worse 
living conditions.
The four years following the Arab revolutions witnessed increasing 
fiscal imbalances in all five countries (see table 2-4). This happened 
because governments tried to jump-start GDP growth by increasing 
public spending, and at the same time they had to give in to politi-
cal pressures and provide increased benefits to different groups. Thus 
15. For a detailed discussion of macroeconomic developments in Egypt and Tuni-
sia, see Ghanem and Shaikh (2013).
TAble 2-3. GDP Growth Rates, Arab Countries in Transition, 2010–14a 
Percent
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
egypt 5.1 1.8 2.2 2.1 2.2
Jordan 2.3 2.6 2.7 2.9 3.5 
Morocco 3.7 5.0 2.7 4.4 3.5 
Tunisia 3.0 (1.9) 3.7 2.3 2.4 
Yemen 7.7   (12.7) 2.4 4.8 1.9 
Source:  International Monetary Fund.
a. Negative values in parentheses.
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Tunisia’s fiscal deficit, which was only 1.1 percent of GDP in 2010, 
grew nearly sixfold to reach 6.4 percent of GDP in 2014. Egypt and 
Jordan already had high deficits of 8.2 and 7.7 percent of GDP, respec-
tively, before the Arab Spring. Those deficits ballooned to about 12 
and 15.6 percent of GDP in 2014. Yemen had a deficit of 4 percent of 
GDP in 2010; it rose to more than 12 percent of GDP in 2012. Even 
Morocco saw its fiscal deficit rise, from 4.6 percent of GDP in 2010 to 
7.4 percent in 2012 and 6.3 percent in 2014.
High budget deficits led to big increases in public debt between 2010 
and 2014 in all five countries (see figure 2-2). Egypt’s public debt rose 
from 73 percent of GDP in 2010 to nearly 94 percent in 2014, and 
Jordan’s debt rose from 67 to 90 percent of GDP in the same period. 
Increased government borrowing led to higher interest rates and 
crowded out private investment. This was particularly true because 
in most countries, notably Egypt and Jordan, most of the borrowing 
was done domestically. In Egypt, external debt only increased from 
12.4 percent of GDP to 18.4 percent, and in Jordan from 24.6 percent 
to 30 percent of GDP during the same period. This means that most 
of the increased government borrowing was happening in the domes-
tic market; between 2010 and 2014, Egypt’s domestic debt rose from 
about 60 percent of GDP to 75 percent, while Jordan’s domestic debt 
rose from about 42 percent of GDP to 60 percent.
Governments were sucking liquidity from domestic banking sys-
tems and leaving very little to the private sector. At some point in 2012 
domestic interest rates in Egypt were 16 percent at a time when inter-
national rates were close to zero. It is therefore no surprise that private 
TAble 2-4. budget balance as Share of GDP, Arab Countries in Transition, 2010–14a
Percent
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
egypt   (8.2) (9.8) (10.6) (13.7) (11.9)
Jordan (7.7) (11.7) (10.4) (13.7) (15.6)
Morocco (4.6)  (6.9) (7.4) (6.2) (6.3)
Tunisia (1.1) (3.5) (5.7) (6.2) (6.4)
Yemen (4.0) (5.7) (12.4) (7.8) (6.8)
Source:  International Monetary Fund.
a. Negative values in parentheses.
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investment, and hence growth and job creation, slowed down. High 
interest rates, together with political uncertainty and civil strife, were a 
strong disincentive for economic activity.
Two or three years into the transition, governments in all five coun-
tries started dealing with their budget problem; they quickly discovered 
that they must reduce or even eliminate some subsidies, especially those 
on energy products. In 2012 Tunisia spent about 4 percent of GDP 
on subsidies, and Egypt spent close to 9 percent of GDP. The Egyp-
tian government allocated about 6–7 percent of GDP on fuel subsidies 
and some 2 percent of GDP on food subsidies. Combined, they were 
roughly equal to the entire sum the government (including health and 
education ministries) paid in wages and salaries and more than double 
the amount the government invested in infrastructure.
Two other arguments were made against fuel subsidies. First, they 
encourage the overconsumption of energy, which has environmental 
as well as economic implications. The energy intensity of the Egyp-
tian economy is estimated to be 2.5–3.0 times higher than the aver-
age for advanced countries. Second, it is argued that fuel subsidies are 
regressive in nature. In Egypt, most subsidy benefits are captured by the 
FIGURE 2-2. Public Debt as Share of GDP, Arab Countries in Transition, 2010 and 2014
Percent
Egypt Jordan Tunisia Yemen
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richest two-fifths of the income distribution. In Tunisia, the households 
with the highest income benefit about forty times more from energy 
subsidies than the poorest households.
Nevertheless, removing subsidies is unpopular and politically diffi-
cult. Morocco succeeded in removing all fuel subsidies without much 
political opposition. Tunisia also reduced fuel subsidies in spite of some 
opposition. In Egypt, President el-Sissi used the honeymoon period 
right after his election to reduce subsidies. In Jordan, subsidy reduc-
tion was met with street demonstrations. In Yemen, the demonstrations 
against subsidy cuts paved the way for the Houthi invasion of Sana’a.
The present crisis should lead to a rethinking of Arab policies on 
price subsidies and social policies in general. It is time for Arab coun-
tries to overhaul their archaic safety-net system and develop a new 
social contract that reflects the realities of the twenty-first century.
Over the past two decades, many middle-income countries (for 
example, Brazil and Mexico) shifted to social protection systems based 
on targeted cash transfers, but Arab countries maintained their system 
based on generalized price subsidies. This is the system adopted by 
President Nasser in Egypt more than fifty years ago, and it involves 
subsidizing prices of a number of commodities (including fuel, electric-
ity, bread, rice, edible oil, tea, and sugar).
Social protection based on generalized price subsidies may or may 
not have worked in the 1960s, but it is certainly not working now. Gen-
eralized price subsidies are part of what has come to be known as the 
autocratic bargain or the autocratic social contract. This has included 
free health care and education, government jobs for all graduates, and 
low prices for necessities but limited political and civil liberties. The 
Arab Spring revolutions demonstrated the limits of that arrangement 
and highlighted the need to develop a new social contract—one that is 
consistent with a market economy and responds to youth demands for 
freedom, dignity, and social justice.
The idea of putting in place a social protection system based on tar-
geted cash transfers has been studied in the Arab world for several years 
and could be quickly implemented. Experience from around the world 
indicates that such a system is much less expensive, more efficient, and 
fairer than price subsidies. Arab governments should consider mov-
ing ahead quickly to put such a system in place. It makes economic as 
well as political sense. It would be one way of responding to demands 
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for greater social justice, and it would make implementation of future 
reforms and further subsidy reductions much easier.
Political instability in the Arab world was also associated with a 
deterioration in external accounts. Tourism declined, foreign direct 
investment fell, and capital flight increased. The result has been a fall 
in foreign reserves (table 2-5). The decline in Egypt’s foreign reserves 
has been the most marked, as they fell from the equivalent of about 
6.9 months of imports in 2010 to only 2.7 months of imports in 2014, 
which is slightly less than the three months that are usually considered 
the minimum prudential requirement. As shown in table 2-5, the other 
four countries also experienced significant declines in their reserve cov-
ers, though not as dramatic as that experienced by Egypt.
As a result, the credit ratings of all of the Arab countries in transi-
tion (ACTs) suffered. In 2010 Tunisia’s debt was rated by Moody’s as 
Baa, which means that it was considered medium grade and subject to 
moderate risk. In early 2015 it is rated as Ba, which means that it is 
speculative and subject to substantial risk. Egypt’s debt was rated as Ba 
before the Arab Spring and is rated as Caa in 2015, which means that 
it is now of poor standing and subject to very high credit risk. Jordan 
also saw its credit rating deteriorate from Ba to B, meaning that it is 
considered a high credit risk.
The decline in credit rating and increased sovereign risk make it 
more difficult for the private sector to engage in international business, 
particularly to obtain credit on the international market. This compli-
cates international trade and makes it more difficult for the country to 
import. Some Egyptian businessmen complained to me in 2013 that it 
TAble 2-5. International Reserves, by Months of Imports, Arab Countries in Transition, 
2010–14
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
egypt 6.9 4.7 2.7 2.5 2.7 
Jordan 7.4 5.9 3.6 5.1 5.8 
Morocco 5.7 5.0 4.2 4.3 4.5 
Tunisia 4.4 3.4 3.9 3.4 3.6 
Yemen 6.0 3.9 5.6 4.6 3.6 
Source:  International Monetary Fund.
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took about six weeks to open a letter of credit to import goods, while 
it took only three days before the revolution.
Increased Fragility and Risks Going Forward
Where are the ACTs heading? Are they moving toward more chaos, 
terrorism, and civil strife, or are they going to succeed in building sta-
ble and prosperous democracies? The jury is still out on this question. 
However, it seems clear that the ACTs are facing serious risks going 
forward. In the Arab world today, Yemen, Syria, and Libya are looking 
more and more like failed states. Will others follow them?
Yemen presents a worst-case scenario in which the dreams of lib-
erty and better living standards have turned into a nightmare of civil 
war, increasing tribalism and sectarianism, escalating terrorism, lack 
of human rights, increasing poverty, and greater injustice. The country 
seems to have entered into a vicious circle where frustration over the lack 
of concrete political and economic results from the 2011 revolution lead 
to civil unrest, which, in turn, leads to more violence and repression and 
even worse economic and social conditions. Yemen seems to have become 
a failed state that could break up into two or more entities at any time.
Tunisia is probably the best-case scenario. After four long years the 
country’s political elite was able to reach a historic compromise on a 
constitution and to carry out free and fair elections whose results were 
accepted by all parties. The Tunisian political forces were also able to 
agree on a broad coalition government that includes Islamists as well as 
secularists. Therefore, it seems that Tunisia is on its way to meeting the 
revolution’s demands for freedom and democracy while maintaining 
political stability and national unity.
But Tunisia’s impressive achievements are still fragile, and the coun-
try remains vulnerable to extremism and violence. It is threatened by 
terrorism from groups who continue to dream of turning Tunisia into 
a theocracy. Ansar al-Sharia is a Tunisian terrorist group that was cre-
ated in 2011. It is suspected of having been behind the attacks on the 
American embassy and the American School in 2012. It is also sus-
pected of assassinating two secular political figures, Chokri Belaid and 
Mohammed al-Brahimi, in 2013. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
has also been operating in Tunisia since 2011, particularly targeting 
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security personnel. For example, on July 16, 2014, fourteen Tunisian 
soldiers were killed and more than twenty were injured during a terror-
ist attack on Mount Chaambi, a closed military zone where the Tuni-
sian army has been tracking terrorist groups since the end of 2012. 
In 2015 the Bardo museum and Sousse attacks were crucial blows to 
tourism. Moreover, significant numbers of Tunisian youth are in Syria 
fighting with extremist groups, such as the Islamic State. How will 
those young men fit into Tunisian society when they return?
Building national consensus in Egypt has proved to be more difficult 
than in Tunisia. The year during which the Muslim Brotherhood was 
in power has left deep marks on the Egyptian body politic, and hardly 
anyone is willing to restart a dialogue with the Brotherhood to work 
toward national reconciliation. Moreover, there is a divide among sec-
ular politicians, and many of the democracy activists who led the 2011 
revolution feel excluded from current political processes.
Egypt has been plagued by terrorist attacks—mostly targeting gov-
ernment officials, Coptic Christians, and tourists—for many decades.16 
But the number and intensity of those attacks increased dramatically 
after the ouster of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013. According to gov-
ernment sources, more than five hundred soldiers, police officers, and 
civilians have been killed in terrorist attacks since 2013.17 Perhaps the 
greatest terrorist challenge has been in the Sinai Peninsula, where the 
group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, which has recently sworn allegiance to the 
organization of the Islamic State, has been active attacking army and 
police installations and personnel. It also claimed responsibility for an 
assassination attempt against the minister of interior, for attacks on 
police headquarters in Cairo, Ismailia, Dakahlia, and Sharqiya, and for 
a suicide attack against a tour bus of Korean tourists near Taba. As the 
security forces focused their efforts on curbing activities of Ansar Beit 
al-Maqdis in Sinai, smaller attacks on police checkpoints and individ-
uals in Egypt’s urban centers have continued.
16. Nearly all the terrorist groups operating in Egypt since the 1970s have been 
inspired by the work of Sayyid Qutb, a Muslim Brotherhood leader who was exe-
cuted in 1966 after an assassination attempt against President Nasser. Qutb’s most 
famous book (Maalim Fi al-Tariq, translated into English as Milestones) is a man-
ifesto for armed jihad to bring about the kingdom of God on earth (Qutb 1990).
17. For more on the terrorism data in Egypt, see Gold (2014).
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The two monarchies have so far been more stable than the repub-
lics, but they too face some challenges and risks. Ethnic differences 
between Transjordanians and Palestinians in Jordan or between 
Berbers and Arabs in Morocco represent an important challenge to 
national unity. Moreover, both monarchies, but especially Jordan, 
have to deal with important external threats. They are both situated 
in dangerous neighborhoods.
The crisis in Syria has had direct impacts on Jordan, which has 
received 600,000 registered refugees and an estimated 1.3 million 
refugees in all.18 Jordan’s population is about 7 million, which means 
that Syrian refugees represent more than 15 percent of the population. 
Imagine if the United States had to receive 57 million foreign refugees. 
In relative terms this is what Jordan is dealing with, and obviously it 
has economic, social, and political implications. But there are other cri-
ses on Jordan’s borders. The crisis in Iraq has impacted Jordan’s econ-
omy because Iraq is Jordan’s main export market, receiving more than 
18 percent of Jordanian exports.19 Moreover, the Israeli- Palestinian 
conflict directly impacts Jordan because of its long borders with the 
West Bank and its large population of Palestinian origin.
Morocco is also impacted but to a lesser extent, given its geograph-
ical location. Moroccan officials estimate that there are more than one 
thousand Moroccans fighting with jihadist groups in Iraq and Syria. 
In July 2014 they announced a tightening of security measures for fear 
that returning jihadist fighters would carry out attacks on Moroccan 
soil or use Morocco as a launching pad for terrorist attacks on other 
countries. In addition, the group al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
operates in neighboring Algeria and in the Sahel. Reports that the 
group is working with the Polisario Front, which rejects Morocco’s 
sovereignty over the Western Sahara, are cause for concern as they indi-
cate additional risks of attacks against Morocco.20
18. Some observers estimate the total number of Syrian refugees in Jordan at 
1.3 million; see “Syrian Refugee Crisis in Jordan Tests Hospitality,” BBC News, 
February 2, 2015. 
19. See International Monetary Fund (2014).
20. For example, see Le Polisario aux cotés d’AQMI au Mali,” Sahel Intelligence, 
March 1, 2013.
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The Need for Action on the Economy
It is obvious from the preceding discussion that building stable democ-
racies in the Arab world will require action on the security and political 
fronts. This has been the focus of Arab governments and their foreign 
partners. In Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Libya the international community 
has focused on supporting negotiations and national dialogues while 
also strengthening security arrangements and waging a war against 
terrorist groups like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
in North Africa. It appears that there has been a decision, conscious or 
otherwise, to postpone dealing with economic and social issues, except 
for relief operations for refugees and displaced people, until the polit-
ical and security situation is stabilized. I believe that this is a mistake.
Peace and stability—and hence successful transitions to democ-
racy—cannot be achieved as long as large segments of the population 
suffer from economic and social exclusion. Hence an economic program 
to achieve inclusive growth—together with actions on the political and 
security fronts—should be an integral part of any policy package that 
aims at building stable and prosperous democracies in the Arab world.
To be credible, and to attract widespread support for the political 
process, such an economic program needs to be broad enough to touch 
large segments of Arab society. The countries of the Arab region are 
facing similar threats, and therefore it would make sense for them to 
cooperate on developing a regional program for inclusive growth.
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Roots of the Arab Spring
Anyone following Arab or international media today would think that 
the Arab uprisings of 2010–11 were all about political issues, and par-
ticularly about defining national identity. As highlighted in chapter 1, 
the Arab world seems to be divided between secularists and Islamists, 
Muslims and Christians, Sunnis and Shia, jihadists and spiritualists, 
liberal democrats and militant nationalists, and so on. Economic issues 
have been put on the back burner. The revolutions’ demands for more 
bread and greater social justice have been forgotten.
This chapter argues that economic issues were at the heart of the 
Arab Spring. It is true that Arab economies had solid growth rates 
during the decade preceding the uprisings. However, that growth was 
not inclusive. The middle class was squeezed, youth were left out, 
women were pushed out of the labor market, and many regions (for 
example, Upper Egypt and western Tunisia) were marginalized. Lim-
ited economic opportunities and increasing inequality were key drivers 
of the Arab Spring.
Arab Economies Were Growing before the Revolutions
The so-called Arab countries in transition (ACTs) experienced respect-
able growth rates over the period 1991–2010 (table 3-1). This was 
especially true at the beginning of the twenty-first century—that is, in 
the ten years immediately preceding the revolutions of late 2010 and 
early 2011. As table 3-1 shows, Egypt’s growth rates during 2000–10 
were in the range of 4–6 percent and Jordan’s in the range of 6–7 per-
cent, while Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen were growing at around 
4.5 percent a year.
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How do these growth rates compare with those of the rest of the 
world, and were the ACTs’ income levels converging? It depends. 
Table 3-2 shows that ACT income levels, compared with U.S. levels, 
have been converging since the late 1990s but at a snail’s pace. On 
the other hand, compared with India and especially with China, it is 
significant divergence.
Table 3-2 shows the ratio of per capita GDP (in trend-purchasing- 
power-parity dollars) in the ACTs to U.S. per capita GDP, and it also 
includes three of the four emerging economies known as BRICs (Brazil, 
China, and India) for comparison.1 The table shows that the 1980s and 
1990s were a period of divergence for most countries, including the 
ACTs.2 The ratio for Brazil fell from 37 percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 
1990 and to 24 percent in 2000. India remained stagnant in the 1980s 
at 5 percent of U.S. GDP. During the 1980s, per capita GDP in Jordan, 
Morocco, and Tunisia fell relative to the United States, while Egypt’s per 
capita GDP remained more or less unchanged in relative terms, moving 
from 17 to 18 percent of U.S. levels. China is a clear exception to this 
trend, as the ratio of Chinese to U.S. per capita GDP doubled, from 2 to 
4 percent, in the 1980s and doubled again in the 1990s to 8 percent.
The situation began to change in the 1990s and especially the early 
years of this century as most emerging and developing economies, includ-
ing the ACTs, started converging toward income levels of Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Egypt’s 
1. The fourth is Russia. The analysis was also done using per capita GDP in nom-
inal terms and gross national income in nominal as well as in purchasing- power-
parity terms. The conclusions do not change.
2. For more, see Pritchett (1997).
TAble 3-1. Average GDP Growth Rate, ACTs, 1991–2010  
Percent
Country 1991–94 1995–99 2000–04 2005–10
egypt 2.4 5.8 3.9 5.9
Jordan 6.4 3.6 5.6 6.6
Morocco 3.1 2.3 4.7 4.6
Tunisia 4.6 5.2 4.5 4.4
Yemen 6.3 5.1 4.3 4.6
Source: Data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. Author’s calculations. 
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and Jordan’s GDP per capita, which were 18 percent of U.S. GDP in 
1990, rose to 22 and 23 percent, respectively, by 2010. During the same 
period Morocco moved from 11 to 13 percent of U.S. GDP, and Tunisia 
from 15 to 21 percent. However, the growth rates of convergence are 
very slow. At those rates Jordan would catch up with the United States 
somewhere around 2060, Tunisia would catch up around 2070, Morocco 
around 2080, and Egypt around 2090. Yemen shows virtually no con-
vergence. Moreover, political upheaval after 2010 has led to a slowdown 
in the ACT economies, implying slower convergence in general and even 
an outright return to divergence in Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen.
Emerging economies, especially India and China, have been growing 
at much faster rates and therefore converging much faster to OECD lev-
els. This also means that the ACTs are rapidly losing ground compared 
with those economies. In 1980 Jordan’s GDP per capita was 647 per-
cent that of India, and Tunisia’s was 374 percent; by 2013 those ratios 
had fallen to 214 percent and 202 percent, respectively.3 At this rate 
India’s per capita GDP will surpass that of nearly all ACTs before the 
end of the century.
The comparison with China is even more dramatic. In 1980 Egypt’s 
GDP per capita was more than seven times that of China, whereas 
3. Data from IMF, World Economic Outlook. Author’s calculations. 
TAble 3-2. Ratio of per Capita GDP to U.S. per Capita GDP, in TPPP Dollars, ACTs and bRICs, 
1980–2013a  
Percent
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013 
brazil 37 28  24  28  28  
China 2 4  8  19  22  
India 5 5  6  9  10  
egypt 17  18   18  22  21  
Jordan 29  18  17  23  22  
Morocco 12  11  10  13  14  
Tunisia 17  15  16  21  21  
Yemen n.a. 9  8  9  7  
Source:  Data from International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook. Author’s calculations.
a. TPPP = trend purchasing power parity.
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now it is 10 percent lower in purchasing-power-parity terms. Today, 
Yemen’s GDP per capita is about one-third that of China. It is hard to 
believe that in 1990 Yemen had a GDP per capita that was more than 
double that of China.
Nevertheless, with the exception of Yemen, the ACTs’ growth rates 
were sufficient to bring about significant reductions in extreme poverty. 
By 2010, $2-a-day poverty was nearly eliminated in Jordan and was cut 
by three-fourths in Tunisia and by nearly half in Egypt. Morocco went 
through a big increase in poverty in the 1990s and then a huge decline 
from 2000 to 2010, which I find hard to explain.4
Yet Arabs Were Dissatisfied
The Arab revolutions of 2010–11 took everybody by surprise. How-
ever, with the benefit of hindsight, it now appears that analysts and 
specialists of the region should have seen it coming. The mood in the 
Arab world was gloomy in spite of the good economic results.
Figure 3-1 shows data from the World Values Survey for the period 
just before the Arab revolutions, that is, wave 5 of the survey. I present 
data for the four Arab countries that participated in this wave plus four 
other middle-income countries that are used as comparators. Iraq is 
clearly an outlier, with more than 45 percent of respondents stating that 
they were both dissatisfied with their lives and unhappy. Given what 
was happening in Iraq at the time (and continues to happen today), can 
anyone really blame them?
But even excluding Iraq, the other three Arab countries’ level of dis-
satisfaction and unhappiness seems to have been very high relative to 
the comparators. More than 30 percent of Egyptians said that they 
were dissatisfied with their lives. Compare that with about 6 percent 
of Brazilians, 8 percent of Malaysians, 10 percent of Indonesians, and 
19 percent of Indians. Looking at the proportion of people who said 
they were not happy yields similar results, except that India appears to 
be an outlier. The Arab countries have much higher unhappiness num-
bers than Brazil, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
4. World Bank, World Development Indicators. Data from the household survey 
closest to the year in question.
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It is important to understand why the Arabs revolted in 2010–11, 
because failure to respond to the demands expressed by Arab youth 
during that time could imply political and social instability over the 
medium term and, in some cases, the collapse of nation states and 
widespread civil strife. It sometimes appears as if today’s political lead-
ers have not yet fully internalized the lessons of the Arab Spring, which 
does not augur well for future economic and social developments.
There are three possible explanations for the Arab revolutions: the 
revolts were against political circumstances and had nothing to do with 
economic conditions; economic growth in the ACTs was not inclusive, 
and large segments of the population, especially youth, were left out; 
and the revolts reflected dissatisfaction with both the political and the 
economic conditions in those countries.
Explanations for the Arab Revolutions 
Some of the proponents of the view that the revolts were only political 
point to the data shown in table 3-3, which indicate that all the ACTs 
FIGURE 3-1. Dissatisfaction and Unhappiness among Surveyed ACT Respondents 
Percent
Egypt Jordan India Indonesia
Source: Data from World Values Survey, wave 5 (2005–09). Period covered by country: Egypt 2008, Iraq 2006, Jordan 
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had low governance scores. Their lowest scores were in the area of 
voice and accountability, where the five Arab countries fell in the bot-
tom one-third of all developing countries. And Tunisia, where the Arab 
Spring started, fell in the bottom 10 percent. It is argued that with eco-
nomic development and higher living standards people typically start 
demanding more voice in the management of national affairs, and that 
is what the Arab revolts were all about.
According to this view, Arab countries were simply following in 
the footsteps of more advanced East Asian (for example, South Korea) 
and Latin American (for example, Brazil) countries, where economic 
development and an expansion of education led to greater demands 
for political and civil liberties and ultimately the fall of long-ruling 
autocratic regimes. In the case of the Arab countries, the process may 
have been accelerated by the revolution in information technology, and 
particularly the expansion of social media, which were used by revolu-
tionary youth to organize and mobilize support.
Of course, there are also the conspiracy theorists. Some proponents 
of the politics-only explanation of the revolutions claim that they were 
the result of an international conspiracy. They point to the chaotic state 
in which Arab countries that went through revolutions find themselves 
today and the explosion of ethnic and sectarian conflicts all around the 
region following the Arab Spring. They conclude that the revolutions 
of 2010–11 were fueled by outside forces that wanted to destroy Arab 
nation-states and thus maintain the Arab world in a state of perpetual 
weakness and dependence on foreigners.5
5. For an exposition of conspiracy theories see, Abdrabo (2015).
TAble 3-3. Governance Scores for 2010 (percentile rank)
Country







quality Rule of law
Control of 
corruption
egypt 13.7 19.3 43.1 46.9 51.2 34.3 
Jordan 27.5 34.4 59.3 57.4 61.1 60.9 
Morocco 28.9 33.0 50.7 51.2 50.2 53.3 
Tunisia 10.0 44.3 63.2 53.1 59.7 54.8 
Yemen 10.9 1.9 14.3 30.1 13.3 10.0 
Source:  World bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators.
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Most Western observers, and some Arabs, do not take those con-
spiracy theories seriously. After all it is hard to see how creating chaos 
in the Middle East and North Africa, with the ensuing wars, exodus 
of refugees, increasing terrorism, and large-scale migration movements 
to Europe, could be in the strategic interest of the great international 
powers. The Arab world is important, but is it really so important that 
the world will invest huge resources conspiring to weaken it? Many 
observers believe that those conspiracy theories are just attempts by the 
ruling elites to blame foreigners for their own failures.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to ignore conspiracy theories 
simply because they seem so far fetched. This may be a case where 
perception is more important than reality. Many Arabs appear to 
subscribe to those theories. The defense of former Egyptian president 
Hosni Mubarak, in his trial for the killing of young demonstrators by 
security forces, presented the revolutionaries in Tahrir Square as agents 
of foreign powers intent on destroying the Egyptian state that President 
Mubarak was trying so hard to protect.
Most of the conspiracy theories are somehow linked to the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. The argument supporting the idea of a global conspir-
acy against the Arab nations is quite simple, maybe even simplistic. It 
is based on the premise that ensuring Israel’s security is a key Western, 
and especially U.S., priority. Therefore, it is argued, the West is always 
conspiring to keep the Arabs weak in order to protect Israel.
The conspiracy argument is not very convincing. The United States 
and its Western allies do not need to destabilize a whole region, sup-
port jihadist ideologies, and support global terrorism to ensure Israel’s 
security. They have sufficient technical, economic, and military supe-
riority to do that, while avoiding the human and economic costs asso-
ciated with fragile or failed Arab states and increasing terrorist attacks 
around the world.
Nevertheless, failure to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict seems to 
complicate Arab transition to democracy. The conflict provides argu-
ments that support extremist ideologies and conspiracy theories. Isra-
el’s military superiority (achieved with Western help), its failure to 
acknowledge Palestinian rights, and the daily humiliations that Arabs 
endure at the hands of Israeli security forces create a feeling of vic-
timization. As a result, Arab societies have become more accepting of 
violence, more suspicious of foreigners, and more willing to sacrifice 
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liberty on the altar of national security and the struggle against the 
Israeli occupiers.
It Is the Economy after All
Even if the conspiracy theorists were right and foreign powers were sup-
porting the revolutions, it is hard to imagine that masses of young peo-
ple would have taken to the streets of Tunis, Cairo, and Sana’a if they 
did not have real grievances. The revolutionaries called for bread, free-
dom, social justice, and human dignity. That is, the slogans of the revo-
lutions included economic (bread and social justice) as well as political 
(freedom and human dignity) demands. But the slogan that attracted 
most attention was “The people want the fall of the regime.” As stated 
in the previous chapter, there is a difference between the so-called Arab 
republics (Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen) and the monarchies (Jordan and 
Morocco). The people of Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen demanded regime 
change, while those of Jordan and Morocco demanded changes in the 
existing regime. It seems that monarchs enjoy a greater sense of legiti-
macy than authoritarian presidents in the Arab world.
The hypothesis that Arabs revolted only for political reasons is not 
supported by available data. After the revolution, Arab Barometer con-
ducted a survey asking Tunisians to state the main reason for their 
revolt. Figure 3-2 presents the results. About 63 percent of respondents 
said that the weak economy was the main reason behind the revolution. 
This may appear surprising at first sight, since, as shown earlier, Tuni-
sian economic performance (measured in terms of real growth) was 
not weak before the revolution. However, it may be the case that many 
Tunisians did not benefit from growth. They were left out, and hence 
from their perspective the economy was weak.
The second reason given for the revolutions, high levels of corrup-
tion, could also be considered economic. Some 17 percent of Tunisians 
said that corruption was the main driver for the revolution. Of course, 
corruption is not a purely economic problem. In the case of Tunisia 
(and Egypt), large-scale corruption reflected a special relationship 
between political and economic elites, whereby some large businesses 
were supported by political elites and hence received special privileges 
and protection.
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Only 14 percent of Tunisians said that they revolted because of lack 
of political freedom. More strikingly, a mere 4 percent of Tunisians said 
that they revolted because they wanted to live in a more Islamic society.
The emphasis on economic issues does not mean that Arabs do not 
care for democracy. In survey after survey Arabs have repeated their 
strong belief in democracy. The latest wave of the World Values Survey 
(2010–14) highlights that nearly 99 percent of Egyptians, 86 percent 
of Jordanians and Tunisians, 85 percent of Moroccans, and 80 percent 
of Yemenis said that democracy is the preferred form of government.
If democracy is so popular in the Arab world, why is democracy hav-
ing such a difficult time taking hold? Egyptian president el-Sissi shed 
some light on this question in a paper he wrote in 2006 while he was 
attending the U.S. Army War College. In this paper he describes the con-
straints on democracy in the Arab world, namely poverty, lack of a demo-
cratic culture, religious extremism, Arab-Israeli conflict, and the negative 
perception Arabs have of the West, particularly the United States. He 
clearly sees democratization as a long-term process. El-Sissi states,
FIGURE 3-2. Tunisians’ Reasons for Revolting against President Ben Ali 
Percent
Weak economy Corruption Want more
Islamization
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It is one thing to say that democracy is a preferred form of gov-
ernment, but quite another to adjust to its requirements and 
accept some [of] the risks that go along with it. . . . The economic, 
religious, education, media, security and legal systems will be 
affected. As a result, it will take time for people and the nation’s 
systems to adjust to the new form of government. . . . In my opin-
ion democracy needs [a] good environment like a reasonable eco-
nomic situation, educated people and a moderate understanding 
of religious issues.6
According to el-Sissi, to develop democracy in the Middle East four 
things need to happen. First, the education system should be strength-
ened and the media should play a bigger role in spreading a culture of 
democracy. Second, a consensus needs to be reached on the appropriate 
role of religion in government. Third, there needs to be greater regional 
integration and exchange of lessons and experiences. Fourth, as the 
Middle East develops, the rest of the world needs to assist in promoting 
democratic values, perhaps by supporting education.
Finally, it is important to note that Arabs support democracy for 
economic as well as political reasons. Table 3-4 shows the results 
from the World Values Survey for the question concerning the essen-
tial characteristics of democracy. Unsurprisingly, the ability to choose 
one’s leaders through free elections received the most votes as an 
essential characteristic of democracy. However, neither protection of 
civil liberties nor equal rights for women ranked second. The second 
most commonly cited characteristic of democracy, according to Arab 
respondents, is that governments provide unemployment benefits. In 
Morocco, more people picked unemployment insurance as an essen-
tial characteristic of democracy than free elections. According to this 
survey, the third most important characteristic of democracy is that 
governments tax the rich to subsidize the poor. In Jordan, 31 percent 
of respondents picked this as an essential characteristic of democracy, 
while only 22 percent picked free elections and just 13 percent picked 
the protection of civil liberties.
This is not to say that the desire for greater political and civil liber-
ties was not an important driver for the Arab Spring. I am only pointing 
6. El-Sissi (2006, pp. 2–3).
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out that polling data indicate that economic factors may have been even 
more important drivers. The data from Tunisia, the first Arab Spring 
country, show that while 63 percent of Tunisians felt that the weak 
economy was the main cause of the revolution, only 14 percent said 
the same about lack of political freedom (see figure 3-2). Moreover, 
while huge majorities of Arabs believe that democracy is the preferred 
political system, most of them seem to support democracy because they 
believe that it would bring about economic benefits in terms of greater 
equality and more protection for the poor and vulnerable.
The Middle Class Felt Left Out 
Recent research has stressed the important role the middle class plays 
in economic development.7 The middle class is seen as important for 
the political stability that is necessary for economic growth. It is also 
a source of entrepreneurship and new ideas that are necessary for the 
small businesses that fuel the world’s economy. Middle-class values also 
emphasize education and savings. Thus the middle class is a key source 
of investment in human and physical capital. Finally, the middle class 
represents the most important source of demand for consumer goods 
and services, and therefore it is an important driver of development for 
domestic industries.
7. For example see Kharas (2010) or Banerjee and Duflo (2008).
TAble 3-4. Respondents’ View of essential Characteristics of Democracy
Country
Government 














Equal rights  
for women
egypt 25.3 24.4 27.4 45.4 27.7 24.7 
Jordan 30.9 20.3 8.8 21.7 12.9 17.5 
Morocco 36.2 52.7 37.2 50.1 39.1 46.4 
Tunisia 30.0 40.2 22.1 47.1 41.9 36.4 
Yemen 47.9 41.8 31.3 69.1 38.3 42.0 
Source:  World Values Survey, wave 6 (2010–14). Periods covered by country: egypt 2012, Jordan 2014, Morocco 2011, 
Tunisia 2013, Yemen 2013.
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There are several definitions of the middle class. I use two different 
definitions to test the robustness of my conclusions. I start by using the 
definition developed by Kharas (2010), who defines the global mid-
dle class as those people who live on $10–100 per capita per day in 
purchasing-power-parity terms. He calculates the size of the middle 
class separately for 145 countries, using distributional parameters from 
household surveys and adjusting the mean of the distribution to reflect 
the consumption level from the national income accounts. I then use 
the definition developed by Banerjee and Duflo (2008) and define the 
middle class solely using household surveys, with the middle class com-
prising people living on $2–10 a day.
Table 3-5 presents the proportion of the population that is in the 
middle class, according to the Kharas definition, for the five ACTs 
as well as Brazil, China, and India. It shows that the relative size of 
the middle class has been increasing gradually in the ACTs and that 
this increase accelerated in the twenty-first century. In Egypt and Jor-
dan, the relative size of the middle class more than doubled between 
2000 and 2010, while in Morocco and Tunisia over the same period it 
increased by more than 60 percent.
The comparison with Brazil is interesting, because it shows that, 
except for Tunisia, the ACTs are still far from achieving the level of 
Brazil, where 45 percent of the population is middle class. In relative 
terms the Brazilian middle class is more than double that of Egypt and 
TAble 3-5. Share of the Population That Is Middle Class, using the Kharas Definition 
Percent
Country 1990 2000 2010
egypt 7.7 11.3 22.4
Jordan 11.7 15.8 36.0
Morocco 5.7 6.2 10.7
Tunisia 15.7 25.5 41.1
Yemen 1.0 2.0 2.0
brazil 24.7 31.0 45.2
China 0.0 2.0 12.0
India 1.0 1.0 5.0
Source: brookings database.
Ghanem_Arab Spring V1_i-x_1-156_final.indd   50 11/20/15   1:16 PM
 roots of tHe ArAb sprIng 51
is 25 percent larger than that of Jordan. The comparison with China 
and India shows the difference in the speed of development of the mid-
dle class. During 2000–10 China increased the relative size of its mid-
dle class sixfold, while India increased its fivefold. Of course, they both 
started from a very low base—from where Yemen was ten years ago 
and where it still is today.
In spite of the increase in the proportion of the population that is mid-
dle class in the ACTs, the absolute number of people who are below mid-
dle class continued to increase everywhere except in Tunisia. In Egypt, 
Jordan, and Morocco the number of people below middle class rose 
from 52.5 million, 3.0 million, and 23.4 million, respectively, in 1990 to 
63.0 million, 4.0 million and 28.5 million in 2010. The number of peo-
ple below middle class in Yemen nearly doubled, from 11.8 to 23.5 mil-
lion, over the same period. Tunisia has been doing better than the other 
four Arab countries. Nevertheless, the absolute number of Tunisians 
living below middle class did not fall significantly and remained around 
6 million people.8 Moreover, those people who were left out tended to 
be concentrated geographically in the country’s interior.9
I get similar results using the Banerjee and Duflo definition. Since 
the lower limit for middle class according to this definition is set quite 
low at $2 a day, there is no increase in the number of people living 
below middle class (that is, poor), as described earlier, and, in fact, 
poverty decreased in the Arab countries before the revolutions. The 
middle class has grown steadily according to this definition. However, 
there is an increase in the number of people stuck in lower-middle-class 
status, consuming between $2 and $6 a day. That is, people did get out 
of poverty but remained very close to the poverty line. Of course, there 
are variations by countries. While the number of people stuck in lower- 
middle-class status increased from 36.5 million in the early 1990s to 
57.2 million right before the revolution in Egypt and from 14.4 million 
to 19 million in Morocco, it remained virtually unchanged at about 
4.5 million people in Tunisia during the same period.10
Thus I could propose one possible explanation for popular dissatis-
faction in the ACTs despite economic growth. The number of people 
8. Brookings database, 2010.
9. For more on this point see Boughzala (2013).
10. Data from PovCalNet. Author’s calculations.
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living below middle class (according to the Kharas definition) or in 
the lower middle class (according to the Banerjee-Duflo definition) and 
therefore feeling left out from the benefits of growth has been increas-
ing in absolute terms. There was an increasing group of unhappy cit-
izens willing to go into the streets to express their dissatisfaction and 
demand what they considered to be their rights.
Of course, one could always argue that with continued strong 
growth people who are initially left out would have ended up benefiting 
as the middle class expanded further. This is probably true. However, 
it is not politically realistic. With the benefit of hindsight, it would 
probably have made more sense for Arab governments to adopt active 
policies aimed at expanding the middle class rather than waiting for 
trickle-down to work.
Youth Felt Excluded 
Within the middle class it appears that youth felt more excluded from 
the benefits of growth than their elders. Conventional wisdom has it 
that youth unemployment was the main driver of the Arab Spring. 
There is probably a lot of truth in that, but a careful analysis of the data 
leads to more nuanced conclusions. Overall, youth unemployment does 
not appear to be particularly high in the Arab region. But there are 
three important issues relating to the youth job market. First, female 
unemployment is exceptionally high and female labor force participa-
tion is exceptionally low, which makes it difficult for young couples to 
create middle-class families with two working adults. Second, unem-
ployment seems to rise with education level, which leads to greater dis-
satisfaction on the part of unemployed graduates and their families. 
Third, those who do find jobs are often dissatisfied because they end up 
finding only precarious and poorly paid employment.
Table 3-6 presents unemployment rates in seven Arab countries and 
compares them with Indonesia, Malaysia (Muslim-majority  countries), 
Brazil, and South Africa (two BRICs). Looking at the overall youth 
unemployment rates, it is noted that individual country experiences 
differ; for example, unemployment rates in Saudi Arabia and in  Tunisia 
are higher than in other Arab countries. At the same time, it is difficult 
to conclude from these data that youth unemployment is a significantly 
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bigger problem in Arab countries than in the comparators. Youth 
unemployment appears to be a global problem, not just an Arab one. 
However, as shown in chapter 5, Arab youth have the lowest labor force 
participation rate in the world. Hence the unemployment rate may not 
be a good measure as discouraged youth leave the labor market.
It is clear from table 3-6, that young Arab females face a much more 
serious unemployment problem than their Arab brothers and certainly 
a more serious one than their sisters in the comparator countries. A 
young Egyptian male has a significantly lower probability of being 
unemployed than a young Indonesian male. However, a young Egyp-
tian female’s probability of being unemployed is more than twice as 
high as that of an Indonesian woman of the same age.
High female unemployment rates are coupled with very low female 
labor force participation rates. Figure 3-3 plots female labor force par-
ticipation rates against GDP per capita and shows that the countries of 
the Middle East and North Africa are clear outliers.
Low female participation rates, together with the high female unem-
ployment rates, mean that only about 18 percent of working-age Arab 
TAble 3-6. Youth Unemployment Rates 
Percent
Country Youth Male Female
Arab
egypt 24.8 14.7 54.1
Tunisia 29.4 27.8 32.7
Algeria 21.5 18.7 37.6
Syria 20.4 16.4 43.5
Saudi Arabia 30.0 23.5 54.8
bahrain 5.0 2.5 11.6
Qatar 1.2 0.5 7.0
Comparator
Indonesia 21.4 21.0 22.0
Malaysia 11.4 11.0 12.0
brazil 17.8 13.8 23.1
South Africa 50.5 47.2 54.6
Source: International labor Organization (2010 and 2011).
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women actually have jobs.11 Obviously this implies a waste of resources, 
especially since many of these women are educated. It also makes it 
much harder to develop a middle class. Today most middle-class fami-
lies around the world depend on two breadwinners. This is still not the 
case in the Arab world, which appears to be stuck in mid- twentieth-
century paradigms of family structures and gender roles. That situation 
would not have been a major problem if productivity and wages in the 
Arab world were so high that a working man could ensure a middle- 
class life for his family. But this is not the case.
The result is severe frustration, as young men are unable to earn enough 
to get married, find a place to live, and raise a family, and young educated 
women stay at home waiting to get married. As described by Assaad and 
Barsoum (2007), this has led to a whole generation in waiting: waiting 
for better jobs, waiting for housing, and waiting to get married and raise 
a family. Some of the social ills observed in some Arab countries today 
could probably be explained, at least in part, by this situation.
11. See Steer, Ghanem, and Jalbout (2014).
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Being young, educated, and unemployed is a major source of frustra-
tion. Boughzala (2013) studies the relationship between education and 
unemployment in Tunisia, which is quite representative of other Arab 
countries. He shows that between 2005 and May 2011, the unemployment 
rate rose from 6.5 percent to 8 percent for people with no education and 
from 14 percent to 29.2 percent for people with a higher level education.
There are at least two possible explanations for this situation. The 
first stresses inadequate demand for labor. Educated Arab youth have 
traditionally been employed by the public sector. In fact, in many Arab 
countries youth with higher education were guaranteed a public job. 
As budgets got tighter and governments reduced (or even froze) hiring, 
the demand for qualified labor (or the supply of high-paying, secure 
jobs) declined sharply, especially since the private sector did not expand 
quickly enough. Thus many young people remain unemployed for 
extended periods of time waiting for a job opening in the public sector.
The second explanation stresses the mismatch between available 
skills and the skills demanded by a globalized labor market. It high-
lights two types of weaknesses in Arab education systems. The first 
concerns the quality of curricula. It is argued that education curricula 
in Arab countries rely too heavily on rote learning and do not help 
students acquire twenty-first-century skills, such as problem solving 
and working with a team, that are demanded by the labor market. The 
second concerns the delivery of the curricula. Results from interna-
tional tests for mathematics and sciences indicate that too many Arab 
children are not learning, even though they attend school regularly.
Table 3-7 presents unemployment rates for Jordan disaggregated by 
education level and sex. It shows a similar relationship between edu-
cation and unemployment as in Tunisia, except for the big spike in 
unemployment for men who have less than a secondary degree. Their 
unemployment rate is 60 percent compared with a 23 percent rate for 
those with higher education.
The relationship between education and unemployment for Jorda-
nian women is particularly interesting. Female unemployment rises 
from 0.1 percent for illiterate women to nearly 70 percent for women 
with higher degrees (table 3-7). This could be explained by the fact 
that female labor force participation rates (which overall are only about 
15 percent in Jordan) rise with education levels. Thus few illiterate 
women actually enter the labor market, hence their low unemployment 
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rate. On the other hand, many highly educated women enter the labor 
market, and their unemployment rate is three times as high as the 
unemployment rate for men with the same qualifications.
As shown in figure 3-4, most Arab youth who do find work end 
up having what is normally considered to be precarious employment, 
as self-employed, unpaid family workers and private informal wage 
earners. The public sector is still a significant employer in many Arab 
countries, but the formal private sector is still too small. For exam-
ple, in Egypt, of the young men and women who do find jobs, only 
38 percent find formal sector jobs—27 percent in the public sector and 
11 percent in the formal private sector. The vast majority, 62 percent, 
end up working in the informal sector, often as unpaid family workers. 
For those who are paid, most have no labor contract, no job security, 
and no social benefits.
Table 3-8 shows that Arab youths’ access to regular full-time employ-
ment is much lower than in all other regions of the world except for 
sub-Saharan Africa. Only 34 percent of young Arab males have full-
time regular employment, compared with a world average of 47 per-
cent. Similarly, only 31 percent of young Arab females have full-time 
employment, compared with a world average of 37 percent.
Table 3-8 also shows that the difference between Arab males and 
females in access to full-time regular employment is quite small (34 
compared with 31 percent) and is smaller than what is observed in most 
of the other regions. Even in Europe the difference is much higher, with 
60 percent of young males having regular full-time employment com-
pared with only 49 percent of young females.





Illiterate 0.9 1.3 0.1
less than secondary 44.4 60.3 7.3
Secondary 8.2 10.0 3.8
Intermediate diploma 9.5 5.4 19.1
bachelor and above 37.0 23.0 69.6
Source: Comolet (2014).
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How could the data in table 3-8 be reconciled with the huge gen-
der gap observed in overall employment? The explanation lies in the 
big share of informal employment in overall employment and in Arab 
women’s apparent belief that the informal sector is an unsafe environ-
ment for women. For example, in Egypt nearly all of the women work-
ing in the informal sector are in agriculture, working on the family 
farm with their husbands and children, and usually are not paid. Many 
Egyptian women explained that if they could not get a formal sector 
job, preferably in government, they prefer to “respect themselves” and 
stay at home.12 This means that expanding formal employment will 
also have a positive impact on gender equality in most Arab countries.
Lack of economic opportunities naturally led to increased youth 
dissatisfaction and was one of the drivers of the revolutions. Gallup 
polled youth across the Arab world between February and April 2009 
12. See World Bank (2012a).



















Source: World Bank (2015).
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and showed that only 28 percent of Egyptian youth and 33 percent of 
Yemeni youth were satisfied with efforts to increase the supply of qual-
ity jobs in their countries. In Jordan and Tunisia, the figure is closer 
to 50 percent. In all of the Arab Spring countries, with the notable 
exception of Jordan, no more than 40 percent of youth felt that their 
countries’ leadership was trying to maximize youth potential.
Young people suffered economic exclusion, and most blamed their 
countries’ leadership for that state of affairs. This came on top of their 
feeling of social and political exclusion. Assaad and Barsoum (2007) 
studied the situation in Egypt and describe the constraints on self- 
expression faced by young men and women and the controls placed on 
student activities by the security apparatus. The result was that most 
young people refrained from any civic activities or volunteer work. They 
felt that their voices could not be heard. Many activist youth in Arab 
countries joined Islamist movements, which, according to Bayat (1998), 
provided them with an alternative moral and cultural community. Isla-
mist organizations also provided youth with services, such as libraries 
and sports facilities, that the public sector was unable to deliver.
Inequalities Persist across Regions and  
between Rural and Urban Areas 
The lower middle class and youth were not the only groups who felt 
excluded from the benefits of growth. Entire regions in the various 
TAble 3-8. Share of Youth, Fifteen to Twenty-nine years, Working Full Time for an employer
Percent
Region Men Women




Former Soviet Union countries 58 60
Arab world 34 31
World average 47 37
Source: Silatech Index brief, 2013.
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countries, mostly in rural areas, felt excluded as rural-urban and regional 
inequalities increased. This could explain why the Arab Spring started 
in Sidi Bouzid, a relatively underdeveloped and poor region in Tunisia.
Agriculture’s role in most ACT economies and societies is much 
more important than is revealed by simply looking at its share in GDP. 
As shown in table 3-9, agriculture’s contribution to GDP varies from 
a low of 3 percent in Jordan to 17 percent in Morocco. But this masks 
agriculture’s important contribution to employment. As also shown in 
table 3-9, almost 40 percent of Morocco’s labor force and 30 percent of 
the Egyptian labor force are employed in agriculture. Moreover, more 
than 40 percent of the Arab region’s population (including 67 percent 
in Yemen and 57 percent in Egypt) lives in rural areas, and livelihoods 
are therefore either directly or indirectly affected by agriculture. Jordan 
is the outlier in this table, with a rural population that is only 17 per-
cent of total population and with agricultural employment representing 
only 2 percent of total employment.
Agricultural yields in the ACTs are low by international standards. 
Low yields imply low labor productivity, low incomes, and high levels 
of rural poverty. World Development Indicators show that poverty in 
the ACTs is mostly a rural phenomenon. In Morocco, rural poverty is 
about three times higher than urban poverty, while in Egypt and Yemen 
it is twice as high.13 In that sense the ACTs are not different from other 
developing (and even developed) countries, where large differences in 
13. World Bank, World Development Indicators. Data from household surveys 
carried out at different times. The latest available year was used for each country. 
TAble 3-9. Relative Importance of Agriculture, Arab Countries in Transition, 2013
Percent 
Country
Agricultural value  
added as share of GDP
Agricultural employment  
as share of total employment
Rural population as  
share of total population
egypt 15 29 57
Jordan 3 2 17
Morocco 17 39 41
Tunisia 9 16 34
Yemen n.a. 25 67
Source:  World bank, World Development Indicators.
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living standards between urban and rural areas lead to migration out 
of rural areas and a process of urbanization. In the case of the ACTs 
the formal private sector has not been generating sufficient jobs. Hence 
the rural youth who migrated to cities ended up either unemployed 
or working in the informal sector. Thus they joined the ranks of the 
excluded and the dissatisfied.
In addition to the rural-urban differences, poverty in the ACTs also 
varies by region. Egypt and Tunisia provide good examples. In analyz-
ing the incidence of poverty in Egypt it is useful to divide the country 
into four regions: metropolitan Egypt, which includes the large cities, 
especially Cairo and Alexandria; Lower Egypt, which includes the 
fertile delta region north of Cairo; Upper Egypt, which includes the 
Nile valley south of Cairo; and border regions, which include the des-
ert areas along the border with Libya and in the Sinai. Each of these 
regions (except the metropolitan region) is divided into rural areas and 
urban centers.
Upper Egypt represents a special problem. It has about 50 percent 
of the country’s population but 83 percent of the extremely poor and 
67 percent of the poor. The problem in Upper Egypt is especially serious 
in the rural areas. Urban Upper Egypt has 11.6 percent of the extremely 
poor and 11.3 percent of the poor. On the other hand, rural Upper 
Egypt has 71.5 percent of the country’s extremely poor and 55.8 per-
cent of its poor.14
Table 3-10 presents the human opportunity index for the various 
Egyptian regions. This index was developed at the World Bank based 
on the idea that outcomes in terms of income and consumption are 
affected by the opportunities available to people, particularly to chil-
dren. The concept behind the index is that people should be given an 
equal opportunity in life. The index can be aggregated into four groups 
describing access to different types of services: education (primary, sec-
ondary, and so on); adequate housing (water, sanitation, and so on); 
early childhood (prenatal and postnatal care, immunization, and so 
on); and nutrition (protection from wasting, stunting, and so on). Table 
3-10 shows that Upper Egypt is the most lagging region in terms of edu-
cation and adequate housing (particularly access to sanitation) and is 
the second most lagging in early childhood development and nutrition.
14. World Bank (2012b).
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People in Upper Egypt appear to have been excluded from the bene-
fits of growth. This could explain, at least in part, the relative instability 
of that region and the spread of extremist ideologies among its youth.
In Tunisia, the western regions of the country are less developed than 
the eastern and coastal regions. Table 3-11 presents average annual 
consumption per capita across regions. It shows large inequalities with 
the level of per capita consumption in the richest region (Grand Tunis) 
more than double that of the poorest region (Midwest). In general, all 
the western regions (the interior) have lower per capita consumption 
than their eastern (coastal) counterparts. For example, average per cap-
ita consumption in the Northwest is only 76 percent of average per cap-
ita consumption in the Northeast. Moreover, per capita consumption 
has been growing at a slower rate in the West than in the East, implying 
increasing inequalities in spite of migration from West to East.
The lower average consumption levels in Tunisia are correlated with 
higher poverty. In the western regions, the poverty rates are indeed 
much higher than in the rest of the country: 32.3 percent, on average, 
in the Midwest and 25.9 percent in the Northwest, and again higher in 
the rural areas, about 50 percent higher than the national average and 
more than twice the poverty rate of big cities. Boughzala (2013) shows 
that all poverty rates, including those in the western regions, decreased 
significantly between 2000 and 2010, the decade before the revolution. 
However, the regional differences remained unchanged, which may 
explain the dissatisfaction felt by people in western Tunisia.
Sidi Bouzid, in midwestern Tunisia, is an example of a disadvan-
taged region in Tunisia and probably the rest of the Arab world. Agri-
culture is the main pillar of Sidi Bouzid’s economy. Until the 1970s 
most of this agriculture was based on extensive cereal production and 
semi-nomadic sheep herding. Only a few small sedentary communities 
TAble 3-10. Aggregate Human Opportunity Index, egypt, by Region, 2009
Category Metropolitan Lower Egypt Upper Egypt Borders
education 76 78 70 77
Housing 89 77 68 75
early childhood 77 69 65 55
Nutrition 77 77 75 65
Source: World bank (2012b). 
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had mastered vegetable growing. Within decades, a state-initiated pro-
cess led to a deep transformation that turned the area’s semi-nomadic 
people into peasants and farmers. The government adopted a three-
pronged approach. First, tribal land was divided into private lots to 
provide the new private owners with an incentive to invest in agricul-
ture. Second, the government built the first water systems based on 
ground water and deep aquifers and facilitated farmers’ access to finan-
cial resources and to subsidized agricultural inputs, including seeds and 
fertilizers. Third, important public projects in infrastructure, roads, 
and electrical and safe-water networks were also completed to the ben-
efit of the poor agricultural community.
Farmers responded quickly to the state’s intervention. They invested 
in irrigation facilities even after the state, starting in the early 1990s, 
slowed down its interventions and stopped or reduced the subsidiza-
tion of most of the inputs. Thus almost 90 percent of the irrigation 
investments—48,000 hectares of irrigated land—were the outcome of 
private investment. The total area has more than doubled since 1995; it 
increased from 223,000 hectares in 1995 to 488,000 hectares in 2012. 
This growth was mainly a private sector achievement. Thus by 2005 
Sidi Bouzid had become a major producer of olive oil (9.5 percent of 
national production), almonds (23.8 percent), tomatoes (8.8 percent), 
and pomegranates (10 percent).
TAble 3-11. Per capita Consumption, Tunisia, by Region, 2010
Region 
Per capita consumption 
(dinars; 2005 prices) Annual growth rate (percent)
2000 2005 2010 2000–10
Grand Tunis 2,000 2,331 2,624 2.8  
Northeast 1,320 1,547 1,718 2.7  
Northwest 1,127 1,292 1,311 1.5  
Mideast 1,707 1,902 2,189 2.5  
Midwest 968 1,034 1,212 2.3  
Southeast 1,126 1,574 1,787 4.7  
Southwest 1,068 1,338 1,507 3.5  
Tunisia 1,441 1,696 1,919 2.9  
Source: boughzala (2013).
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Incomes rose and living conditions improved in Sidi Bouzid, but 
many people, especially youth, did not benefit from this growth. Inves-
tors from outside the region, mainly from Sfax, developed large mod-
ern farms concentrated in the most fertile part of Sidi Bouzid. Small 
local farmers felt excluded.
Young people in Sidi Bouzid benefited from secondary and tertiary 
education. They expected this would be the key to better employment, 
but for a large number of them this did not happen. Few employment 
opportunities were available. In 2010 the average unemployment rate 
for university graduates in Sidi Bouzid was around 40 percent. It was 
even higher for young women, many of whom simply exited the labor 
market. The only jobs available were for seasonal, low-paid farm labor-
ers, jobs that do not interest educated youth. Young people were also 
unable to start farming businesses because they lacked the financial 
resources and had no access to land. Sidi Bouzid’s youth were forced to 
join a long waiting list for a government job.
It All Started in Sidi Bouzid
The educated youth of Sidi Bouzid were frustrated and ready to express 
their anger by all available means. Their anger peaked on December 
17, 2010, when police confiscated the cart and scales of a twenty-six-
year-old informal vegetable seller, Mohamed Bouazizi. When he tried 
to argue with them because he needed the cart and the scale to sup-
port his mother and six siblings, a policeman slapped him in the face. 
He went to complain to the municipality and the governorate but was 
turned away. Humiliated, angry, and frustrated, he burnt himself in 
front of the governorate headquarters. This sparked a rebellion in Sidi 
Bouzid and ignited a massive uprising in Tunisia that quickly spread 
to the rest of the Arab world. Mohamed Bouazizi died of his burns on 
January 4, 2011.
Bouazizi’s action and consequent revolutions in Tunisia and else-
where obviously had a political and governance dimension. This was 
not the first time that the police harassed Bouazizi: they had done that 
occasionally to extort payments from him. But this time he apparently 
refused, or maybe he did not have enough to pay them off. The authori-
ties had no respect for human rights or citizens’ dignity. The policeman 
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slapped him. Bouazizi felt that he did not have any voice. He tried com-
plaining to the municipality and to the governorate but he was ignored. 
Government officials, particularly the police, were not accountable for 
their actions. They could confiscate Bouazizi’s property and even slap 
him without being questioned about their actions.
But didn’t Bouazizi’s action and the consequent revolution also have 
an economic and social dimension? Would that incident have occurred 
if Bouazizi had had a regular full-time job? Would it have occurred if 
he had been the owner of an officially sanctioned small business rather 
than an informal enterprise operating in the shadows of legality and 
thus vulnerable to police extortion? Would this incident have occurred 
if his mother or one of his sisters had a job so that the weight of sup-
porting the entire family did not fall on his shoulders alone?
It seems to me that economic issues were central to the Arab Spring. 
This also means that social and political stability in most Arab coun-
tries will remain elusive until those socioeconomic issues are resolved. 
Returning to past policies, generating growth and waiting for it to 
trickle down to the middle class and the poor, is not good enough. The 
Arab world needs to consider a change in economic policies, focusing 
on inclusive growth—that is, growth that expands the middle class, 
enhances social justice, and increases opportunities for all citizens.
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Institutional Reforms for  
better Implementation
The World Bank has stated that “weak governance has led to weak 
growth in MENA [the Middle East and North Africa].  .  .  . Indeed, 
simulations find that if MENA had matched the average quality of 
administration in the public sector for a group of well-performing 
Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sin-
gapore and Thailand), its growth rates would have been higher by 
about one percentage point a year.”1 Economic institutions and gover-
nance arrangements affect growth in many different ways, but excel-
lent economic plans, programs, and projects are not of much use if 
they are not implemented. Weak institutions and inadequate gover-
nance arrangements in Arab countries lead to the adoption of plans 
and policies that while they may be technically sound, do not necessar-
ily reflect the needs of different stakeholders. Those institutional and 
governance weaknesses imply that the plans, programs, and projects 
are often not implemented.
Governance is a complex concept, and I present different definitions 
in the following section. Throughout this book I focus on just two 
pillars of good governance: inclusiveness and accountability. Good gov-
ernance requires institutions that are both inclusive and accountable. I 
focus on those two components of good governance because they have 
been identified by several authors as areas where Arab countries are 
particularly weak and lag behind other nations of similar per capita 
1. World Bank (2003, pp. 8–9).
Ghanem_Arab Spring V1_i-x_1-156_final.indd   65 11/20/15   1:16 PM
66 HAfez gHAnem
income and level of development.2 Such lack of inclusiveness and weak 
accountability affect implementation of projects and programs.3
Governance, Institutions, and Economic Growth 
According to Keefer (2004, p. 3), “Governance is the extent to which 
the institutions and processes of government give government decision 
makers an incentive to be responsive to citizens.” That is, good gover-
nance is about putting in place institutions and processes that ensure 
that economic decisions reflect the citizens’ will. This view of what 
is good governance seems to be also the one adopted by the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP). Its website states that “more 
countries than ever before are working to build democratic governance. 
Their challenge is to develop institutions and processes that are more 
responsive to the needs of ordinary citizens, including the poor, and 
that promote development.”4 The agency’s definition of good gover-
nance goes beyond that presented by Keefer, because it specifically 
mentions democratic governance, and it specifies that institutions need 
to be responsive to ordinary citizens, including the poor.
The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators computes 
systematic measures of governance. It looks at six groups of gover-
nance indicators: voice and accountability, political stability, govern-
ment effectiveness, control of corruption, regulatory quality, and rule 
of law.5 This reflects the breadth of the concept of governance and 
the general view that a system of good governance should give more 
voice to citizens, hold governments accountable, lead to more effective 
bureaucracies, lower corruption, improve the regulatory framework, 
and respect the rule of law.
2. For example, the United Nations Development Program (2002).
3. This chapter is based on research carried out by a team of JICA and Brookings 
scholars, and particularly Sakamoto (2013), Matsunaga and Ragheb (2015), and 
Tanaka and Yoshikawa (2013). The work of those authors has focused on Egypt and 
Iraq, and hence most of the examples presented here are from those two countries. 
However, lessons drawn from this work are relevant across the Arab world.
4. See United Nations Development Program, “Democratic Governance” (www.
undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/democraticgovernance/overview.html). 
5. See Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzi (2008).
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In its 2003 report on governance in the MENA region, the World 
Bank stresses the importance of inclusiveness and accountability. It 
defines an inclusive institution as one that guarantees certain basic 
rights to all citizens. This means that all citizens have the right to par-
ticipate in decisionmaking processes on an equal basis. It also means 
that government must treat all citizens equally. An accountable institu-
tion is defined as one in which leaders are answerable to the people for 
their decisions. Accountability requires transparency, for people need 
to know how the government is functioning to hold it accountable. It 
also needs contestability, for people should be able to choose among 
different entities on the basis of how well they perform. It also implies 
the existence of recourse mechanisms, for it is hard to achieve full 
accountability by simply putting in place internal accountability mech-
anisms within the public administration, especially in countries where 
the executive is able to overpower other branches of government. That 
is why accountability usually requires inclusiveness so that citizens 
have voice and can express their views on government performance.
The development literature has focused mostly on the relation 
between governance and growth.6 Most studies show a positive cor-
relation between different governance indicators, particularly those 
relating to the security of property rights and government effectiveness 
and to growth. However, the direction of causality is not always clear. 
Good governance facilitates growth, but it is also true that growing 
countries with higher incomes demand better governance. That is, gov-
ernance is also endogenous to growth. The ideal is to achieve a virtuous 
circle where governance reforms support growth, which, in turn, leads 
to better governance and even faster growth.
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that the main (or even only) 
explanation for different economic outcomes among countries is dif-
ferent institutions. Economic institutions are important in determin-
ing economic outcomes. Inclusive institutions lead to the creation of 
inclusive markets that support growth and equality of opportunity. On 
the other hand, extractive institutions stifle entrepreneurship and cre-
ativity and thus lead to low growth and high inequality. According to 
Acemoglu and Robinson, it is political institutions that determine what 
kind of economic institutions develop in a country. Hence a country’s 
6. For example, see Calderon and Chong (2000); Easterly and Levine (2002).
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economic development is driven by its politics. Relatively open political 
systems that provide voice for their citizens and allow them to hold 
governments accountable naturally lead to inclusive economic institu-
tions. In their discussion of Egypt, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that 
“Egypt is poor precisely because it has been ruled by a narrow elite that 
has organized society for their own benefit at the expense of the vast 
mass of the people. Political power has been narrowly concentrated, 
and was used to create great wealth for those who possess it.”7
Sakamoto (2013) argues that lack of transparency and low account-
ability in Arab countries has led to greater corruption and the emer-
gence of “a soft state.”8 A sense of alienation and exclusion, especially 
among youth, contributed to popular dissatisfaction, which continues 
even after the revolutions. That is why, he argues, there is a need to 
improve participation in policymaking and economic planning in the 
Arab world. The experiences of Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia indi-
cate the importance of achieving a national consensus on an economic 
vision for the future and the policies and programs needed to achieve 
it. Successful East Asian countries have put in place consultative pro-
cesses (in different government departments, the private sector, and 
civil society) to agree on national development plans and monitor 
their execution.
Arab countries are aware of this lacuna, and some of them are start-
ing to take steps to improve inclusion and accountability. For example, 
articles 12–15 of the new Moroccan constitution set out inclusive par-
ticipation in government decision making as a fundamental principle. 
Morocco asked for World Bank support to put in place a legal and 
regulatory framework for access to information to enhance transpar-
ency. Morocco is also introducing reforms to extend the scope of public 
consultations and enable citizens to petition the government and make 
legislative proposals.9 Similarly, Egypt has been receiving support from 
the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to introduce inclu-
sive planning.
Enhancing the planning function is essential to improving the alloca-
tion of public investment and to raising its efficiency. Inclusive planning 
7. See Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), preface.
8. Sakamoto (2013, p. 7).
9. See World Bank (2013b).
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could also increase ownership of the investment program by different 
stakeholders. Widespread buy-in helps improve implementation rates 
and thus could lead to an increase in overall investment levels.
Low Investment Rates in the Arab Countries in Transition 
Economic growth usually requires the accumulation of physical capi-
tal, whether as infrastructure or as new buildings, factories, machinery, 
and equipment. Table 4-1 shows the evolution of the ratio of investment 
to GDP in the Arab countries in transition (ACTs) and three compar-
ator countries. Two points are worth noting. First, in 2013 investment 
rates in the ACTs were comparable to those of Brazil but much lower 
than those of India, which invests about a third of GDP, and especially 
China, which invests nearly half of GDP. Second, on average, ACT 
investment rates seem to be stagnating or declining (with the notable 
exception of Morocco), while investment rates in China and India (but 
not Brazil) have been increasing.
To catch up with the emerging economies, the ACTs will probably 
need to raise their investment rates. This would require an increase in 
both public and private investment. Public investment that improves 
the quality of infrastructure would encourage greater private sector 
investment, through a crowding-in effect.
Figures 4-1 and 4-2 show the evolution of public and private invest-
ment in Jordan and Egypt over the past thirty years. They tell a similar 
TAble 4-1. Gross Fixed Capital Formation as Share of GDP, Various Countries, 1980–2013
Percent
Country 1980 1990 2000 2010 2013
brazil 23 20 18  20  18 
China 35 36 35  48  49 
India 18 25 24  37  30 
egypt 28 29 20  19  14 
Jordan 37 31 22  24  28 
Morocco 24 25 26  35 n.a.
Tunisia 29 27 26  24 n.a.
Yemen n.a. 12 19 n.a. n.a.
Source:  World Development Indicators.
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FIGURE 4-1. Public and Private Investment as Share of GDP, Jordan, 1976–2012
Percent











FIGURE 4-2. Public and Private Investment as Share of GDP, Egypt, 1982–2012
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story. Private investment has stagnated at around 20 percent of GDP in 
Jordan and 10 percent of GDP in Egypt, while public investment has 
declined dramatically from about 20 percent of GDP in both countries 
to less than 5 percent. This is very different from the experience of 
countries like India and China, where both private and public invest-
ment increased.
The quality of institutions affects private as well as public invest-
ment. Noninclusive institutions have a negative impact on the business 
environment and therefore lead to a reduction in private investment. 
Experience in some ACTs indicates that simply reforming the rules 
on the books may not have an impact, because the reforms may be 
poorly implemented or not implemented at all.10 It is important that 
the institutions responsible for implementing the regulatory framework 
affecting the private sector be reformed to become more inclusive (so 
that the private sector has a say in how regulations are implemented) 
and accountable (so that the institution is judged on its results and the 
quality of service it provides).
Not all public investment is good for growth. In a weak institutional 
framework poorly designed or implemented public investment could 
be counterproductive, introducing distortions and inefficiencies in the 
economy and providing opportunities for corruption. Moreover, if the 
macroeconomic framework is weak, increasing public investment could 
lead to more serious fiscal imbalances and debt problems.
Inclusive Planning in Egypt and East Asia 
Sakamoto (2013) studied the planning process in Egypt and compared 
it with that of East Asia.11 He found that during the period 1982–2000, 
Egypt had fourteen plans, three visions, seven strategies, and three 
programs, among others. In total there were forty-one schemes indi-
vidually drafted by ministries and relevant organizations with support 
from international donors. They do not seem to have been related or 
systematically linked to one another. The national five-year plan was 
supposed to be the guiding document for economic policy.
10. For an example from Egypt, see Ghanem (2013).
11. This section draws on the work of Sakamoto (2013).
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Egypt had six national five-year plans between 1982 and 2011. Bud-
get allocations were determined before drafting the economic goals and 
strategies. The first planning step was the production of the investment 
budget allocation sheet, which was put together by the Ministry of 
Planning, based on the investment budget request prepared by each 
line ministry. The contents of the five-year development plan were then 
drafted by the Ministry of Planning based on the budget allocation 
sheet. This system was simple, with drafting being fully completed 
inside the ministry without official outside contacts. On the other 
hand, the system led to the exclusion of major stakeholders, such as the 
private sector, civil society organizations, labor unions, and the media.
This does not mean that there was no interaction between gov-
ernment and the private sector. But communication and cooperation 
occurred without an institutional dialogue mechanism. This led to 
numerous collusive relationships and hence the risk of corruption. 
Some privileged private companies benefited, while others were left in 
the lurch. Sakamoto (2013) describes this situation as the emergence of 
the soft state.
None of the plans had a strategy for implementation. Since the 
five-year plans in Egypt were drafted inside one department of the 
Ministry of Planning without building consensus among major stake-
holders, including line ministries, which were the real implementers, 
the national plan was viewed as a concept paper that did not call for 
execution. Plans, visions, and strategies were well prepared but never 
implemented. To deal with those problems, Handoussa (2010) proposed 
a mechanism, based on uniform and fair rules, for including academics 
and civil society organizations in the planning process. However, those 
proposals have so far not been implemented.
The situation in many other Arab countries is similar to that of 
Egypt. Plans have been developed that are technically sound but are not 
necessarily implemented, and the public investments that are included 
in those plans are not fully realized.
But is planning really needed in today’s market economies? Experi-
ence from successful East Asian countries indicates that the answer is 
yes but that planning today plays a different role from the one that it 
played in the 1950s and 1960s. In the twenty-first century, economic 
planning plays two roles. First, it introduces a mechanism for a soci-
etal dialogue on economic issues; and second, it develops consensus 
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on a medium- to long-term vision for economic growth. That is, the 
plan should be the result of an inclusive process and should present a 
guiding vision for economic development. Former Indonesian president 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, in his presentation of the 2011 economic 
plan, stated that “it is impossible to achieve our long-term economic 
goals without the master plan. We also can’t rely wholly on market 
mechanisms. The government’s role, as a ‘visible hand,’ is important.”12
Successful East Asian economies were the first group of countries 
to develop strategies for inclusive growth. To achieve this, they put in 
place systems of inclusive planning. Arab countries could benefit from 
the experiences of countries like Japan, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
Since the end of World War II, Japan has developed fourteen eco-
nomic plans as follows: the first plan targeted reconstruction and inde-
pendence, the second and third plans aimed for high economic growth, 
the fourth, fifth, and sixth tried to balance economic growth with social 
development, and the seventh to fourteenth strived for stable growth.
Japan’s Economic Council was created to build national consensus 
on economic issues and to draft the five-year plans. It was established 
in 1952, under the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, as the 
advisory body for the prime minister. It includes government officials, 
academics, private sector representatives, labor unions, the media, 
consumer representatives, and civil society. Thus it plays a key role in 
coordinating interests and resolving conflicts among stakeholders. Line 
ministries (the implementers) participate actively in the planning pro-
cess. Thus they own the outcome and are bound by the results, which 
is one of the reasons why all the Japanese plans were fully implemented 
ahead of the original schedule.
An effective system for planning, monitoring, and evaluation con-
tributed to Malaysia’s socioeconomic success.13 Malaysia’s Economic 
Planning Unit, which functions as a superministry, is attached to the 
prime minister’s office. It takes the leading role in formulating the coor-
dination plans with the National Budget Office. It is also in charge 
of drafting the five-year plans as well as their mid-term reviews. The 
Implementation Coordination Unit, also under the prime minister’s 
office, is responsible for supervising plan implementation, working 
12. Quoted in Sakamoto (2013, p. 12).
13. See United Nations (2001).
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with the line ministries. By placing the Economic Planning Unit and 
the Implementation Coordination Unit under the authority of the prime 
minister’s office, the government created a strong administrative body 
that enhanced the efficiency of the planning process and ensured effec-
tive implementation.
The implementation function is further strengthened by the inclusion 
of various stakeholders and the institutionalization of public- private 
dialogues, at regional as well as federal levels. Thus the Malaysian sys-
tem is comparable to the Japanese Economic Council, with a strong 
focus on plan implementation. While impact evaluation at the project 
level was undertaken by each of the ministries, it was the Implemen-
tation Coordination Unit that conducted the impact evaluation at the 
macro level. The agency also developed various monitoring systems, 
which involved the periodic collection and analysis of physical and 
financial data.
Inspired by the Japanese and Malaysian experiences, Indonesia 
changed its economic decision, after the fall of the Suharto regime, from 
a top-down planning process to a bottom-up approach. The Develop-
ment Planning Committee was strengthened in 2004 and expanded 
to include citizen representatives. Thus coordination between stake-
holders became institutionalized, allowing the voices of citizens to be 
reflected in policies and helping build consensus around economic poli-
cies. Moreover, starting in 2009, national dialogues with the thirty- two 
governors and chief executive officers of the chambers of commerce 
were organized once every several months to build consensus and own-
ership of the major implementers (local government and the private 
sector) of the economic plan.
From Plan to Implementation in Cairo’s Urban Transport 
Cairo is one of the most congested cities in the world. The World Bank 
estimates the cost, mostly because of fuel and time lost in traffic, at 
about 4 percent of GDP.14 A 2002 study carried out jointly by the Egyp-
tian government and JICA concluded that if no major reforms and new 
14. See World Bank (2014a). This section relies on the work of Matsunaga and 
Ragheb (2015).
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investments were implemented, by 2022 the average trip speed would 
decline from 19 kilometers an hour to 11.6 kilometers an hour and the 
average home-to-work trip time by car would increase from 37 minutes 
to 100 minutes. Recent updates of the study by the Egyptian Ministry 
of Transport yield worse results. Trip speed is expected to drastically 
worsen to reach 5 kilometers an hour and trip time to reach 240 min-
utes, or four hours, by 2022 if nothing is done to improve the situation. 
That is, this study implies that, under a business-as-usual scenario, in 
less than ten years the average Cairo resident will spend at least as 
much time in traffic as at work.
Faced with this disastrous situation the Ministry of Transport for-
mulated the Transport Master Plan in 2002 and carried out feasibility 
studies—the Cairo Regional Area Transportation Study (CREATS)—
for selected priority projects in 2003.15 The ministry also tried to for-
mulate the plan in an inclusive way. Key stakeholders were invited to 
participate at the planning stage. These included the Ministry of Trans-
port, the Egypt National Institute of Transport, the National Authority 
for Tunnels, the Egyptian National Railways Authority, the General 
Authority for Roads Bridges and Land Transport, and Cairo and Giza 
governorates as well as private sector and civil society representatives. 
The planning process was supported by JICA and appears to have been 
carried out efficiently and achieved good results.
Yet the plan was not implemented, and Cairo’s traffic situation con-
tinues to deteriorate. The plan recommended fifty-nine actions, includ-
ing new investments and policy reforms. About thirteen years later, 
only four of those fifty-nine actions had been initiated. Matsunaga and 
Ragheb (2015) identify five possible reasons for the failure to imple-
ment: lack of proper authorization for the plan, weak coordination 
among the concerned agencies and lack of a focal point, insufficient 
institutional capacity, budget limitations and lack of private sector par-
ticipation, and inability to reduce fuel subsidies.
In Egypt, sector or regional master plans and strategies are approved 
by the concerned minister. They do not necessarily receive cabinet or 
parliamentary approval. Ministers change often in Egypt. Hence the 
minister who approved a plan or strategy is often not around when 
15. See Arab Republic of Egypt and Japan International Cooperation Agency (2002).
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implementation is expected to start. New ministers are often not com-
mitted to their predecessors’ plans and strategies and do not push for 
implementation. The transport plan was approved by a so-called higher 
committee chaired by the minister of transport. But the minister and 
many members of the committee were replaced after the plan’s approval, 
and the committee itself stopped meeting, even though legally it still 
exists. Thus the legal status of the transport master plan is unclear, 
and the Ministry of Transport does not feel obliged to implement it. In 
other words, no one in government seems to be held accountable for 
dealing with Cairo’s traffic problems.
Coordinating the various stakeholders is another big problem. The 
Ministry of Transport supervises twelve entities: six service authorities 
and six economic authorities, each of which is in charge of a specific 
transport subsector. The coordination problem is not only in vertical 
coordination within the Ministry of Transport and its affiliated entities 
or between central and local levels but also in horizontal coordina-
tion and linkage among concerned ministries and agencies beyond the 
realm of the Ministry of Transport. In the case of the urban transporta-
tion, other ministries and agencies such as the Ministry of Housing, the 
Ministry of Interior, and Cairo and Giza governorates are key stake-
holders. In 2013 a regulatory agency for urban transport was created, 
partly to act as a focal agency that can mediate among all stakeholders 
and help improve coordination. However, it is still not functioning and 
has only one professional staff working there.
Other countries are facing similar coordination problems. The situ-
ation in Thailand is even more difficult than in Egypt. More than thirty 
institutions are involved in urban transport development in Thailand, 
but the country has somehow managed to develop the infrastructure 
since the early 1990s. Manila was quite the same until it formed the 
Strategic Metropolitan Transport Planning in 1995 (Mandri- Perrott 
2010). Jakarta is trying to manage the adverse impacts of institutional 
fragmentation by establishing a metropolitan transportation author-
ity, known as the Jabodetabek Transportation Authority, at the cen-
tral government level with participation of more than fifteen relevant 
entities to facilitate the implementation process through coordina-
tion of activities while avoiding any overlap. Many other countries 
(for example, India, Singapore, and China) have established focal or 
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lead institutions for managing urban transport development. Hence 
Egypt’s new Agency for Urban Transport could benefit from those 
countries’ experiences.
Institutional capacity is a major constraint on implementation. Lead-
ership is one of the factors that affect the capacity of any organization. 
In the case of the Ministry of Transport, frequent changes of ministers 
(there have been seven ministers over the past three years) have nega-
tively impacted continuity. The Ministry of Transport is a hierarchical 
top-down organization, with a relatively weak back office. Therefore, 
ministerial changes typically lead to changes in direction and strategy.
The lack of a technical back office with qualified staff is another 
important constraint. Although the ministry, like the rest of the Egyp-
tian civil service, has a huge number of administrative staff, it has few 
technical specialists. An exacerbating factor is that instead of focusing 
on its key strategic and policymaking role, the ministry is often exces-
sively involved in operational issues, spreading itself too thin.
It is useful to compare Cairo’s experience with that of New Delhi. 
Cairo was one of the first cities in the developing world to introduce a 
metro system, in 1987. The system has seen little extension, and after 
twenty-five years it consists of three lines with a total of 69 kilometers. 
The metro system in Delhi started to operate in 2002, fifteen years 
later, but it already has six lines for a total of 190 kilometers. Differ-
ences in institutional capacity could explain the different outcomes. In 
Cairo, the weak capacity of the National Authority for Tunnels may 
be behind the weak performance. In New Delhi, an executing agency, 
Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Limited, was established in 1995 and 
was a driving force in implementing the development of Delhi Metro 
as scheduled. Construction work on the New Delhi metro has not suf-
fered from the long delays experienced in Cairo.
Could the difference in performance between the Cairo and New 
Delhi metro systems be explained by factors other than institutional 
capacity (for example, availability of financing)? It does not seem so. 
The Japan International Cooperation Agency has funded both the 
Delhi Metro and the Cairo Metro No. 4 under its soft-loan scheme. 
Construction of the Delhi metro did not face any delays, whereas the 
Cairo Metro No. 4 is facing a two-year delay and a new extension of 
Cairo Metro No. 3 is six years late.
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Ministry of Transport staff complain that tight budgets are the 
most important reason for the weak implementation. It is true that the 
urban transport system needs huge investments and that resources are 
scarce. One way of dealing with tight budgets is to improve cost recov-
ery. Very little was done in this area. Currently, the price of a metro 
ticket is about US$0.14, far below what is needed to recover the cost 
of investment.
Another way of dealing with tight budgets is to attract private sector 
participation, but Egypt has not been successful in this regard. This is 
very different from the experience of Asian countries, who were able to 
mobilize large amounts of private capital. In Manila, a public-private 
partnership was used to develop an expressway and the city’s Light 
Rail Transit. Metro Manila Skyway was developed by a joint venture, 
and the Southern Tagalog Arterial Road is a build-own-transfer proj-
ect. In Bangkok, the Second Stage Expressway System was built using a 
build-transfer-operate scheme. Two lines of the elevated railway system 
and one line of the subway were built by public-private partnerships.
It must be noted, however, that these Asian experiences were not 
without their own problems. While they succeeded in attracting pri-
vate investment to build the urban transport infrastructure based on 
private participation, several projects faced financial sustainability 
challenges. In the Philippines, government kept fares very low and had 
to make large subsidy payments to the private operator to ensure a 
minimum return on his investment. Similarly, in Bangkok, low tolls on 
the expressway reduced the profitability of the foreign investor, who 
ultimately sold his shares to a local company.
The lesson from the Asian experience is that it is possible to mobilize 
large amounts of private investment for the transport sector. However, 
the long-term sustainability of those investments depends on the adop-
tion of pricing policies that reflect the cost of the service and ensure an 
adequate return on investment.
In addition to investments to expand the transport system, most 
countries adopt measures to restrict demand and reduce congestion. 
For example, to restrict car use and encourage reliance on public trans-
port, Jakarta initiated the so-called three-in-one scheme, requiring that 
vehicles entering the city carry at least three passengers during peak 
hours. Manila had introduced a color coding program in 1996 that 
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does not allow cars with certain number plates to drive in the city 
within certain hours on weekdays. Manila also introduced truck bans 
and bus priority lanes to reduce traffic congestion. Bangkok’s Intelli-
gent Traffic Information System provides drivers with traffic informa-
tion in order to avoid congested areas.
Proper pricing, through car licensing fees, parking fees, toll prices, 
and fuel prices, is probably the most effective demand management 
measure. By increasing the cost of vehicle operation, this measure pro-
motes greater use of public transportation and hence less traffic con-
gestion. In Egypt, fuel prices are heavily subsidized, which encourages 
greater car use, congestion, and pollution. The government started 
reducing fuel subsidies in July 2014. As subsidies are reduced further 
and fuel prices increase to reach world levels, more people will start 
using public transportation instead of private cars, which should lead 
to less congestion and less air pollution.
Involvement of Donors in Iraq 
Implementation is a serious problem in Iraq, an example of a fragile 
country that is reconstructing in a context of political instability and 
weak governance.16 According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Gov-
ernance Indicators, Iraq is ranked twentieth from the bottom, after 
Liberia and the Republic of the Congo, in government effectiveness and 
fifth, after Sudan and Afghanistan, in political stability.17 In addition, 
owing to decades of economic sanctions, Iraq’s government officials 
have limited knowledge and experience in international commercial 
activities, further discouraging foreign businesses. Even official donors 
avoid implementing large-scale projects.
To address these difficulties, JICA and the Iraqi government agreed 
to introduce a unique monitoring platform composed of three pillars: 
increased interaction, a multilayer structure, and the presence of the 
UNDP. A first priority was to build the capacity of Iraqi staff, who had 
little experience implementing donor-financed projects. Project enti-
ties set up a project management team for each project, and the Iraqi 
16. This section relies on the work of Tanaka and Yoshikawa (2013).
17. Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2011 data.
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government decided to limit staff rotations so as to encourage capac-
ity development and knowledge sharing. Each team has to submit a 
monthly project progress report. The Japan International Cooperation 
Agency reviews the report and provides feedback. The progress report 
and feedback cover important aspects of project management and con-
tribute to establishing the project management framework. Regular 
and structured interaction between the relatively inexperienced Iraqi 
staff and their JICA counterparts is designed to build capacity and help 
Iraqi staff identify the main constraints on project implantation and 
develop ways of resolving them.
Second, a multilayered monitoring system was introduced, and a 
committee including representatives from high-level oversight agen-
cies such as the Prime Minister’s Advisory Commission, the Ministry 
of Finance, and the Ministry of Planning was established to periodi-
cally oversee the various projects. Quarterly monitoring meetings that 
included all the relevant actors were introduced. In those meetings, 
project entities discuss best practices and common problems, while 
JICA and the high-level oversight agencies evaluate project entities 
based on measureable factors of their performance. They praise project 
management teams that had good performance records and encourage 
those that have bad performance records to improve.
Third, JICA and the Iraqi government agreed to partner with the 
UNDP to provide additional support to project implementation. The 
UNDP staff had easier access to projects in areas affected by strife than 
JICA officials and thus were better able to capture actual implementa-
tion problems through direct access rather than via emails or phone 
calls. Based on the findings, they provide analyses and evaluations in 
monthly reports and quarterly monitoring meetings. In addition, the 
presence of the UNDP alleviated an unequal relationship between 
donor and recipient. Such imbalanced relationships or feelings between 
donors and recipients are often observed in implementation of aid proj-
ects. But being a recognized international organization, the UNDP’s 
assessments are considered to be an independent third-party’s opinion, 
which contributes not only to maintaining a well-balanced relationship 
among stakeholders but also to improving monitoring effectiveness.
This system has led to an improvement in the implementation effi-
ciency of JICA’s projects in Iraq. For example, during the course of 
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implementation, the average lapse of JICA’s review of documents on 
each procurement process has become shorter, suggesting that the 
quality of the documents prepared by the government has improved 
and that aid projects will be completed sooner.18
Tanaka and Yoshikawa (2013) compare the efficiency of JICA proj-
ects across different countries, using the time taken to complete the 
project as a proxy for efficiency. They conclude that the Iraqi govern-
ment manages JICA projects more effectively than the average country. 
They also compare the efficiency of JICA projects in Iraq with those of 
the World Bank. They conclude that efficiency rates improve over time 
for both JICA projects and World Bank projects. However, the effi-
ciency rate for JICA projects exceeds that for World Bank projects over 
time, while the efficiency rate for the World Bank’s projects is better 
at the beginning. Thus JICA’s projects in Iraq could be considered an 
example of successful implementation. But what are the causal factors 
behind this success?
Three mechanisms were introduced in Iraq by JICA: increased inter-
action (a knowledge-sharing mechanism), a multilayer structure (a 
social recognition mechanism), and the presence of the UNDP (a medi-
ation mechanism). The three mechanisms were introduced at the same 
time. Hence it is difficult to disentangle them and measure the impact 
of each mechanism separately.
Increased interactions with Iraqi officials were aimed at knowledge 
sharing and capacity building. Tanaka and Yoshikawa (2013) focus 
on two aspects of interactions: quality and quantity. Increased inter-
actions and knowledge sharing should in principle enhance the imple-
mentation capacity of the Iraqi teams. But what is more important, the 
quantity of interactions or their quality? To reduce misunderstanding 
and help Iraqi officials accumulate relevant knowledge, JICA increased 
18. In each step of procurement, JICA requires project entities to submit procure-
ment documents and reviews the documents against JICA’s procurement guidelines, 
which indicates basic guidance in international bid procedure. Prequalification doc-
uments’ average lapse and bidding documents’ average lapse mean the number of 
days taken by JICA for review of prequalification documents and bid documents, 
respectively. In case of prequalification result and bidding result, JICA reviews the 
evaluation process and the result described in the evaluation documents.
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communications with them at all levels. At the same time it improved 
the content of monitoring and gave the officials more detailed feedback.
Social recognition was also used to improve performance. The 
UNDP and JICA published a project-entity ranking based on their 
performance every year. Using the ranking, Iraqi authorities praised 
project entities that performed well and criticized those that failed to 
achieve their targets. Thus project teams that received good evaluations 
were motivated to work efficiently to maintain their record, and teams 
that received bad evaluations tried to improve to avoid social punish-
ment and become recognized as good achievers. 
The UNDP partnered with JICA to help with capacity development 
and to provide a mediation mechanism between donor and recipient 
institutions. According to Tanaka and Yoshikawa (2013), the UNDP’s 
participation had two positive impacts. First, UNDP officials’ ability 
to move easily across the country while introducing UNDP-facilitated 
project management allowed face-to-face interactions that resulted in 
more efficient project management. Second, since Iraqi officials con-
sider the UNDP a neutral third party, the Iraqi officials seemed to have 
more frank conversations with UNDP officials, leading to early detec-
tion of problems and more efficient project management.
Tanaka and Yoshikawa (2013) carried out econometric analyses to 
see how the different mechanisms affected implementation capacity. 
This analysis indicates that project teams that received more feedback 
from JICA or the UNDP tended to improve their work effectiveness 
over time, but that the number of interactions or communications may 
not be as important an indicator as the quality of interactions—that 
is, the quality of interaction is more important than its quantity. The 
analysis also shows that the more negative evaluations a project team 
received in the previous year, the more likely its work effectiveness was 
to increase. This implies that the social recognition mechanism works 
better for those who receive negative evaluations than for those who 
receive positive evaluations.
Hence it would appear that donor agencies have a role to play in 
enhancing implementation capacity, even under the difficult situation of 
a fragile state facing civil conflict and widespread unrest. Mechanisms 
for knowledge sharing and for social recognition could be powerful 
tools for enhancing institutional capacity and improving the efficiency 
of project implementation.
Ghanem_Arab Spring V1_i-x_1-156_final.indd   82 11/20/15   1:16 PM
 InstItutIonAl reforms 83
Suggestions for Improvement 
The analysis presented here indicates that successful implementation 
requires inclusive planning to help build support for the economic pro-
gram, the development of implementation strategies while formulating 
plans and strategies, and a process for the legitimization of plans. In 
addition, there is a need to reform and strengthen economic institu-
tions and hold them accountable for implementation and to ensure that 
sufficient resources are mobilized to cover implementation and finally 
strengthen monitoring and evaluation systems.
The Egyptian case study demonstrates that often, though a great 
deal of resources and energy are exerted in the planning phase, after 
the formulation of a plan less attention and fewer resources are directed 
toward implementation. But is there value to a plan that is not imple-
mented? It may have some political value. Announcing good intentions 
could attract some support, at least initially, until citizens realize that 
nothing has really changed on the ground. It could also have some 
bureaucratic value. Writing and rewriting plans and strategies is one 
way for civil servants to justify their jobs and salaries. But it certainly 
has no economic value. A plan to build a new metro line would not 
reduce traffic congestion. It is the actual building of the new metro line 
that reduces congestion.
Though a great deal of effort is often exerted, planning in the ACTs 
could still be improved. The experience of East Asia underlines the 
importance of involving all stakeholders. Presumably listening to the 
voices of all concerned citizens would help improve the quality of the 
plan by making sure that it responds to real needs. Moreover, buy-in at 
the planning stage by all those involved in implementation could help 
improve execution, as all stakeholders would cooperate to ensure that 
the plan they developed together is actually implemented and actually 
bears fruit. It is important to ensure ownership of the plan by those 
who are supposed to implement it.
Plans and strategies must be complemented with implementation 
plans that clarify in detail how to execute the plan with identified 
actions, timelines, and concerned stakeholders. These drivers can be 
consolidated into an execution or implementation plan. Executing 
agencies often complain that they have difficulty figuring out how 
to realize the strategies, since the strategies tend to describe overall 
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direction and broad visions and projects with little or no guidance on 
how they could be achieved.
Plans and strategies need to be seen as legitimate by various stake-
holders if they are to be effectively implemented. Legitimization is 
important for any policy action since it will provide priority, momen-
tum, and support for implementation, especially when there is a strain 
on the budget resources. If legitimacy is not appropriately secured, the 
stakeholders will not recognize the need to comply with the plan and 
to work on achieving it.
How can a plan be legitimized? In some cases legitimacy is conferred 
on a plan by the top political leadership, the president or the prime min-
ister. The project to expand the Suez Canal in Egypt provides an exam-
ple, as it was identified as a priority by the president, who obtained 
support of the cabinet for the project. Parliaments can also legitimize 
economic plans, for example by voting on five-year plans as well as on 
the budgets to implement them. Plans and strategies that are simply 
approved by the sector or line ministry are rarely fully implemented.
A plan could also be seen as legitimate because it attracts a high level 
of public support. In addition to acquiring authorization and legitimi-
zation from the government, the support of final beneficiaries is needed 
to ensure success. In other words, getting buy-in from the public is 
another key factor for the success of implementation.
Constituency building to obtain public support for economic plans 
is a weak area in nearly all Arab countries, as they tend to rely on 
top-down legitimization processes. Plans or policy reforms need to be 
marketed and promoted, and they need to acquire public support to be 
implemented successfully. The wider public should be well informed 
about the benefits and demerits from the implementation of a plan or 
public reform since there will inevitably be both winners and losers 
once some kind of change takes place. The general public needs to 
understand why policy reforms are being implemented and how the 
majority of the population will benefit from them. Communication is 
essential to building trust and credibility for the government and to 
keep citizens involved, increase their sense of ownership, and reduce 
information asymmetries among stakeholders involved. It is easier to 
persuade people to accept the new strategies when they feel they are 
part of the decision and implementation process.
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Reforms of public sector management and institutions are often 
needed to solve implementation problems. A comprehensive civil ser-
vice reform is usually politically difficult and time consuming. How-
ever, some changes, those that do not require use of a great deal of 
political capital, can be introduced to improve the public sector’s imple-
mentation capacity. Improving coordination among public sector insti-
tutions is one such change. This would include vertical coordination to 
improve the line of command inside a ministry, between a ministry and 
subordinated executing agencies, and between upstream core economic 
ministries such as the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of Planning 
and downstream bodies, including sector ministries and nonexecutive 
state institutions. It would also include horizontal coordination across 
different ministries and departments.
Some countries (for example, Malaysia) have created a focal orga-
nizational body to improve horizontal coordination. An organization 
that includes various government and nongovernment representatives 
such as a national economic council might become a good mechanism 
for promoting an economic reform program. Following the Japanese 
example, such a council can become an authorizing body for plans 
and strategies, and it can strengthen coordination among various stake-
holders to enhance implementation efficiency.
What should be the role and functions of central economic agencies 
like the ministries of planning and finance and the central bank, and 
how could they improve coordination? Countries’ institutional designs 
for central economic agencies are diverse, reflecting different political, 
economic, and social contexts. This introduces a subset of questions 
that need to be addressed: What would be the optimal organizational 
setup for conducting strategy formulation, budget planning, and bud-
get execution? What would be the relationship between recurrent and 
capital expenditures? What would be the relationship with sector min-
istries and other stakeholders?
After the ouster of President Suharto, Indonesians started a national 
debate on the type of planning system that would be a consistent 
move toward decentralization and more inclusive economic and polit-
ical systems. New laws were passed to restructure the roles and func-
tions of the Indonesian ministries of planning, national development 
planning, and finance. Similarly, Prime Minister Modi of India on 
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January 1, 2015, scrapped the powerful planning commission of India 
and replaced it with a policy think tank, NITI Aayog, which involves 
states in economic policymaking. The moves in Indonesia and India 
to reduce the role of central planning agencies reflect a trend toward 
greater decentralization, as well as the bigger role of the private sector 
in the economy. Decentralization is not advanced in the Arab world, 
and there are few structured public-private dialogues. Therefore, it may 
make sense to first concentrate on making the central economic agen-
cies function more effectively and efficiently while becoming more open 
and inclusive.
Effective implementation needs accountability. Naturally, each exe-
cuting agency in charge of a particular sector or policy issue should 
be held accountable for implementation. But there also needs to be a 
supervisory mechanism that secures the accountability of the institu-
tions and ensures that things happen. The Iraq case study has shown 
that peer pressure can be a powerful tool for encouraging responsi-
ble agencies, policymakers, and leaders to accelerate implementation. 
Reviewing implementation progress with peers provides an incentive 
for institutions to improve performance to avoid public embarrassment.
In addition to pressure from their peers, institutions could respond 
to pressure from the top (president or prime minister) and from the 
bottom (citizens). In Morocco, the execution of sector strategies (for 
tourism, industry, agriculture, and so on) has been boosted by the 
direct involvement of the king in the supervision of the implementa-
tion process. Beneficiaries of government programs could also exert 
pressure to ensure implementation, but they need to be organized so 
that their voices are heard. In Brazil, nongovernmental organizations 
were encouraged to help organize the various stakeholders and citizen 
groups who benefited from the Zero Hunger Program.
The insufficiency of resources is often blamed for inadequate imple-
mentation. Effective use of financial and human resources is essential 
for effective and efficient implementation. The case study of urban 
transport in Egypt suggests ways of dealing with financial resource 
constraints through better prioritization, improved cost recovery, and 
private sector participation. Constraint on financial resources tends 
to be highlighted as a major implementation gap in developing coun-
tries, but as this discussion indicates, there are ways of dealing with 
this problem.
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The Iraq case study highlights capacity and knowledge constraints. 
The solution to Iraqi officials’ lack of experience in implementing 
donor-supported programs was to intensify contacts between donor 
and recipient to facilitate knowledge transfer and to share experiences. 
Moreover, international agencies (the UNDP, in the case of Iraq) can be 
helpful in building capacity and providing technical support.
Effective monitoring and evaluation systems are needed to increase 
the impact and quality of public investment and to promote bet-
ter service delivery to the public. Such systems help improve institu-
tional capacity and accountability. Some countries (for example, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia) have been trying to strengthen 
monitoring and evaluation through the introduction of results-based 
management and budgeting as well as through the adoption of key 
performance indicators for the public sector.
Both the Philippines and Indonesia made significant progress in 
establishing results-based public sector management and performance- 
based budgeting, where linkage between planning and budgeting was 
strengthened. Both installed a medium-term expenditure framework 
and set performance indicators to be monitored during implementation. 
In the case of Indonesia, the president established a unit to monitor the 
progress of achieved results, and incentives and sanctions were set to 
enhance performance. As noted earlier, in Malaysia a whole machinery 
for monitoring and evaluating the implementation of five-year plans 
has been set up and is managed by the Implementation Coordination 
Unit, a special unit that reports directly to the prime minister.
Successful political and economic transitions require renewed insti-
tutions that are responsive to citizens’ demand and are able to effi-
ciently implement plans and projects. The Arab countries in transition 
need to pay particular attention to the development of effective eco-
nomic institutions that are responsible for project and program imple-
mentation and public service delivery. Experiences from East Asia and 
Latin America indicate that successful implementation of economic 
development programs almost always requires institutional strength-
ening and renewal.




While strengthening public institutions responsible for implementing 
economic policies and important projects that provide physical and 
social infrastructure is necessary, it is always important to remember 
that it is the private sector that creates jobs and income-generating 
opportunities for youth. Economic growth in the Arab countries in 
transition has not been inclusive, as it left millions of people stuck in 
the lower middle class consuming $2 to $6 a day and provided few 
opportunities for youth who felt economically and socially excluded. 
Therefore, encouraging youth entrepreneurship and the development of 
small businesses has to be central to any new growth strategy.
Arab economies are dominated by large firms and by micro enter-
prises that mostly operate in the informal sector. Those micro enter-
prises use low technology and therefore provide low wages and are 
predominantly family affairs. They provide livelihoods for large 
numbers of Arabs, but they do not offer decent jobs. While poor and 
uneducated youth have no option but to work in the informal sector, 
educated youth prefer to wait for a formal job. This could explain why 
youth unemployment rates in ACTs increase with the level of education. 
Moreover, the informal sector is considered unsafe for women, because 
of the high incidence of sexual harassment. Unable to find formal jobs 
and denied entry into the informal sector, many women are discour-
aged and remain at home. Inclusive growth can be achieved by shifting 
away from a system that favors large and established enterprises to 
one that focuses on developing small businesses and on creating more 
opportunities for young men and women.
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Micro, Small, and Medium-Size Enterprises  
in the Arab Countries in Transition 
A focus on expanding small businesses and the small and medium-size 
enterprise (SME) sector would appear to be an appropriate response 
to the need to grow the middle class and provide greater opportuni-
ties for young men and women as business people as well as employ-
ees. The development of small and medium-size enterprises is closely 
linked to economic growth. In developed countries, 50 percent of GDP, 
on average, is produced by SMEs. Among the member nations of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, SMEs 
(those with fewer than 250 employees) are responsible for two-thirds of 
total employment and 60 percent of industrial employment. Small and 
medium- size enterprises are often on the cutting edge of innovation, as 
their small size allows them to be more flexible and attentive to their 
client needs than larger businesses.1
Figure 5-1 shows employment shares by size of enterprise.2 It seems 
clear from the graph that Arab SMEs do not play the same role in 
employment creation as their Western counterparts. Their share in 
total employment rarely exceeds 20–30 percent. Most employment is 
created in micro enterprises, with large enterprises also making signifi-
cant contributions of about 30 percent of total employment in countries 
like Jordan and Tunisia. That is why some analysts often talk about 
the missing middle in the world of Arab enterprises. Micro enterprises 
(those with fewer than ten employees) appear to be the most import-
ant employers in the region, responsible for nearly 60 percent of total 
employment in Egypt and West Bank–Gaza and about 40 percent in 
Tunisia and Jordan.
What are these micro enterprises that employ so many young Arabs? 
Ghanem (2013) uses a simple enterprise classification system, widely 
accepted in Egypt, which is based on number of employees. According 
to this classification, micro enterprises are defined as those that employ 
1. See Ardic, Mylenko, and Saltane (2011).
2. The graph shows the share of employment by firm size according to the follow-
ing classification: micro firms have less than 5 employees, small firms have between 
5 and 9 employees, medium firms have between 10 and 99 employees, and large 
firms have 100 employees or more.
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fewer than 10 workers, small enterprises employ 10–49 workers, 
medium-size enterprises employ 50–99 workers, and large enterprises 
employ 100 workers and more. Egyptian micro enterprises are mostly 
family businesses that provide simple services to the household sector, 
using traditional technologies, with low capital-to-labor ratios and low 
productivity (and hence wages). More than 60 percent of employees are 
related to the owner-manager. Slightly fewer than two-thirds of micro 
enterprises work in trade. These are small retailers and wholesalers who 
sell food products, clothes, furniture, plastics, and building materials. 
About 30 percent operate in the services sector, including transpor-
tation and distribution, laundry, cafes, restaurants, and hotels. Fewer 
than 10 percent of micro enterprises are in manufacturing, including 
food processing, wood and furniture, ceramics, building materials, and 
some electrical and engineering workshops.
Looking at Tunisia, Boughzala (2013) argues that the informal sector, 
consisting mainly of micro enterprises, is the largest and the fastest grow-
ing of private enterprises. The number of informal micro enterprises is 
growing annually at 5.1 percent compared with 2.1 percent for the larger 
FIGURE 5-1. SMEs and Job Creation in the Arab World
Percent
Egypt WBG Tunisia Turkey
Source: World Bank (2015). Periods covered, by country: Turkey, 2006; Tunisia, 1996–2010; Jordan, 2006; Egypt, 2006; 
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enterprises. According to Boughzala, Tunisian micro enterprises are the 
least structured, are the most volatile and uncertain, and generate mostly 
low-quality, informal jobs. Micro enterprises cover a large spectrum of 
activities but are concentrated in food, retail commerce, construction, 
transportation, and automobile repair. Tunisian micro firms have limited 
access to formal financing, which covers less than 10 percent of their 
investment, and depend mainly on self-financing. Like their Egyptian 
counterparts, Tunisian micro enterprises have limited access to new tech-
nology: more than 90 percent of these businesses lack access to the Inter-
net and consequently have low productivity and offer low wages.
The situation seems to be the same in Algeria, where a 2011 census of 
200,000 SMEs showed that 95 percent of them are informal micro enter-
prises providing low-quality services to households. It therefore seems 
that the Arab micro enterprise sector mostly plays a social role as a cop-
ing and livelihood mechanism for the large proportion of the population 
that is unable to find opportunities in the formal public or private sec-
tors. These businesses are unlikely to be the basis for a new and dynamic 
SME sector that can innovate and compete on the world markets.
Nevertheless, there are a few success stories in the Arab world. Stone 
and Badawy (2011) present cases of Arab SMEs whose sales or employ-
ment increased by at least 20 percent between 2003 and 2007. They 
find that those enterprises are more innovative, hire more-qualified per-
sonnel, invest more in staff training, and use the Internet more inten-
sively. Many of those enterprises operate under licensing agreements 
with foreign companies, have access to foreign technology, and obtain 
international quality certification. This implies that the success of Arab 
SMEs requires investment in human resources, in information and 
communications technology, and in quality assurance mechanisms.
Surveys and interviews with entrepreneurs in Algeria, Egypt, and 
Tunisia indicate that the Arab SME sector faces six important chal-
lenges: access to markets, access to technologies, access to financing, 
access to land and infrastructure, a constraining legal and regulatory 
framework, and weak governance and lack of accountability.3 These 
constraints prevent the Arab SMEs from growing into a vibrant private 
sector that provides much needed employment to youth and women.
3. For Algeria, see Berrah and Boukriff (2013) and Gharbi (2011). For Egypt, 
see Ghanem (2013), and for Tunisia, see Boughzala (2013).
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Access to markets for sufficient quantities at a remunerative price 
is essential for the success of any business. Most of the Arab SMEs 
surveyed operate mainly in local markets with no links to national or 
international markets. They are unaware of consumer tastes in those 
larger markets and do not know how to access them.
Enterprises also need appropriate up-to-date technologies to pro-
duce the needed goods and deliver them to the market. Typically this 
would require importing the technology in the form of machinery and 
equipment, licensing agreements, and so on. In some countries this is 
a problem, because it involves dealing with customs rules and regula-
tions. In Algeria, some businessmen also stated that controls made it 
difficult to obtain foreign exchange to pay for the imported equipment 
and licenses. After purchasing the technology, firms need to develop 
training programs for their staff, as most SMEs in the Arab world have 
little experience with modern technologies.
Most SMEs around the world complain that access to financing is a 
major constraint, and Arab SMEs are no exception. Algerian business-
men complain that the banks refuse to lend to SMEs that they consider 
too risky, and at the same time microfinance institutions are ill adapted 
to the needs of medium-size enterprises. Surveys in Egypt indicate that 
only 2.3 percent of entrepreneurs were able to get a formal loan in order 
to start their business, and 2.9 percent obtained an informal loan.4
Small businesses also complain about access to land and to infra-
structure. In Algeria, 35 percent of investor requests from government 
concern access to industrial land. Algerian SMEs complain about the 
lack of information concerning the availability of land for industrial 
development, a rigid application of real estate rules, and failure to reg-
ularize land titles. In Egypt, lack of access to infrastructure and public 
services affects the performance of all enterprises but particularly small 
ones that do not have the resources to invest in alternatives to publicly 
provided infrastructure.
Arab legal and regulatory frameworks discourage SME development. 
As a result, the rate of creation of new formal enterprises in the Arab 
world (excluding Gulf Cooperation Council members) is the lowest in 
the world. In Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, the rate of creation of new 
limited liability companies is less than 0.5 for each 1,000 inhabitants 
4. MSE survey carried out by the Economic Research Forum in 2003.
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of economically active age. For comparison purposes, the average for 
developing countries is 1.7 and the average for the whole world is 2.6. 
Surveys in Egypt show that about two-thirds of entrepreneurs consider 
the tax system (rates and administration) to be a major impediment to 
their work, and a somewhat lower proportion (60 percent) say the same 
about licensing and registration requirements.
The Micro and Small Enterprise Sector in Egypt 
Only 28 percent of Egyptian youth find formal sector jobs—18 percent in 
the public sector and 10 percent in the formal private sector. The vast major-
ity, 72 percent, end up working in the informal micro and small enterprise 
(MSE) sector, often as unpaid family workers. For those who are paid, many 
have no labor contract, no job security, and no social benefits.
According to a 2006 Establishment Census conducted by the Cen-
tral Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics, the Egyptian labor 
force is estimated at about 20.1 million workers, with about 7 million 
working for the public sector and the remainder divided nearly evenly 
between agriculture and the nonagriculture private sector.5 There are 
2.5 million nonagricultural private enterprises in Egypt employing 
7.3 million workers. Micro and small enterprises (with fewer than fifty 
workers each) represent nearly 99 percent of total private enterprises 
and about 80 percent of total employment (5.8 million workers). Fur-
thermore, of those 5.8 million workers, 88 percent are employed by 
micro enterprises, with 72 percent employed in enterprises with one 
to four workers and 16 percent in enterprises with five to nine work-
ers. The remaining 18 percent are employed by small enterprises that 
employ ten to forty-nine workers. This relative importance of small and 
micro enterprises for employment generation is not unique to Egypt. 
For example, Ozar, Ozartan, and Irfanoglu (2008) and Samitowska 
(2011) show similar results for Turkey and Poland, respectively.6
5. Quoted in el-Mahdi (2012).
6. Data for this section on Egypt are taken from two sources: an MSE survey 
carried out by the Economic Research Forum in 2003 that covered 4,957 enterprises 
and a survey of 3,000 enterprises carried out in 2010 and 2011 and reviewed by 
el-Mahdi (2012) in a background paper for the Brookings project on Arab econo-
mies. Whenever possible, I base my results on the more recent survey. However, the 
2003 survey is larger and covers more questions.
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The vast majority of MSEs in Egypt are very small, with average 
assets valued at 30,000 Egyptian pounds (LE) (some US$5,000) and 
average employment of 2.2 workers (see table 5-1). The average age 
of the owner-manager of an enterprise is 40.3 years, with an average 
education level of 8.4 years of formal schooling. Women entrepreneurs 
head about 10.5 percent of enterprises. About 12 percent of entrepre-
neurs are young, between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four. Enter-
prises headed by youth tend to have fewer assets (nearly half as much) 
than the average. Another important feature of young entrepreneurs 
is that they tend to be better educated than older colleagues, with an 
average education of 10.3 years. In fact, the simple correlation coeffi-
cient between age and years of education for the whole sample is –0.33. 
Some 15.4 percent of young entrepreneurs are women. They tend to be 
better educated than their male counterparts, and their enterprises tend 
to be slightly bigger. Table 5-2 shows the age structure of entrepreneurs 
from the 2011 survey. Youth, defined as younger than twenty-five years 
of age, represent only 10 percent of the sample. However, as table 5-2 
also shows, if the definition of youth is extended to include all of those 
younger than thirty, then young entrepreneurs would represent about 
23 percent of total entrepreneurs.
Young people’s share of employment in MSEs is much higher than 
their share in ownership. Using data from the 2003 Economic Research 
Forum survey, I estimate that those in the fifteen to twenty-four age 
group represent 37 percent of total MSE employment. If we define youth 
as being younger than thirty, then this share rises to more than 50 per-
cent. Women’s employment in MSEs remains low, at only 11.4 percent, 
as those enterprises are not considered safe for female workers. Half of 








Total 30,147 2.2 8.4
Youth (15 to 24 years of age) entrepreneur 16,809 2.3 10.3
Youth and female entrepreneur 18,368 2.4 11.2
Source: Author’s calculations from eRF 2003 survey.
a. In egyptian pounds (le).
b. Number of workers.
c. Years of formal schooling.
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the women working in MSEs (50.1 percent in the Economic Research 
Forum 2003 sample) are younger than twenty-five. Wages are low, 
the average wage for male workers in the 2011 survey being $3.70 a 
day and that for female workers $2.60 a day. Slightly more than half 
(50.5 percent in the 2003 survey) of employees have a work contract, 
which shows the precarious nature of employment in this sector.
Egyptian MSEs mostly provide services to the household sector. In 
response to a question about their main clients, 90 percent of enter-
prises service households, 8 percent sell to other firms or home-based 
workers, and 2 percent sell to government or public enterprises. Thus it 
is evident that little subcontracting is taking place. More than 99 per-
cent of MSEs sell mainly to local markets, with few selling in the 
national market (within Egypt). Only 0.3 percent of enterprises sell to 
the export market.
Peattie (1987, p. 851) states that the concept of an informal sec-
tor is “utterly fuzzy,” and this seems to be the case in Egypt, where 
most MSEs operate in a gray zone between formality and informality. 
To be considered formal an Egyptian enterprise needs to have a busi-
ness license, be registered as a commercial or industrial establishment, 
obtain a tax card, and keep regular accounts. Noncompliance with one 
or more of those four official procedures would make the enterprise 
count as informal. Table 5-3 shows the status of compliance in the 
2011 sample. Only 21.6 percent of enterprises comply with all four 
procedures and are therefore considered formal. On the other extreme, 
18.4 percent do not comply with any procedure and therefore operate 
completely informally. The remaining 60 percent of enterprises comply 
TAble 5-2. enterprises, by Sex and Age of entrepreneur, egypt, 2011
Percent
Age Male Female Total
less than 18 years 0.2 0.8 0.2
18 to less than 21 years 2.0 4.1 2.2
21 to less than 25 years 7.4 9.6 7.6
25 to less than 30 years 12.9 13.0 12.9
30 to less than 40 years 27.2 21.2 26.6
40 years or more 50.4 51.3 50.5
Source: el-Mahdi (2012).
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with one or more (45 percent of the total comply with three of the 
four) of the procedures and are officially considered informal, but in 
fact seem to be at least partially formal. The procedure that is least 
complied with is (unsurprisingly) maintaining regular accounts and 
presenting them to the tax department (see table 5-3). The degree of 
formality is positively correlated with the size of the enterprise and the 
education level of its owner, and urban-based enterprises tend to be 
more formal than rural-based ones. Similar results on the relationship 
between characteristics of the entrepreneur and formality and firm size 
were found by Jackle and Li (2006) for Peru.
Micro and small enterprises have very low capital-labor ratios and 
tend to use simple traditional technologies. The average capital-labor 
ratio calculated from the 2003 survey is around LE 10,000 (about 
US$1,600) and LE 14,000 (about US$2,300) from the 2011 survey. 
The surveys asked entrepreneurs about the type of technology they 
use, including the choice between traditional, modern, and up to date. 
Among the manufacturing enterprises, 68 percent stated that they use 
traditional technology, while 30 percent use modern technology and 
only 2 percent use up-to-date technology. In services the shares were 
71 percent traditional, 27 percent modern, and 2 percent up to date; 
while the shares in the trade sector were 80 percent, 19 percent, and 
1 percent respectively. Thirty percent of entrepreneurs stated that they 
introduced innovations to their services and products to meet changing 
market needs. A 2008 survey on innovation covered 3,000 manufac-
turing and services enterprises.7 It found that 19 percent of enterprises 
had technological innovation activities, with manufacturing firms 
7. Egyptian National Innovation Survey, 2008.




Commercial or industrial registration 70.1
Tax card 73.1
Keeping regular accounts 28.4
Source: el-Mahdi (2012).
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and larger firms being more likely to innovate. About 90 percent of 
innovations were produced within the firm, and only 10 percent were 
produced in collaboration with domestic or foreign partners.
When asked why they did not use modern technology, more than 
half of the entrepreneurs stated that they could not afford the expense. 
Table 5-4 shows sources of funding for MSE start-ups. It indicates that 
only 1.4 percent of youth entrepreneurs were able to get a formal loan 
to start their business, and 2.2 percent obtained informal loans. Most 
entrepreneurs (68.6 percent of total and 73.7 percent of youth) relied on 
their own savings to start their business. Inheritance is also an import-
ant source of financing, with 20.2 percent of entrepreneurs (18.7 per-
cent of youth) stating that they used money that they inherited to start 
their business.
Access to infrastructure and public services is an important factor 
affecting the performance of MSEs. Table 5-5 presents the propor-
tion of entrepreneurs who answered no in response to questions about 
access to different types of infrastructure. A surprising finding here is 
the high proportion that does not have access to landline telephones 
(71.9 percent of the total and 73 percent of youth). However, it is not 
clear how serious this is at a time of increasing access to mobile phones. 
Public transport for people and goods appears as a major problem for 
MSEs, with some 95 percent of them stating that they do not have 
access to those services. The same is true for water and sewage, as 
59.4 percent of respondents stated that they had no access to water and 
68.1 percent have no access to sewage. There does not appear to be a 
significant difference between young entrepreneurs and the rest of the 
sample in terms of access to infrastructure and public services.
TAble 5-4. Source of Initial Funding, egypt, 2003
Percent
All entrepreneurs Youth entrepreneurs
Formal loan 2.3 1.4
Informal loan 2.9 2.2
Individual savings 68.6 73.7
Inheritance 20.2 18.7
Others 6.0 4.0
Source: Author’s calculations from 2003 eRF survey.
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Two-thirds of small-firm entrepreneurs identified taxation (tax rates 
as well as tax administration) as a key constraint facing their business 
development (table 5-6). This is consistent with the earlier finding that 
the vast majority of small firms did not comply with the requirement 
to file their accounts with the tax department. It is commonplace for 
businessmen all over the world to complain about taxes. Nevertheless, 
the loud complaints (based on 2003 data) and massive noncompliance 
(based on 2011 data) may be an indication that a review of tax policies 
affecting small businesses is warranted. About 61 percent of all entre-
preneurs (64 percent of young entrepreneurs) mentioned licensing and 
registration as key constraints. This is surprising since in the 2003 sur-
vey about 70 percent of respondents report having complied with those 
requirements. During 2004–10 the government, as part of its economic 
reform program, embarked on a massive deregulation and simplifi-
cation effort. Hence this conclusion could be based on data from an 
earlier period. However, el-Mahdi (2012) states that the deregulation 
and simplification effort does not seem to have affected the MSE sec-
tor, based on a 2011 survey. Hence there may be two explanations 
for this result: the entrepreneurs may be ill informed and unaware of 
the changes or application of the deregulation and simplification mea-
sures is being ignored by a bureaucracy that is keen to protect possible 
sources of rents.
Table 5-6 also indicates that financing is seen as a major constraint 
by nearly 65 percent of entrepreneurs (61 percent of youth). More- 
detailed data on access to credit are presented in table 5-7, which shows 
TAble 5-5. Access to Infrastructure, egypt, 2003a 






Transport of workers 96.6 97.1
Transport of goods 94.8 95.4
Source:  Author’s calculations from 2003 eRF survey.
a. Table presents share of surveyed entrepreneurs reporting that they have no access to item.
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that only 5.3 percent of entrepreneurs said they have had any access 
to credit, and of those, 47.9 percent (57.1 percent of youth) received 
that credit from family, friends, or business associates. Banks provided 
35.6 percent of credit to MSEs, while the Social Fund for Development 
and nongovernmental organizations provided 9.2 and 7.3 percent, 
respectively. The table also shows that young entrepreneurs have much 
less access to credit from banks and the Social Fund for Development 
than older ones.
The surveys indicate a significant level of dissatisfaction with gov-
ernment policies affecting small businesses. Entrepreneurs claim that 
the regulatory framework (licensing, registration, and so on) is a hin-
drance, that it costs significant time and money, that taxation is high 
and cumbersome, and that they have little access to basic infrastructure 
TAble 5-6. Constraints on Small business, egypt, 2003a
Constraint All entrepreneurs Young entrepreneurs
Securing capital 64.6 62.1
licensing and registration 61.3 64.0
labor law 32.3 35.7
labor inspection 44.9 49.2
Tax rates 68.6 66.7
Customs duties 5.8 5.8
Tax administration 65.0 63.0
Source: Author’s calculations from eRF 2003 survey.
a. Table presents share of surveyed entrepreneurs reporting the item is a major constraint.
TAble 5-7. Credit to Small businesses, 2003
Percent
Category All entrepreneurs Young entrepreneurs
Access to credit 5.3 4.8
Source of credit
Friends and  family, business associates 47.9 57.1
bank 35.6 28.6
Social Development Fund 9.2 3.6
Nongovernmental organization 7.3 10.7
Source: Author’s calculations from 2003 eRF survey.
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or to credit. Very few seem to have benefited from targeted interven-
tions such as credit from the Social Development Fund or special train-
ing programs. Hence there seems to be a good case for a review of 
policies and programs that affect small enterprises in Egypt.
Tunisian Private Sector 
Most observers rank Tunisia better than Egypt in terms of the business 
environment, and the country implemented many reforms over the two 
decades preceding the Arab Spring.8 Nevertheless, private sector invest-
ment remained low at about 15 percent of GDP. Moreover, growth was 
not sufficient and did not create enough jobs for the young Tunisians 
entering the labor market, especially those with higher education. Table 
5-8 shows that the unemployment rate increased with education, and 
Tunisians with higher education had an unemployment rate of about 
29 percent by May 2011.
As in the case of Egypt, there appears to have been a significant 
gap between official rules and regulations and actual implementation. 
The business environment has been plagued with cronyism and cor-
ruption, and was not conducive to substantial investment and enter-
prise creation, especially small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Private 
investments remained at the bottom of the technological scale. Most 
Tunisian firms failed to move up the value chain or to improve their 
productivity. They were unable to switch from labor-intensive, low-
wage activities to more capital- and skill-intensive ones, which could 
explain the low demand for educated labor.
Also as in Egypt, the informal sector, which mainly consists of micro 
enterprises, is important for providing livelihood to a large portion of 
the population. Surveys indicate that 98 percent of micro enterprises 
employ no more than two persons and of these 87 percent employ only 
one individual (the owner). Total employment of the informal micro 
enterprise sector is slightly more than 500,000 people, 80 percent of 
whom are men. This is about 16 percent of the country’s total work-
force and only about 5 percent of wage-earning employees, making a 
little less than the minimum legal wage (less than TND 250 per month 
8. For example, see any edition of the World Bank’s Doing Business Report. 
Tunisia is always ranked better than Egypt.
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in 2007) and often without any social security. Female employees earn 
30 percent less than male employees, and wage is positively correlated 
with the size of the enterprise.9
The nature of the Tunisian micro enterprise sector could explain 
why unemployment increases with the level of education. This is the 
most dynamic and fastest growing sector, but it only provides low- 
productivity, low-paying jobs. Educated youth are not attracted to those 
informal micro enterprises. They prefer to wait for a formal sector job, 
and most of them have families that can support them while waiting. 
Hence they remain unemployed for long periods of time. Youth with 
less education, who typically are from poorer families, cannot afford 
this luxury. Informal jobs in micro enterprises are the only available 
source of livelihood. Hence their unemployment rate is low, but so is 
the quality of their jobs. In general, poorer youth are forced to join 
the informal sector, even if they are educated. Mohamed Bouazizi, the 
vegetable salesman who burnt himself in despair and sparked the Arab 
Spring, is an example of this group of young people.
The Tunisian case also highlights the plight of young Arab women. 
Tunisian women have as much access to education as men. In fact, 
more young women graduate from universities than young men. But 
most of those young women either drop out of the labor force or remain 
unemployed. Women avoid the informal sector because it is considered 
inhospitable to women. Survey data indicate that young women pre-
fer to respect themselves and stay at home rather than seek informal 
employment. The public sector used to offer good jobs to women, but 
its hiring has declined due to budget constraints and the necessity to 
provide space for private sector development. The formal private sector 
9. Data in this section are from Boughzala (2013).
TAble 5-8. Unemployment Rate, by education level, Tunisia, Various Years 
Education 2005 2007 2009 May 2011
None 6.3 4.4 6.1 8.0
Primary 14.3 11.5 10.4 12.4
Secondary 13.3 13.5 14.0 20.6
Higher 14.0 18.2 21.9 29.2
Source:  boughzala (2013).
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is not growing fast enough to provide enough jobs for all young people, 
and when offered a choice between hiring a young man or a young 
woman most prefer hiring the man. Data from the World Values Survey 
indicate that across the Arab world a majority of people feel that it is 
more important for men to have jobs than women, because men must 
provide for their families.
In Tunisia, SMEs are 2.5 percent of the total number of firms, but 
they generate about one-third of total employment and have 43 percent 
of salaried employees. Small enterprises (between 10 and 50 employees), 
which are by far the majority among SMEs, maintain many informal 
features, in particular in their human resources management, while 
larger enterprises behave more like modern and formal enterprises. The 
larger the size the closer they are to formality. Since half of the Tuni-
sian SMEs are small and employ fewer than 20 persons and 25 percent 
employ between 20 and 50 persons, informality is widespread among 
SMEs. In 2010 only 2,613 enterprises out of 11,242 SMEs employed 
between 50 and 200 persons each and qualified as medium enterprises.
However, SMEs have not been growing fast enough. According to 
the World Bank (2015), this could be explained in part by a distorted 
policy environment that aimed at protecting a few large firms that 
had political connections to the Ben Ali regime. The system generated 
privileges for the lucky few and did not create a level playing field. 
According to the World Bank, policy and regulatory framework insu-
lated politically connected firms from domestic as well as international 
competition. Small and medium-size firms were not allowed to enter 
sectors where politically connected firms operated, and when they did 
enter those sectors they were always at a competitive disadvantage that 
ensured that they remained small and could not grow.
The Way Forward 
Achieving inclusive growth requires a fundamental change in Arab eco-
nomic policies affecting the private sector. Past policies that prioritized 
large projects at the expense of small and medium projects may have 
succeeded in achieving high growth rates. However, they led to wide-
spread dissatisfaction, and eventually revolution, because large seg-
ments of the population did not benefit from that growth. One could 
argue that given enough time the benefits from growth would have 
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“trickled down” to the middle and poorer classes. But such a process 
would take decades to take its course, if it actually works at all. Hence 
it is not a politically feasible option. Developing small and medium-size 
businesses should be a priority.
The aim of policy should not be simply to support the growth of 
the existing SME sector, which consists mostly of micro enterprises. It 
should aim to transform it by raising its productivity and its linkages to 
domestic and international markets. The objective should be to support 
the modernization of the sector so that it can become more dynamic, 
provide better living standards for young entrepreneurs and decent jobs 
for new entrants to the labor market. A possible vision would be to 
become similar to the sectors in Europe or Japan where SMEs lead in 
innovation, often operate in clusters, and have strong links to larger 
firms as well as to national and international markets.
Governments cannot provide all of the solutions on their own. non-
governmental organizations around the world usually play a significant 
role in supporting SMEs. They help mobilize resources and provide credit 
to the sector, from their own resources as well as working as delivery 
agents for public agencies. They are also in a good position to provide 
technical and marketing support, and to help organize broad consulta-
tions with relevant stakeholders. Governments can help develop NGOs 
by putting in place appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks.10
The World Bank (2015) argues that the main problem holding back 
the development of the Arab formal private sector, including SMEs, 
is a policy environment that favors a few large firms that are well- 
connected to political elites and insulates them from competition. The 
development of a modern and competitive SME sector will require the 
creation of a level playing field so that newcomers can compete with 
the older and well-established market players. That is, the close and 
non transparent ties between political and business elites need to be sev-
ered. Political changes after the Arab Spring revolutions, and the depar-
ture of long-serving autocrats like presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak and 
the political and business elites surrounding them, are a step toward 
weakening those ties. However, unless institutional and regulatory 
changes are adopted, there is always a risk that new alliances between 
10. See Kharas and Abdou (2012) for a study of NGO development in Egypt.
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politicians and large business interests will emerge to the detriment of 
small and medium activities.
Arab SMEs complain about high tax rates and cumbersome tax 
administration. High and complicated tax systems could also be a way 
of discriminating against small businesses. Large and well-connected 
firms are better able to deal with the tax department and are therefore 
at an advantage compared to SMEs. This advantage is positively cor-
related with the level of taxation and the degree of complication. Hence 
an important way of supporting SME development is to lower taxes 
and simplify the tax system. International experience indicates that this 
is an important area for reform. According to the World Bank (2015), 
many countries (for example, Gabon, Jamaica, and Sweden) have 
reduced profit taxes for SMEs by 2 percentage points or more, while 
others (for example, Guatemala, Croatia, Philippines) have simplified 
tax compliance by introducing systems of electronic filing and payment.
Most new jobs are created by start-ups rather than by the expansion 
of existing SMEs. This is true around the world, and the Arab countries 
are no exception.11 That is why it is important that entrepreneurs not 
be discouraged from opening new businesses by excessive bureaucracy. 
Moreover, survey data indicate that the difficulty in obtaining official 
permits and licenses is one of the reasons why some SMEs prefer to 
remain informal.12 Some countries (for example, Algeria and Egypt) 
are trying to facilitate the process for entrepreneurs by putting in place 
one-stop shops that handle all procedures and obtain all permits on 
behalf of the entrepreneurs. But so far experience with one-stop shops 
has been mixed, and many small businesspeople face long delays at the 
start-up phase, which obviously puts them at a disadvantage versus the 
large well-connected businesses who are able to maneuver the bureau-
cracy and obtain all of the required permits in a timely fashion.
Restrictions on international trade are important impediments to 
the development of SMEs in the Arab world. SMEs need to be able to 
import equipment and intermediate inputs as well as technology and 
know-how in order to be internationally competitive. Moreover, many 
successful SMEs enter the export market. High import tariffs as well as 
11. World Bank (2015, p. 72).
12. See Ghanem (2013) for the example of Egypt and Boughzala (2013) for the 
example of Tunisia.
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complicated customs procedures are an important constraint on SMEs 
in some Arab countries, for example, Algeria. In other countries (for 
example, Egypt) access to foreign exchange in order to pay for imported 
goods and services is the key constraint. Cognizant of the importance 
of international trade for SME development, many countries (for exam-
ple, Argentina and Mexico) have simplified their import procedures 
and strengthened capacity of their customs and ports authorities.13
Good tax laws and simple regulations will only be effective if their 
implementation is not marred by abuse and corruption. Hence efforts 
to fight corruption and to professionalize the civil service could have 
a positive impact on SME development. Government needs to partner 
with civil society, the press, and business owners to bring about greater 
transparency and hold civil servants accountable. During its transition, 
Indonesia created the Partnership for Governance Reform between 
government and civil society to lead the fight against corruption.
Direct interventions by governments to support SMEs should go 
beyond credit programs to include support to some pilot SME clusters 
and programs for entrepreneurship development. Cluster development 
could be a very useful activity, provided that it is based on an exist-
ing local competence. Initially, interventions could focus on supporting 
local SMEs to better connect with each other, modernize, and link to 
national and international markets. For such an endeavor to succeed, 
it would be important to partner with a private enterprise that can 
provide the technical support and market access. Bringing in a foreign 
partner would be particularly useful for export-oriented activities.
Governments should also consider policies to encourage foreign 
investors to partner with domestic SMEs to help them obtain technical 
design and marketing expertise. In the case of the garment industry in 
Bali, the Indonesian government reduced the minimum level of foreign 
investment from $1 million to $250,000 in order to encourage small 
foreign investors to partner with local SMEs, bringing in their techni-
cal know-how and market access.
A key challenge to the implementation of the vision presented here 
is that young Arabs are not prepared for a life of entrepreneurship and 
risk taking. Education systems in the Arab world have been geared 
to produce civil servants and do not provide graduates with the skills 
13. World Bank (2014b, p. 107).
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needed to survive in a twenty-first-century marketplace. Educated Arab 
youth do not have the skills or the inclination to start their own busi-
ness. They prefer the security of a public sector job even if it implies 
a long period of unemployment as they wait for a job opening. There 
is clearly a need to modernize Arab education. At the same time gov-
ernments can partner with the private sector to develop entrepreneur-
ship programs to provide skills to youth and help them start their 
own business.
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6
Targeting excluded Groups:  
Youth, Smallholder Farmers, and Women
Economic exclusion was an important driver for the Arab Spring 
revolts. Although the Arab economies grew at decent rates in the 
decade preceding the revolution, large groups of people were not part 
of this growth and did not benefit from it. The three biggest excluded 
groups were youth, family farmers, and women. Redressing grievances 
of these groups and including them in future economic plans is essen-
tial for long-term sustainability of Arab economies.
Youth is a large excluded group. The old social contract whereby 
government provided free education, guaranteed public sector jobs, 
and subsidized housing and consumer goods has imploded. Govern-
ments are no longer able to provide jobs to all graduates or to subsidize 
housing and consumer goods. To benefit from economic growth, get 
married, and raise a family, youth need to find decent jobs in the pri-
vate sector that allow them to pay full prices for housing and consumer 
goods, or they need to start their own small business. However, the 
education system was designed to produce civil servants, not private 
sector workers or entrepreneurs. That is why it needs to be overhauled. 
Unless curricula and pedagogical methods are modernized youth will 
remain excluded from economic gains.
Smallholder farmers are another excluded group. Whole regions in 
the Arab world are excluded from the benefits of growth, and those 
regions are nearly all rural and highly dependent on agriculture. More-
over, most agricultural plots are small in size and are managed by 
smallholder family farmers. Hence policies aimed at achieving inclu-
sive growth need to include special programs and measures to support 
smallholders.
Ghanem_Arab Spring V1_i-x_1-156_final.indd   107 11/20/15   1:16 PM
108 HAfez gHAnem
Arab women (including young women and women farmers) suffer 
more than men from exclusion. They have lower labor force partici-
pation rates, higher unemployment rates, and limited access to credit, 
land, and other productive assets. That is why programs that target 
women are also critical for achieving inclusive growth.
Education as Key to Ending Youth Exclusion
Policies to deal with the problem of youth exclusion have usually 
focused on raising the demand for labor by encouraging more private 
sector activities, especially start-ups and SMEs, or by expanding the 
public sector. Demand-side policies are important, but they may not be 
sufficient to expand youth opportunities and ensure that youth are not 
excluded from the benefits of economic growth. The skills that Arab 
youth acquire at schools and universities do not seem to match those 
required by employers. And the education systems in the Arab world 
do not prepare students for a life of entrepreneurship and risk taking.
Arab countries have made huge strides in expanding access to edu-
cation, and more young Arabs than ever before are attending schools 
and universities. Arab governments spend more than 5 percent of GDP 
on education, which is a higher share than other middle-income regions 
spend. They have demonstrated a commitment to education and have 
succeeded in increasing the quantity of education delivered by schools 
and universities.
Quality of education should be the focus now. There is a need to 
improve the teaching of basic literacy and numeracy skills and to adjust 
curricula and teaching methods to reflect the skills and competencies 
demanded by today’s globalized labor market. There is also a need for 
institutional reforms that hold schools and teachers accountable for 
student learning.
Arab countries have done particularly well in improving primary 
school enrollment. Morocco, Oman, Djibouti, Mauritania, and Yemen 
made the largest improvements over the first decade of this century. As 
these same countries had the lowest rates of primary enrollment in the 
region in 2002, this indicates a strong narrowing of disparities in access 
across the region. Despite impressive gains, three of these countries—Dji-
bouti, Mauritania, and Yemen—continue to have the lowest enrollment 
rates in the region. For instance, while primary enrollment in Djibouti 
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has jumped nearly 30 percentage points since 2002, as of 2010–11 it 
rests at just 52 percent—by far lowest in the region (figure 6-1).
Secondary enrollment has also improved significantly, though these 
data are much more limited. In the five countries for which ten-year 
trends can be calculated, all have recorded positive gains at the second-
ary level. In particular, Syria, Oman, and Qatar have made impressive 
progress, with enrollment gains of 26, 24, and 12 percentage points, 
respectively, although Syria has most likely lost much of this progress 
over the past three years of civil conflict (figure 6-2).1
Increasing school attendance is an important achievement, but it 
does not necessarily mean that students are prepared to be competitive 
in a globalized twenty-first-century marketplace. Nor does it necessar-
ily mean that they are acquiring the skills that prospective employers 
are looking for. In fact, an important critique of Arab education sys-
tems is that they were designed to produce public sector workers and 
do not reflect today’s realities, where the public sector is stagnating or 
declining and most new jobs are in the private sector.
A fairly obvious weakness of Arab education systems is that they tend 
to overproduce people with higher education in arts and humanities, 
1. For more detail see Steer, Ghanem, and Jalbout (2014).
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while the labor market demands more science, mathematics, and tech-
nology graduates. On average, about two-thirds of Arab university 
graduates major in arts and humanities. This is much higher than in 
other successful middle-income countries in East Asia and Latin Amer-
ica that tend to put greater emphasis on science and mathematics.2
The education literature identifies five skill levels that are usually 
needed in production processes, each of which requires use of different 
cognitive skills and decisionmaking capacity. These levels are routine 
manual tasks that can be described using a set of rules; nonroutine 
manual tasks that cannot be well described by rules and require optical 
recognition and fine muscle control; routine cognitive tasks, such as 
maintaining expense reports, that are well described by logical rules; 
expert thinking that implies solving problems for which there are no 
rule-based solutions; and complex communication, which involves 
interacting with others to obtain and provide information and convince 
them to take action.3
2. See World Bank (2008).
3. See Levy and Murnane (2004).
FIGURE 6-2. Secondary Net Enrollment Rate, Selected Arab Countries, 2001–11
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Recent technical advances have increased the demand for expert 
thinking and complex communication and decreased demand for other 
levels of cognitive and decisionmaking capacity.4 This trend is likely to 
continue. In response to those changes, education systems around the 
world have evolved in two directions. First, the configurations of sub-
jects taught at school have changed so that subjects previously reserved 
for elite education are now more widely available. Second, the kinds of 
competencies needed have changed with a focus on developing students’ 
transferable skills that would help them adapt to an ever- changing labor 
market, as well as to living in societies that are continually evolving. In 
other words, schools need to prepare students for lifelong learning and 
continuous adaptation to new norms and technologies.
Workers in a twenty-first-century enterprise are increasingly 
expected to take responsibility and make decisions without turning 
to hierarchical structures. That is why education reforms around the 
world have focused on introducing inquiry-based learning and on 
adapting teaching to the learning capacity of the individual student.
Arab education systems are lagging in this area. Higher-order cog-
nitive skills such as flexibility, problem solving, and judgment are inad-
equately rewarded in Arab schools, and the individual needs of the 
students are usually not addressed. Teaching methods remain tradi-
tional, with the main activities in Arab schools continuing to be copy-
ing from the blackboard, writing, and listening to the teachers. Frontal 
teaching (wherein a teacher talks to the whole class) is the dominant 
method. Very little group work, creative thinking, or proactive learning 
take place.
Moreover, Arab children are not acquiring the basic foundational 
skills of literacy and numeracy. The 2013 Education for All Global 
Monitoring Report estimates that 43 percent of children and young 
people in the Arab region are failing to learn.5 Steer, Ghanem, and 
Jalbout (2014) argue, based on the average scores in reading and math 
for countries for which data were available, that 56 percent of primary 
school–age children and 48 percent of youth are not learning. By coun-
try, this figure ranges from 33 percent of children in Bahrain to 91 per-
cent of children in Yemen who are not learning at the primary level, 
4. See Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003).
5. Education for All Fast-Track Initiative Secretariat (2011). 
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despite being in school. At the secondary level, more than one-quarter 
of children are not learning in Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates, 
while nearly two-thirds are not learning in Morocco.6
Now could be the right time to launch an Arab initiative to mod-
ernize and strengthen education systems. Arab countries could pool 
financial and human resources and share knowledge and experience 
to work together to build world-class education systems. The objective 
should be to make sure that Arab youth will be able to find decent jobs 
and be competitive in the twenty-first century and beyond.
Education reform must include changes in curricula as well as in 
teaching methods. Curricula need to emphasize mathematics, science, 
and technology. They also need to build competencies—such as prob-
lem solving, teamwork, and communication skills—that employers are 
looking for. This means that teaching methods also need to change 
from frontal teaching and rote learning to a focus on problem solving 
and inquiry-based learning. One way to ensure that education reflects 
the needs of the labor market is to involve the private sector in devel-
oping the curricula and in service delivery. This would require the cre-
ation of a platform for dialogue and partnership on education between 
the public and private sectors.
Education reform also needs to include institutional innovations to 
hold schools and teachers accountable for learning outcomes. It is pos-
sible to build on local success stories in the Arab world to develop such 
innovations. Case studies highlight the importance of accountability rela-
tionships and the role of local leadership in building effective parental 
engagement and improving the quality of service delivery in the education 
sector. For example, Brixi, Lust, and Woolcock (2015, pp. 3–4) report
In Jordan the Zeid Bin Haritha Secondary School in the village 
of Yarqa has been achieving excellent results amid poverty and 
low capacity. Jordan’s national School and District Development 
Program, launched in 2009, encourages schools and directorates 
to collaborate with parents and communities, and it provides 
small school grants allowing some autonomy. Involving parents 
and citizens as partners, however, has not come naturally in tra-
ditional communities such as in Yarqa, with its deeply embedded 
6. Data from PISA (2009) and TIMMS (2011).
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lines of authority. It meant changing the leadership style of the 
school principal and teachers, creating a sense of common pur-
pose around the school in the community, and establishing new 
relations through a parent-teacher association and Education 
Council and making these new structures effective. Significantly, 
the Education Council in Yarqa has reached out to parents and 
the wider community and gained their trust for its transparency 
and inclusive decision making. Furthermore, friendly competition 
and rivalry among local schools and communities have helped to 
improve student outcomes. Student performance in national tests 
has become a source of community prestige and pride.
The experience of Yarqa could inspire similar reforms and institu-
tional innovations across the Arab world.
Agricultural Reforms to End the Exclusion  
of Smallholder and Family Farmers 
Most of the agriculture in the region is under family farming, which 
is defined as a type of agricultural production system managed by one 
or more members of a family and primarily reliant on nonwage family 
labor.7 Family farming includes agricultural, forestry, fisheries, pas-
toral, and aquaculture activities. It is often characterized by multiple 
activities as the family tries to increase its income and diversify its 
sources to protect itself from exogenous shocks.
Family farmers are often, but not necessarily always, smallholders. 
However, nearly all smallholders tend to be family farmers. That is why 
most empirical work on the subject has used the size of landholding 
as a proxy measure for family farming. Table 6-1 shows the relative 
importance of small family-run farms (less than five hectares) in Arab 
countries. On average, about 84 percent of all holdings are under fam-
ily farming. The importance of family farming appears to be quite uni-
form across countries. About 55 percent of agricultural landholdings in 
Algeria and Tunisia are under family farming, as are nearly 70 percent 
of holdings in Morocco and above 90 percent of holdings in Yemen, 
7. See Abaab and others (2000).
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Lebanon, and Egypt. This underlines the importance of family farming 
for poverty reduction.
Family farms in Arab countries tend to be very small. The average 
size of a family farm ranges from 0.7 hectare in Egypt to 2.2 hectares 
in Tunisia. Naturally, it is difficult to make comparisons on the basis of 
land area alone. For example, 0.7 hectare in the fertile Nile delta may be 
more productive, and hence worth more, than 2.2 hectares that depend 
on uncertain rain-fed irrigation in the Tunisian Southwest region.
The second column of table 6-1 shows that while family farms rep-
resent the majority of holdings, they control only a small proportion of 
total agricultural land. About 90 percent of agricultural land in Alge-
ria and Tunisia is under relatively large corporate-type farming. This 
figure declines to 75 percent in Morocco, 56 percent in Yemen, and 
30 percent in Egypt. This reflects the dualistic nature of agriculture in 
Arab countries, where large numbers of family farms operate alongside 
big and more modern entities. While family farmers tend to produce for 
their own consumption (subsistence farming) and to sell to local mar-
kets, the large modern farms produce for national and international 
markets. They tend to have higher productivity and to be more profit-
able than small family-operated farms. In Morocco, the average large 
modern farm earns about nine times the earnings of the average family 
farm. Table 6-2 presents the number of family members working on 
TAble 6-1. Share of Holdings of less than Five Hectares, Selected Arab Countries
Percent
Country Share of total holdings Share of land area
Algeria 55.4 11.3 
egypt 98.2 70.7 
Jordan 78.9 23.8 
lebanon 96.7 60.1 
Morocco 69.8 23.9 
Qatar 73.3 3.4 
Tunisia 53.5 10.9 
Yemen 93.0 43.9 
Average 84.2 25.3 
Source:  FAO Agriculture Census data. Period covered by country: Algeria, 2001; egypt, 1999–2000; Morocco, 1996; 
Jordan, 1997; lebanon, 1998; Qatar, 2000–01; Tunisia, 2004; Yemen, 2002.
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family farms in four Arab countries and their share of the total popu-
lation. It shows that a large number of people are working on family 
farms across Arab countries, making family farming a major source 
of household income and probably the most important source in some 
countries. About 16 percent of Egypt’s population is engaged in family 
farming. In Morocco and Algeria, nearly 11 percent of the population 
is engaged in family farming. Even the lower estimate of 4.6 percent of 
the population in Tunisia is still highly significant.
It is often argued that governments in the region have neglected fam-
ily farming and focused on the development of large-scale modern agri-
culture. For example, in Egypt the government invested huge sums in the 
New Valley (Toshka) project, which aims at irrigating about a quarter 
of a million hectares of desert land by building a 150- kilometer-long 
canal from Lake Nasser south of Aswan. Those large projects often have 
negative social and environmental impacts. On the other hand, it could 
be argued that developing modern agriculture is a legitimate national 
objective, as long as it does not come at the expense of family farming.
Morocco’s agriculture development program, Plan Maroc Vert, is an 
example of a strategy that tries to balance the desire to develop modern 
agriculture with the need to support family farmers. The strategy is built 
on two pillars: The first aims at developing modern, high- productivity 
agriculture through large projects built on public- private partnership. The 
second pillar aims at developing family farming through projects that are 
mainly government financed. This second pillar consists of 545 projects 
that, combined, will cost about 20 billion dirhams (US$2.5 billion) over 
a ten-year period and will target about 950,000 farmers operating in 
TAble 6-2. Family Farmers as Share of Population, Selected Arab Countries
Country
Smallholders and families 




Ratio of family  
farmers to population 
(percent)
Algeria 3,349 36,414 9.2
egypt 12,647 80,410 15.7
Morocco 3,452 32,245 10.7
Tunisia 489 10,674 4.6
Source: FAO Agriculture Census data. Period covered by country: Algeria, 2001; egypt, 1999–2000; Morocco, 1996; 
Tunisia, 2004.
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remote and difficult areas. The projects are divided into three types: proj-
ects that replace existing crops and products with new ones that provide 
higher value added to the farmers; projects that enhance productivity of 
existing products; and projects that introduce new activities to increase 
family income and diversify its sources. The projects are designed jointly 
with the professional associations representing the beneficiaries, who are 
also expected to participate in the project costs (about 30 percent) to 
ensure ownership and sustainability.
Linking farmers to markets is essential to raising their productiv-
ity and standards of living. Raising their share in value added is an 
important way to improve family farmers’ income. Family farmers tend 
to retain a very small share of value added from their products. For 
example, a study by the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture shows that 
for many vegetables the farmer’s share of the market price is only about 
20 percent. The absence of marketing, whether domestic or for exports, 
is a serious constraint on agriculture development and to increasing 
farmers’ incomes. The majority of family farmers in Egypt continue to 
use the traditional marketing system known as kerala. Under this sys-
tem, the crop is sold in the field at a price per hectare. The buyer takes 
control of the product in the field and handles the harvesting, selection, 
grading, and transportation. An obvious problem with this system is 
that it does not allow for much price differentiation to reflect quality. 
This also means that the farmer gets a lower share of the market value 
of the product, as the buyer needs to be compensated for harvesting 
and grading.
New marketing techniques could be introduced to reduce the role 
of intermediaries in the marketing process through better organiza-
tion of family farmers. For example, governments can help promote 
the products of family farms through special labels and information 
campaigns about the benefits of consuming local products. Moreover, 
family farmers’ incomes can be raised by establishing links between 
family farmers and small and medium-size enterprises to process the 
farmers’ products or between family farmers and traders to link farm-
ers with national and international markets. Such links can be created 
through contract farming or out-grower schemes.
The West Noubaria rural development project in Egypt is an example 
of a project that helped link smallholder family farmers to the interna-
tional market. The project helped establish contract farming arrangements 
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between family farmers producing organic potatoes and an Italian trad-
ing company. Thus the farmers were directly linked to the international 
market and started receiving better prices for their products.8
Limited access to financing and investment resources is perhaps 
the most important constraint facing family farmers. Table 6-3 shows 
credit to agriculture as a percentage of agricultural GDP and the ratio 
of credit to the private sector as a percent of total GDP in five coun-
tries. It shows that agriculture’s share of financing is extremely low 
compared with its contribution to the economy. In Egypt and Morocco, 
two large agricultural countries, agriculture’s share of credit (adjusted 
for its contribution to GDP) is less than one-fifth of the average for the 
whole economy. In Algeria and Tunisia it is about one-half. In Mauri-
tania, agricultural credit is only 2 percent of agricultural GDP.
The data in table 6-3 probably underestimate the magnitude of the 
problem facing family farmers because a large proportion of agricultural 
credit goes to big modern farms. Nevertheless, the data confirm that 
limited access to financing is a major problem for family farmers. Even 
if one could assume that all the credit to agriculture is going to family 
farmers, one would still conclude that they are grossly underserved by 
the financial system compared with other sectors of the economy.
Existing financial institutions, credit instruments, and bank proce-
dures are ill adapted to the needs of family farmers. Farmers are not 
8. See Ghanem (2014b).
TAble 6-3. Credit to Agriculture and Credit to the economy as Shares of GDP,  
Selected Arab Countries, 2011
Percent
Country
Credit to  agriculture as  
share of agriculture GDP
Credit to private sector as  






Source:  Credit to agriculture and agricultural GDP are from Arab Organization for Agricultural Development, Statistical 
Yearbook, 2012; and credit to the private sector and total GDP are from the Arab Monetary Fund, Economic Statistics 
Bulletin, 2011.
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able to provide the kind of guarantees that banks require to lend, since 
many family farmers do not have notarized land titles. The amounts of 
credit required by individual family farmers are usually small and are 
not of interest to banks. Moreover, many banks consider agriculture to 
be too risky and prefer not to lend to it.
To deal with this situation governments may consider creating new 
institutions or reinforcing existing ones with simplified lending proce-
dures that are adapted to the realities of family farmers; putting in place 
lines of credit to encourage banks to lend to family farmers; develop-
ing insurance and guarantee facilities to reduce the risk of lending to 
agriculture; and encouraging the development and expansion of rural 
microcredit facilities as well as farmer-centered financial institutions 
(where farmers have a stake in these institutions). There is also a need 
to increase public investment in agriculture and in rural areas to build 
the social and physical infrastructure necessary for the development of 
family farming.
There are several examples from Arab countries of initiatives to 
enhance financing for smallholders and family farmers. Sudan created 
a Micro Finance Development Facility owned by the Central Bank and 
the Ministry of Finance and mainly funded from donor resources. It 
has supported the creation of sixteen new microfinance institutions and 
has reached nearly half a million beneficiaries. About 80 percent of 
funding under this program is directed to agriculture activities. The 
facility funds small investments by family farmers and gives special 
preference to women and young graduates from agriculture and veter-
inary colleges.
Lebanon’s Disaster Fund for Agriculture is an example of an initia-
tive to provide guarantees and reduce the riskiness of family farming. 
Half of the resources for this fund are provided by the government and 
the other half by the farmers themselves. The idea is to provide finan-
cial compensation to farmers suffering from bad weather conditions or 
other types of natural disasters. By reducing farmers’ risks, this fund 
also helps them obtain credit.
Access to land is another important issue for smallholder fam-
ily farmers. As suggested earlier, the average size of a family farm in 
Arab countries is less than two hectares. Moreover, this average size 
is decreasing steadily as a result of population increase. The applica-
tion of inheritance laws that divide land among surviving children and 
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the absence of well-functioning land markets that allow consolidation 
compound the problem. The small size of family farms complicates 
their access to technology, inputs, and markets.
Many family farmers in Arab countries do not have title to their 
small holdings. In some countries, land continues to be legally owned 
by the state, and farmers are considered tenants, although they often 
lack a legal document proving this relationship. In addition to mak-
ing it difficult for family farmers to obtain credit, uncertainty about 
their ownership of land discourages them from investing. Governments 
could help boost investment in agriculture by facilitating land titling 
for farmers and in some cases distributing public and collective land 
to smallholder family farmers. It is also recommended that laws and 
regulations be amended to protect the rights of tenants on small farms.
Research and extension services should be adapted to the needs 
of family farmers. Productivity of Arab countries’ family farmers is 
lagging partly because of lack of access to appropriate modern tech-
nology. Regional institutions need to carry out their own agricultural 
research to adapt existing knowledge and techniques to local ecologi-
cal, social, and economic realities. Many studies show that the return 
to investment in agricultural research is typically very high, and it is 
estimated at 36 percent for Arab countries. However, as is shown in 
figure 6-3, Arab countries’ investment in research ranges from 0.4 to 
0.9 percent of agricultural GDP, far below the rate of about 2.4 percent 
observed in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel-
opment (OECD) countries and the 1.5 percent observed in successful 
Latin American countries.
Perhaps more important, many extension services in Arab coun-
tries are poorly funded and therefore ineffective. Moreover, extension 
workers are often not trained to communicate with family farmers and 
end up delivering information in a manner that is not convincing or 
helpful to the farmers. This appears to be a problem across the Arab 
world. For example, a recent study in Jordan compared productivity of 
olive farmers who received support from extension services with those 
who received no support.9 The study concluded that receiving support 
from extension services had no impact on productivity. This implies 
that even when research is carried out successfully, its results are not 
9. See al-Sharafat, Altarawaneh, and Altahat (2012).
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adequately transmitted to smallholder family farmers. It appears that 
there is a need to consider innovative types of research and extension 
institutions as well as new instruments for delivering information to 
family farmers. Innovative extension systems put family farmers at the 
center and do not consider them as mere end receivers. New institutions 
could be based on government partnerships with the private sector, 
family-farmer-producer organizations, and civil society. Many civil 
society organizations have earned the trust of family farmers because 
they have deep knowledge of the sector and long experience working 
with family farmers. They increasingly use modern technologies and 
information technologies such as mobile phones and the Internet to 
deliver information to family farmers. The use of dedicated television 
programs to provide information to farmers in Egypt is an interesting 
example in this area.
Better research and extension services are particularly needed to help 
family farmers adapt to the impact of climate change. Higher tempera-
tures, less rainfall, and increased land salinity (which are predicted to 
result from climate change) in a region that is already very hot and arid 
FIGURE 6-3. Investment in Agricultural Research as Share of Agricultural GDP, 
Selected Countries, 2008
Percent
Algeria Egypt Brazil Mexico
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and in which per capita water availability is among the lowest in the 
world do not augur well for the future of agriculture in the region, unless 
urgent action is taken now. Family farmers should be at the center of 
action to adapt to climate change. They are the largest producers of food 
for local consumption and creators of rural employment, and at the same 
time their small size and lack of investment resources make them partic-
ularly vulnerable to climate change and other types of shocks.
Some farmers are already adapting to higher temperatures by adjust-
ing planting times. Research and extension services can be helpful 
here by introducing new varieties that are more heat resistant and by 
informing farmers about new cropping patterns to reflect changes in 
climatic conditions. Arab countries’ biggest challenge will continue to 
be dealing with water shortages. Here again, research and extension 
can play an important role by introducing more drought-resistant vari-
eties. This needs to be accompanied by new investments in better irri-
gation systems to avoid water waste and ensure the most efficient use 
of limited water resources.
In addition to better policies and programs, promoting agriculture 
and supporting smallholder family farmers require new and more inclu-
sive institutions. Producer organizations and cooperatives can play an 
important role in strengthening the governance system of the agricul-
ture sector, particularly in developing and supporting family farmers 
and therefore in increasing the productivity of this sector. Problems 
caused by the large number of very small dispersed family farms in 
Arab countries can be tackled through the development of strong pro-
ducer organizations that group farmers together to ensure that their 
voice is heard in policy discussions and also help enhance access to 
technology, input and output markets, information, communication, 
and natural resources. Compared with other regions with similar per 
capita income (for example, Latin America or East Asia), producer 
organizations, as well as other civic society organizations that operate 
in rural areas, are still quite weak in the Arab countries and do not yet 
fully play their roles in supporting family farming.
Arab countries are characterized by a multiplicity of weak producer 
organizations that are highly dependent on governments. In several 
countries the statutes place producers and other civil society organiza-
tions under the administrative supervision and authority of the govern-
ment. Thus their autonomy and ability to operate in support of family 
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farmers is restricted. Moreover, producer organizations are usually 
heavily dependent on government budgets for financial support, which 
further erodes their independence and limits their areas of action. In 
fact, producer organizations sometimes act more as government agen-
cies, informing farmers of policy decisions that are taken at the central 
level and helping implement them, rather than as bodies that represent 
farmers and advocate for policies that protect their interests.
Many producer organizations suffer from inadequate human, finan-
cial, and material resources, which severely limits their ability to par-
ticipate in agricultural and rural development. Lack of training and 
knowledge among grassroots actors limits the organizations’ ability to 
identify issues and mobilize appropriate expertise at different levels to 
deal with them. Moreover, lack of members with experience and train-
ing negatively affects the way collective and individual responsibilities 
are being exercised in various producer organizations.
Family farmers need effective producer organizations and cooper-
atives. Those organizations should play an important political role. 
Family farmers do not feel that their voices are being heard in policy 
circles. The lack of strength and the low level of political participa-
tion of organizations that represent family farmers may explain why 
development strategies and policies tend to be biased in favor of urban 
activities and large modern agriculture. Independent and strong pro-
ducer organizations could play an effective advocacy role and could 
help lobby politicians to promote the interests of family farmers.
Producer organizations and cooperatives should also play an import-
ant economic role, grouping family farmers together to enhance their 
access to technology and inputs, improve market access, and help them 
retain a larger share of value added. Producer organizations could 
encourage the exchange of experience and know-how between farmers. 
They could propose and encourage programs for applied agricultural 
research that support family farmers and also help improve extension 
services and adapt them to the needs of family farmers. In fact, civil 
society organizations, including producer organizations and coopera-
tives, are often much better placed than government agencies to deliver 
extension and technical support to family farmers.
When provided with adequate support, family farmers are able to 
meet quality standards and sell for export, thus considerably increas-
ing their incomes. Some civil society organizations have been active in 
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this area with good results. The SUN (al-shamas in Arabic) nongovern-
mental organization, which was created in 2002 and operates in Upper 
Egypt, is a good example.10 This organization works with family farmers 
in one of the poorest regions in Egypt. It supports the creation of asso-
ciations and provides them with technical, managerial, and marketing 
support. It helps link family farmers to large producers and exporters 
through different contractual arrangements and out-grower schemes. In 
its first five years of operation, it signed nearly 900 different contracts 
with exporters and agro-processors. It also prioritizes women’s partic-
ipation in the program. By 2007 more than 12,500 family farmers had 
joined SUN associations. They exported nontraditional products worth 
85 million Egyptian pounds (about US$12 million) and estimate that 
participants’ income rose by 60 million pounds (about US$8 million).
Producer organizations and cooperatives can also work across 
national borders and therefore help in regional integration, in addition 
to supporting family farmers. The Union of Sheep and Goat Growers 
Associations in the Maghreb is a good example in this area. The union 
was created in 2011 by growers associations in Morocco, Algeria, Tuni-
sia, and Mauritania. Its overarching objective is to set up a regional 
professional framework for organizations of sheep and goat growers so 
as to contribute to the development of the subsector in the countries of 
the Maghreb. It facilitates knowledge sharing across the subregion and 
works to elaborate joint strategies and programs as well as joint coor-
dination mechanisms among its member organizations. This growers 
association also operates as an advocacy group to defend the interests 
of its membership. As a union of several national producer organiza-
tions it has more political weight than any of its individual members 
and hence can be a more effective interlocutor with governments.
Governments need to support producer organizations, cooperatives, 
and other civil society organizations working with family farmers and 
to ensure their political and financial independence. This may require 
an enabling environment that would entail legal and policy changes 
that provide more autonomy to civil society organizations, moves them 
out of governments’ control, and provides them with greater financial 
and operational freedom. It will also require a change in the current 
bureaucratic and political culture away from centralized control and 
10. Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (2009), box 4, p. 59.
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toward a much more decentralized and participatory system of gov-
ernance. Governments should regularly invite producer organizations 
and cooperatives’ representatives to participate as equal partners in the 
formulation and implementation of policies and development programs.
Women and Economic Empowerment 
The Arab Spring opened up a prospect of opportunity for women. Like 
their male counterparts, young women demanded an inclusive role in 
society, economic growth, and access to employment opportunities. 
The demographic shift toward youth population has brought young 
women to the forefront. This new generation of women aged fifteen 
to twenty-nine is more educated and has better health outcomes and 
lower fertility rates than its predecessors. Still, the labor force partici-
pation rate for young Arab women is particularly low compared with 
the rest of the world. It stood at about 27 percent, on average, in 2003 
(see figure 6-4) compared with 64 percent in the Americas, 55 percent 
in Europe, and 62 percent in sub-Saharan Africa.
Social and cultural norms, legal and regulatory frameworks, and 
economic factors are all responsible for creating gender disparity in 
labor force participation. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region, gender norms are defined by the patriarchal system. According 
to Offenhauer (2005, p. 10), the patriarchal system in Muslim societies 
is characterized by “male domination, early marriage, son preference, 
restrictive codes of behavior for women, and the association of family 
honor with female virtue.” It can be argued that these gender norms 
translate into cultural and social norms and restrict women’s access to 
the labor market.
On the other hand, the recent wave of the World Values Survey 
(2010–14) shows that women do care about education and jobs. Figure 
6-5 shows that across the MENA region, women consider education 
and employment as important priorities for themselves. More than 
40 percent of women in Lebanon and Morocco disagree with the pri-
ority given to men in jobs. In eight of the sampled countries, more than 
60 percent of women agree with the importance of having a job for 
independence, and in Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia 
more than 40 percent of women strongly disagree with the notion that 
a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.
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The Arab world has a very high level of legal restriction on women, 
which could explain the low female labor force participation rate. For 
example, a husband’s unilateral right of divorce and a wife’s legal obli-
gation to obey her husband may create an additional barrier to wom-
en’s entry into the labor force. On the other hand, Morikawa (2015b) 
notes that many Arab countries have laws that prohibit labor discrim-
ination in the workplace. Hence the low level of female labor force 
participation often stems from de facto discrimination rather than from 
de jure discrimination.
This seems to be especially applicable to Morocco. Morikawa (2015b) 
presents a social institution and gender index by considering a country’s 
family code, civil liberties, the physical integrity of citizens, traditional 
preferences for male offspring, and ownership rights. Morocco is ranked 
forty-third among more than 100 non-OECD countries, the second- 
highest ranking for an Arab country after Tunisia. In fact, significant 
reforms to the Moroccan family law, Moudawana, in 2004 led to a 
FIGURE 6-4. Female and Male Labor Force Participation across MENA, 




Source: Data compiled from household surveys conducted between 2005 and 2011. See World Bank (2013a) for more detail.
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rise in the minimum marriage age for women from fifteen to eighteen, 
placed a family under the joint responsibility of both spouses, and elim-
inated a woman’s legal obligation to obey her husband. However, there 
remain issues regarding enforcement, as some judges have circumvented 
the law, while others are still unfamiliar with the amendments. In 2012 
roughly 10 percent of the marriages recorded in Morocco involved a 
girl under the age of eighteen, permitted under articles 20 and 21 of 
Moudawana, which allow family judges to authorize the marriage of 
minors. Even though the articles require well- substantiated arguments 
to justify such marriages, more than 90 percent of requests are autho-
rized. By removing legal restrictions on women, including those that 
are implicit, the society would be better prepared for working women.11
Added to the gender norms and social and institutional constraints, 
economic conditions have also hampered employment opportunities 
11. For more on the case of Morocco, see Morikawa (2015b).




Source: World Values Survey, wave 6, 2010–14. Period covered by country: Egypt, 2012; Iraq, 2013; Jordan, 2014; Kuwait, 
2013; Lebanon, 2013; Libya, 2013; Morocco, 2011; Palestinian Territories, 2013; Qatar, 2010; Tunisia, 2013; Yemen 2013.
a. Series a = Proportion of women who disagree with the statement “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right 
to a job than women.” Series b = Proportion of women who agree with the statement “Having a job is the best way for a 
women to be an independent person.” Series c = Proportion of women who strongly disagree with the statement “A 
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for women. As employment in the public sector fell, and the under-
developed private sector could not absorb the unmet demand for 
employment, the informal sector grew. Most young Arabs get their 
first job in the informal sector.12 However, Arab women shy away from 
the informal sector owing to its insecure working conditions. While 
both men and women aspire to public sector jobs, women consider 
government jobs more “acceptable, personally and socially.”13 In addi-
tion, the connections and networks required to get jobs in the increas-
ingly shrinking public sector give preference to men. The World Bank 
(2013a) report highlights the prevalence of a gender bias in women’s 
access to job- relevant skills and entrepreneurship opportunities among 
factors that reduce female labor force participation.
Surprisingly, there appears to be little gender bias in access to educa-
tion. Arab countries have done particularly well in improving the ratio 
of female to male school enrollment. Figures 6-6 and 6-7 show that the 
gender gap in enrollment at the primary and secondary levels decreased 
12. See Devarajan and Mottaghi (2015).
13. World Bank (2013a, p. 98).
FIGURE 6-6. Ratio of Female to Male Primary Enrollment, Selected Arab Countries, 
2000 and 2010 
Percent
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from 2000 to 2010. The ratio of female to male primary school enroll-
ment has gone up close to or above 95 percent in all six countries. The 
secondary enrollment ratio has also improved for Egypt, Morocco, 
and Tunisia while remaining stagnant at above 100 percent for Jordan 
and Algeria.
The learning crisis is affecting boys much more than girls. The per-
centage of girls who meet basic learning levels is higher than that for 
boys in all nine Arab states for which learning data are available. At the 
primary level, Saudi Arabia shows the largest disparity, with nearly half 
of the boys not learning but fewer than one-third of the girls not learning.
Girls also learn more than boys while in secondary school. In nine 
of the eleven Arab states for which learning outcomes are available, 
higher proportions of girls are learning than boys. In four countries, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, the share of 
boys not learning was at least 15 percentage points higher than the 
share of girls not learning (see figure 6-8).14
14. See Steer, Ghanem and Jalbout (2014).
FIGURE 6-7. Ratio of Female to Male Secondary Enrollment, Selected Arab Countries, 
2000 and 2010
Percent
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Even if women are better educated overall, their economic activity 
remains weak, and their unemployment rate is systematically higher 
than men’s.15 The case of Jordan is fairly typical of Arab countries. 
Women represent less than 20 percent of the labor force, and a smaller 
share of Jordanian women work (less than 16 percent). That is, women 
are largely excluded from the economic and productive process. Wom-
en’s activity rate by age suggests that until women are in their late 
twenties, their participation increases, but contrary to men it decreases 
from then on (see figure 6-9). The contrast is striking since almost all 
men between the ages of twenty-five and forty are part of the work-
force. It means that from the beginning of their work lives, women lag 
men in the job market, in terms of experience and date of entry.
Participation dramatically increases for women with diplomas (in 
2012 less than 6 percent of women with no more than a secondary 
education participated in the workforce, 31 percent with an interme-
diate diploma, and 57 percent with at least a bachelor’s degree); for 
15. See Amer (2012).
FIGURE 6-8. Fifteen-Year-Old Girls and Boys Not Meeting Basic Learning Level, 
Selected Arab Countries, 2009 and 2011
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men, the added value of an intermediate diploma or higher degree is 
important, but even illiterate men participate in the workforce at more 
than 20 percent (table 6-4). Assaad, Hendy, and Yassine (2012) argue 
that the ability of educated women to get a job in the government, and 
in the private sector to a lesser extent, is the reason for the discrepancy 
between education levels. However, women’s unemployment rate rises 
systemically with education, more strongly than for men (for whom the 
correlation is weaker).
Marriage seems to push women to drop out of the workforce (the 
opposite is true for men).16 Whatever the level of education, married 
woman are indeed less present in the labor force. This is particularly 
true for women with higher education: half of the married women 
are out of the labor market, while that is the case for only 21 percent 
of unmarried women. This pattern holds true to a lesser extend for 
women with secondary degrees, while the difference for less educated 
women is marginal. Moreover, it can be noted that the group of women 
16. And childbearing, most probably.
FIGURE 6-9. Employment Activity, by Sex and Age, Jordan, 2013
Percent
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with the highest unemployment rate is unmarried educated women, 
26 percent of whom are unemployed.17
Teaching is the main economic activity for women (more than 
40 percent of the active women are in the education sector) (table 6-5). 
The health sector and public administration follow (less than 15 per-
cent in 2012), which illustrates the fact that outside of the public sector, 
women are present in few economic activities.
17. Assaad, Hendy, and Yassine (2012, tables 1 and 2, p. 27).
TAble 6-4. economic Activity, by Sex and education level, Jordan, 2012
Percent 
Sex and education level Percentage




ment rateTotal Employed Unemployed
Total 38.0 33.4 4.6 62.0 12.2
Illiterate 100 6.8 6.2 0.6 93.2 9.3
less than secondary 100 34.8 30.9 3.9 65.2 11.2
Secondary 100 25.4 23.2 2.2 74.6 8.6
Intermediate 100 50.7 45.2 5.5 49.3 10.8
bachelor and above 100 70.8 59.6 11.2 29.2 15.9
Men
Total 61.3 54.9 6.4 38.7 10.4
Illiterate 100 21.9 19.6 2.3 78.1 10.4
less than secondary 100 60.4 53.6 6.8 39.6 11.2
Secondary 100 45.2 41.4 3.7 54.8 8.3
Intermediate 100 80.3 74.9 5.4 19.7 6.8
bachelor and above 100 82.6 73.5 9.1 17.4 11
Women
Total 14.1 11.3 2.8 85.9 19.9
Illiterate 100 1.3 1.3 0 98.7 2.1
less than secondary 100 3.8 3.4 0.4 96.2 11.0
Secondary 100 5.6 5.0 0.6 94.4 11.0
Intermediate 100 30.9 25.4 5.5 69.1 17.8
bachelor and above 100 57.1 43.4 13.7 42.9 24.0
Source: Assaad, Hendy, and Yassine (2012). 
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Assaad, Hendy, and Yassine (2012) use the panel data gathered in 
2010 to study the dynamics of women’s employment over the past forty 
years. They find that among women, “new entrants were much more 
reliant on government jobs in the 1970s and 1980s than their men 
counterparts.”18 The rate of female employment in the government 
sector was higher than 60 percent until 1985; it then fell to 25 per-
cent in the late 1990s and rose to 30 percent in the first decade of this 
century. The slowdown in government jobs first affected women, as 
men continued to be hired in high numbers until the late 1990s. The 
job status of women subsequently became more precarious in both the 
informal wage sector and in temporary private employment. Studying 
the trajectories of young women entering the labor market, the authors 
confirm that many women drop out of the workforce in the first ten 
years, especially from less family-friendly jobs (that is, outside of gov-
ernment). The only mobility appears to be from formal private jobs to 
government jobs.
The above discussion indicates that the problem of female economic 
inclusion and labor force participation is complex and multifaceted. 
18. See Assaad, Hendy, and Yassine (2012, p. 6).
TAble 6-5. Top Ten economic Activities for Working-Age Women, Jordan, 2012
Percent
Activity Kingdom Rural Urban
education 41.8 47.9 40.6
Human health and social work activities 14.3 15.4 14.1
Public administration and defense; compulsory social security 12.1 17.7 11.1
Manufacturing 6.4 5.9 6.5
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles  
and motorcycles
5.5 3.4 5.9
Financial and insurance activities 3.2 0.7 3.6
Professional, scientific, and technical activities 3.0 0.9 3.4
Other service activities 2.8 1.6 3.1
Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods-  
and services-producing activities of households for own use
2.5 0.6 2.8
Information and communication 1.9 0.4 2.2
Source: Department of Statistics, employment and Unemployment Survey, Jordan.
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Improving the economic status of women in the Arab world would 
require action in at least three areas. First, the legal and regulatory 
frameworks would need to be revised to abolish discrimination against 
women, and at the same time institutions will need to be strengthened 
to ensure that the new rules are actually implemented and the discrimi-
nation is effectively removed. Second, policies and programs to expand 
the formal private sector would help increase the supply of decent jobs 
that are considered safe for women. Third, a continued expansion of 
female access to quality education will increase overall labor force par-
ticipation rates, since there is a positive correlation between a woman’s 
level of education and her decision to enter the job market.
Special attention needs to be paid to women in agriculture. Women 
play an important role in family farming. Table 6-6 presents the distri-
bution of family farm workers by sex in four countries. It shows that 
between 23 and 39 percent of the labor on family farms is provided by 
women. Moreover, the role of women in family farming is increasing 
because more and more male family members are migrating to oil-rich 
countries and to cities to earn a better living and send remittances to 
their families, who remain on the farm. Women are left to look after 
the family farm. As a result, a process of feminization of family farm-
ing in Arab countries seems to have started.
There is a common division of labor between men and women on 
the family farm. Women tend to be responsible for food production 
and for animal husbandry. They plant food crops for their families’ 
consumption, and they look after small and large ruminants and spe-
cialize in the production of eggs, milk, and dairy products. They also 
participate with all family members in harvesting activities. They are 






Share of women 
(percent)
Algeria 2,580 769 3,349 23.0
egypt 8,227 4,420 12,647 34.9
Tunisia 334 155 489 31.7
Yemen 2,105 1,344 3,449 38.9
Source: FAO, Agriculture Census data. Period covered for country: Algeria, 2001; egypt, 1999–2000; Tunisia, 2004; 
Yemen, 2002.
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usually helped by their children, who take small ruminants to water 
and pasture and work alongside their parents at harvest time.
Women farmers suffer from lack of access to land, credit, and tech-
nology. Women landholders generally represent less than 5 percent of 
landholders in the region. Moreover, the small size of farms and land 
fragmentation pose a special problem for women, who are hampered 
by social norms from moving among plots that may be far from one 
another. Women have great difficulties in obtaining rural credit. The 
husbands’ agreement is often required, which may not always be forth-
coming. There is also the requirement of literacy to sign legally binding 
documents. Older women, who participate most in commercial activi-
ties and can benefit readily from microcredit, are the least likely to be 
literate. Women often have to form associations to obtain microcredit. 
These organizational requirements can be time consuming and often 
require the presence of an agent in the community.
Rural women have little access to extension services. Most extension 
programs lack qualified personnel and have limited capacity to main-
stream gender in policies, programs, and implementation strategies. 
The design of many extension programs has not taken women’s cul-
tural and time constraints into account. Consequently, women’s oppor-
tunities to express their needs and to have them met are more limited 
than those of men. Research and extension work tend to focus on cash 
crops rather than the subsistence food crops that women grow on land 
they own. Although women play a predominant role in all forms of 
animal husbandry, including raising small ruminants, caring for cows, 
and preparing all milk products, extension services for women rarely 
focus on those activities.
Given their important role in agriculture and in food and nutrition 
security, particular attention needs to be paid to the needs of women 
farmers.19 Governments could consider a three-pronged approach to 
supporting women farmers. First, existing laws on access to land and 
to credit need to be reviewed and, whenever appropriate, revised to 
remove biases against women farmers. In addition, many existing pro-
cedures, particularly those regulating titling land as well as obtaining 
microfinance, need to be revised and simplified to reflect the realities of 
rural women. Second, governments could put in place special programs 
19. See Food and Agriculture Organization (2011).
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to provide financial services for rural women, such as an agricultural 
women’s bank that would specialize in working with women farmers 
and catering to their banking needs. Third, extension services and pro-
grams need to be revised to better reflect the increased feminization 
of family farming. For example, Sudan has developed Woman Farmer 
Schools, a program that caters to the needs of rural women and shares 
information on health and nutrition issues as well as on agricultural 
production and animal husbandry.
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How Can the International  
Community Help?
The international community is interested in inclusive growth in the 
Arab world because it would contribute to peace and stability. And 
peace and stability in the Arab world are global public goods. Insta-
bility in the Arab region spills over to the rest of the world through 
refugees, illegal migration, and, of course, terrorism.
Many analysts, for example, Wittes (2008), go a step further and 
argue that it is in the interest of the international community, and par-
ticularly the United States, to promote democracy in the Arab world. 
The rise in violence and extremism is viewed as a reaction to the lack 
of democratic governance. Hence those analysts call for an active pol-
icy of supporting democratization to contribute to peace and stability. 
Of course, democracy and human rights also impact economic devel-
opment, and there is a growing literature on the role of human rights 
in development.1
But can the international community really influence short-term 
political developments in the region? Probably not. Nevertheless, it 
is important that the international community remain engaged in the 
region. However, it may also be necessary to reexamine the nature of 
this engagement and reorient aid flows toward areas and sectors that 
directly enhance economic and political inclusiveness. Examples of 
such areas would be institution building, support for small-scale enter-
prises, agriculture and rural development, and education.2
1. For example, see World Bank and OECD (2013).
2. This chapter is based on the analysis in Ghanem and Shaikh (2013).
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Adopting a Long-Term View: Can the West Be Patient? 
Achieving the goal of a stable democracy requires peace. It also requires 
building important institutions (such as a free press, independent judi-
ciary, political parties, and so on) that ensure transparency, voice, and 
accountability. Most important, it requires a change of political culture 
toward greater inclusion and acceptance of the other. Those changes 
take years to materialize. Therefore, patience and a long-term vision are 
needed. International aid could be used strategically and be combined 
with knowledge sharing and technology transfer to influence the path 
of the transition and help achieve greater inclusion and social justice.
Economic support to the region could focus on fixing the problems 
with the growth model adopted before the Arab Spring. It could tackle 
questions of social justice and inclusiveness. Achieving inclusive growth 
that is associated with the development of institutions that provide for 
transparency, voice, and accountability in decisionmaking, an expan-
sion of the middle class, and the growth of small businesses would 
be important for the democratization process. International economic 
support for the region could prioritize inclusiveness and social justice 
by supporting institutional development, helping small businesses, and 
investing in agriculture, rural development, and education.
Developing Inclusive Economic Institutions:  
How Can Donors Overcome Political Sensitivities? 
Inclusive institutions are important for democracy, and they are 
important for social justice. Most Arab governments over the past four 
decades have at least given lip service to the goal of social justice and 
have taken some symbolic steps toward implementing parts of this 
agenda. However, there has been no serious attempt made so far to 
fully implement an agenda for achieving social justice and economic 
inclusion. Even after the revolutions, transition governments did not 
take any significant moves toward achieving this key goal.
Arab governments’ failure to act decisively on social justice issues 
could be explained by the fact that the lower middle class and the 
poor who would benefit from such an agenda have little or no voice 
in the economic decisionmaking process. This could explain why their 
interests were not served by economic policies, while a system of crony 
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capitalism flourished. Inclusive economic institutions that would give 
voice to ordinary citizens in economic policymaking and empower 
them to hold government officials accountable would increase the prob-
ability that an agenda for achieving social justice is actually adopted 
and implemented. It would provide important support for the democ-
ratization efforts.
The allocation of public investment is often biased toward relatively 
better-off regions and groups, which reflects the noninclusive nature of 
the planning and economic decisionmaking process. Sakamoto (2013) 
analyzes Egypt’s planning system and finds that lack of a structured 
dialogue among key stakeholders is a key feature of the planning pro-
cess in Egypt. Six five-year development plans were prepared during the 
Mubarak era. Budget allocations were determined before determining 
economic goals and strategies. The first planning step was the pro-
duction of the investment budget allocation sheet by the Ministry of 
Planning, based on the line ministries’ investment budget requests. The 
five-year development plan was then drafted by the Ministry of Plan-
ning based on the budget allocation sheet. This system was simple, with 
drafting being fully completed inside the Ministry of Planning without 
official outside contacts. Thus the system excluded major stakeholders, 
such as the private sector, civil society organizations, labor organiza-
tions, and farmer organizations. Even line ministries had little voice in 
the preparation of the plan document.
Kharas and Abdou (2012) look at the role that civil society organiza-
tions could play in achieving inclusive growth and social justice. They 
argue that such organizations can make four important contributions 
to inclusive growth. First, they can play an advocacy role for small 
businesses, the informal sector, and other marginalized groups, ensur-
ing that government takes their concerns into account when formulat-
ing policies and programs. And they can also act as whistleblowers, 
denouncing corruption and other unfair practices that harm small or 
weak economic agents. Second, they could provide important economic 
services that the public sector is unable to provide (or provides ineffi-
ciently): for example, by helping small enterprises get access to finance 
and to technical assistance. Third, they can act as think tanks, develop-
ing ideas and promoting best practices that support inclusive growth. 
Fourth, they can be an important source of employment opportunities 
for youth. Kharas and Abdou (2012) conclude that the legal framework 
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governing civil society organizations needs to be reformed to provide 
them with greater flexibility and incentives to expand their activities.
Farmer organizations and cooperatives are a special type of civil 
society organization that can play an important role in strengthening 
the governance system of the agriculture sector, particularly in develop-
ing and supporting family farmers. Problems caused by the large num-
ber of family farms with very small holdings can be tackled through 
the development of strong producer organizations that group farmers 
together to ensure that their voice is heard in policy discussions and 
also help enhance access to technology, inputs, and markets. Existing 
farmer organizations and cooperatives are weak and are overly depen-
dent on government for financial and technical support, which erodes 
their independence and limits their areas of action. Cooperatives and 
farmer organizations sometimes act more as government agencies, 
informing farmers of policy decisions that are taken at the central level 
and helping implement them, rather than as bodies that represent farm-
ers and advocate for policies that protect their interests.
These are just three examples of areas where support for institution 
building is badly needed. International support to institution building 
could be a sensitive subject as it may raise political issues. Experience 
with U.S. funding for Egyptian civil society organizations is an exam-
ple of how things can go wrong.3 But this should not be an argument 
for doing nothing. Instead, it should be an argument for engaging the 
governments of the region in a serious dialogue on the issue. Inclu-
siveness and social justice cannot be achieved without institutions that 
ensure transparency of decisionmaking, provide voice to all stakehold-
ers, and hold government officials accountable.4
Some members of the international community are particularly well 
equipped to provide support to the development of inclusive economic 
institutions. The United Nations Development Program, which has a 
strong presence in the region, has a clear mandate in the area of human 
rights that includes the principles of transparency, voice, and account-
ability. Moreover, it is a neutral UN agency that can provide needed 
3. Egyptian authorities closed down a number of U.S.-supported NGOs and 
started legal proceedings against their staff on the grounds that they were not regis-
tered and were illegally receiving funding from abroad.
4. For more on the role of institutions in development, see Acemoglu and Rob-
inson (2012).
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support to nongovernmental organizations, legislatures, and the free 
press without necessarily being accused of political meddling. Another 
UN agency, the Food and Agriculture Organization, has a long expe-
rience of working with farmer organizations. The International Mon-
etary Fund and the World Bank have vast experience in the area of 
public financial management, procurement policies, and civil service 
reforms. The Japan International Cooperation Agency has experience 
in the area of inclusive planning. The European Commission, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom have experience in supporting organizations 
that promote transparency, voice, and accountability, including in the 
Arab world.
Supporting Small Business:  
Could Donors Move beyond Simple Credit Programs?
The expansion of the small and medium-size enterprise sector would 
help promote economic inclusiveness as it would provide greater 
opportunities especially for youth. It would also contribute to a grad-
ual democratic transition. When the private sector consists of a small 
number of large firms they tend to build special links to government. 
Those connected firms are happy to support autocratic regimes that 
provide them with protection and other privileges such as access to 
financing, government contracts, and public infrastructure. Thus a sys-
tem of autocracy and crony capitalism grows and tends to perpetuate 
itself. The owners of large businesses have no interest in promoting 
democracy, as it could disrupt their special relations with government. 
In his study of Egypt, Rutherford (2008) argues that autocracy can 
be countered by supporting a large number of small business owners 
who would normally exert pressure to institute legal and institutional 
reforms that would level the playing field and break the link between 
powerful capitalists and autocratic governments. They would also call 
for democratic reforms so as to use electoral politics to push for policy 
reforms to support small businesses.
Most donors have programs to support small and medium-size 
enterprises and youth entrepreneurship, and they need to be refined and 
scaled up. In addition to providing access to financing, those programs 
need to prioritize technology transfer and market access. Vocational 
and entrepreneurship training programs are also important to correct 
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some of the weaknesses of the Arab education system. Successful pro-
grams for the development of small and medium-size enterprises are 
usually based on partnership between governments (that provide fund-
ing), civil society organizations (that provide training), and the orga-
nized private sector (that provides technology and markets). In the case 
of most Arab countries, those partnerships still need to be developed. 
In particular, donors can help connect domestic small and medium-size 
enterprises with foreign investors and export markets.
Access to regional and international markets is important for busi-
ness development and job creation. The international community could 
make a huge contribution to the development of exports and job cre-
ation. It could facilitate exports of manufactured goods from Arab 
countries, especially for mechanical and electrical industries and con-
struction materials, by negotiating mutual recognition agreements to 
reduce technical barriers to trade. Agriculture and agro-processing is 
an important sector for many Arab countries (for example, Morocco, 
Tunisia, and Egypt), and it is also a sector where small and medi-
um-size enterprises could easily develop. The international community 
could improve Arab countries’ access to agricultural markets by remov-
ing nontariff barriers to agricultural trade. This would require, among 
other things, the abolition of quotas, reference prices, and seasonal 
restrictions, especially for exports of fruits and vegetables.5
Support to Backward Regions and the Rural Poor:  
Is It Possible to End Decades of Neglect? 
A strategy to achieve inclusive growth will have to deal with the prob-
lems of regional inequalities and rural poverty. For many years no real 
action has been taken to develop backward regions or support the 
rural poor. This had serious political consequences as some backward 
regions became centers of extremism and sometimes even violence. It 
also had serious social and economic consequences. Illiteracy, child 
malnutrition, and even stunting continue to be unacceptably high in 
rural areas, particularly in Upper Egypt. Intervention is needed in two 
5. For more on the importance of opening up developed country markets to 
Arab country exports, see Chauffour (2013).
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areas: social protection for the rural poor and development of agricul-
ture and agro-industries.
In most Arab countries, social protection has been provided to the 
populations of large cities through a system of untargeted price sub-
sidies. In the rural areas, social protection is usually project based 
and therefore fragmented. There is a need to move to a systems-based 
approach to social protection. Arabs can benefit from Latin Ameri-
ca’s experience in this area, especially Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Mex-
ico’s Progresa-Oportunidades. This experience shows that direct cash 
transfers can be used to achieve poverty reduction as well as develop-
ment objectives. By providing cash to poor families those programs 
help raise their consumption and get them out of poverty. It is a much 
more direct method than generalized price subsidies for products that 
can be consumed by the poor as well as the nonpoor. By making part 
of the transfer conditional on school attendance or immunization the 
programs also encourage investment in human capital and thus help 
achieve long-term development objectives. There is also some evidence 
that recipients of cash transfers in rural areas tend to save part of it and 
use it for investments in productive physical capital.
Agriculture is crucial for many Arab economies and particularly for 
poor households. All of the poor in rural areas are either directly or 
indirectly affected by agriculture. Therefore, agriculture growth and the 
resulting growth in the nonfarm rural economy would have significant 
poverty-reducing effects. It would also have strong equalization effects 
as it reduces the large income gaps between urban and rural areas.
The international community has a great deal of experience in social 
protection and agriculture development and could provide important 
support to achieving inclusive growth through financing and knowl-
edge sharing. The World Bank has done extensive work on social safety 
nets and can support reforms in this area. Several donors are funding 
agriculture development, and UN agencies (mostly the Food and Agri-
culture Organization) are providing technical assistance and knowl-
edge sharing. They could scale up their interventions and focus them 
on supporting smallholder farmers, particularly in the poorest areas.
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h afez Ghanem delivers a thorough assessment of the economic di-
mensions of the  Arab Spring, beginning with political developments 
since the revolutions and the economic impact of changes in legal 
and institutional frameworks.  Arab economies grew at healthy rates 
before the revolts, but the benefits of economic growth were unfairly 
distributed. The politically connected reaped great benefits, while 
educated youth could not find decent jobs, and the poor and middle 
class struggled to make ends meet. 
Ghanem advises the Arab Spring countries to adopt new economic 
policies and programs that enhance inclusiveness, expand the middle 
class, and foster growth in undeveloped regions. Key elements include 
strengthening economic institutions, developing small businesses, re-
forming the education system to better prepare Arab youth for the 
modern labor market, promoting gender equality with the objective 
of raising female labor market participation rates, and setting up pro-
grams for rural and regional development to reduce inequality and 
eliminate extreme poverty.
hafe z ghanem  is vice president for the Middle East and 
North Africa at the World Bank and a nonresident senior fellow in 
Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution. He is 
a former assistant director general of the UN’s Food and Agriculture 
Organization and a former country director at the World Bank. He is 
coauthor of After the Spring: Economic Transitions in the Arab World 
and author of numerous articles on Arab economies.
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